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Abstract

This dissertation explores the meaning of the Civil War in the South by examining white
Southerners’ perceptions of the Army of Tennessee from 1861 to 1930. While scholarship on the
war’s memory is immense and growing, little of this literature examines the memory of the
Confederacy's war effort in the western theater—the area of operations military historians now
deem central to the war's outcome. This project rectifies that oversight by examining white
Southerners’ memory of the Army of Tennessee in the post-war decades. Unlike Robert E. Lee’s
Army of Northern Virginia, the Confederacy’s primary western field army suffered a near
endless string of battlefield defeats and a revolving door of incapable, egotistical, and irascible
commanders. Its wartime record is hardly complimentary to the Lost Cause which insisted on the
martial, moral, and masculine superiority of Confederate officers and soldiers.
An examination into the popular historical memory of the Army of Tennessee reveals
two significant developments that change our understanding of how post-war white Southerners
conceptualized the Confederate war-effort and processed the trauma of defeat. First, despite
historians’ insistence that white Southerners focused their attention and memories on Lee and his
army, the western theater occupies a more prominent place in the post-war Confederate mind
than previously thought. Second, unlike that of the eastern army, the Army of Tennessee’s
memory was constructed in a fragmented manner that allowed for the circumvention of its
wartime record. For the army to maintain both prevalence in Confederate memory and
synchronicity with the Lost Cause narrative of the war, it could not be remembered in the same
holistic manner as “General Lee’s Army.” In focusing their memories on isolated moments,
contingencies, units, or individuals—as opposed to the army as an inclusive institution—exConfederates succeeded in reconciling the army’s record with the Lost Cause.
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Introduction:
The Fragmented Memory of the Army of Tennessee

On May 26, 1900, the Roger Hanson Camp of the United Confederate Veterans and the
Virginia Hanson Chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy convened in Winchester,
Kentucky, to observe Confederate Memorial Day. The date, long recognized in many Southern
states, was selected to commemorate the Army of Tennessee’s surrender to William T. Sherman
at Durham Station, North Carolina, in 1865. Attorney L. H. Bush’s oration was similar to
countless others given by former Rebels and their descendants in the thirty-five years since the
capitulation of the Confederacy’s primary army of the western theater. Confederate soldiers had
been brave and pious, Bush reminded the crowd. They had faced unflinchingly a numerically and
materially superior enemy. They had fought not for the perpetuation or expansion of slavery but
for the principle of states’ rights, and did so with the steadfast support of white Southern women.
We have gathered this day, he went on, to “draw aside the curtain from some of the beautiful
pictures which hang high on memory’s walls. . . . The chiefest [sic] picture in our group of
treasures is the picture of that spotless, that immortal Virginian, the hero of Appomattox, the
ideal of our heart of hearts, for the very sound of the name of Robert Edward Lee fills every true
Southern heart with an indescribable charm.” Lee was not the only Lost Cause idol Bush
invoked; Stonewall Jackson, John Pelham, and Jeb Stuart were all cited as proof of Confederate
martial superiority, valor, manhood, and Christianity. But Bush then reminded his audience of
something memorialists and historians would later forget: “Virginia is not the only State that
weeps for her children that are gone.”1
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Confederate Veteran 8 (1900): 310-12. Hereafter Confederate Veteran will be cited as CV.
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Bush was one of many white Southerners in the postwar decades with a memory of the
Confederate war effort that encompassed more than Robert E. Lee, his army, and the Old
Dominion. In 1866 a popular Southern periodical published a flattering profile of General
Sterling Price, a Confederate cavalryman who had served primarily in the trans-Mississippi
theater. Before chronicling Price’s Civil War career, the author asked his readers: “Who with the
soul of a man, though he be the most unconditional advocate of the Union of the States, can fail
to have his loftiest admiration kindled, in studying the life and characters of such men as Lee,
Jackson, the Johns[t]ons, Beauregard, the Hills, Cleburne, Forrest, and Price?” In these men,
veterans of every theater of the war, “we find Washingtonian dignity and virtue, piety, science,
energy, valor, dash and love of country in most eminent relief.”2
On October 10, 1900, Virginia veteran Claudius Baker Denson spoke before the North
Carolina Division of the United Daughters of the Confederacy in Raleigh. Acknowledging the
powerful role of women in shaping Confederate memory, he told the audience that should the
hundreds of thousands of dead Rebel soldiers rise from their graves their first words would be:
“Thank God for the Daughters of the Confederacy.” He then proceeded to the main topic of his
speech, Jefferson Davis. The Confederate president should be commemorated for many things,
argued Denson: not only his abilities as a soldier, statesmen, and orator, but also his Christian
faith. One of Davis’s greatest achievements, he asserted, was his record as commander in chief.
“It has been well said, ‘Men judge Napoleon by his marshals.’ Judge Jefferson Davis and his
cause by his chosen chieftains.” The great chieftains of the Confederacy, in Denson’s opinion,
were “Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, Albert Sidney Johnston, Joseph E. Johnston, . . . Stuart,
Beauregard, . . . Forrest, . . . Polk, Pender, Longstreet, Hardee, Hampton, . . . Stephen D. Lee,
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The Land We Love 1 (1866): 364. Hereafter The Land We Love will be cited as TLWL.
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Hood, . . . Cleburne, . . . Gordon, . . . Pickett—where shall we pause in the role of the
immortals?”3
Six years later, Army of Northern Virginia veteran James Britton Gannt gave a speech in
New Orleans at the sixteenth annual reunion of the United Confederate Veterans. With a
nationwide reconciliatory spirit gaining ascendency in the years following the Spanish American
War, Gannt assured the men in his audience that their conduct in the Civil War had earned them
the North’s admiration. It was not only the veterans of Gannt’s army who had impressed the
Yankees, he said, but also those who had served in the Army of Tennessee. “[T]he men who rode
with Forrest . . . and Wheeler, and those that charged with Hood and Cleburne, and Stewart and
Cheatham . . . at Franklin and Nashville, and who, under Bragg at Chickamauga and Joseph E.
Johnston from Chattanooga to Atlanta, won imperishable glory.”4
Despite these examples and a multitude of others that could be cited, historians have long
argued or implied that white Southern memory of the Confederate military experience was
narrowly focused on Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia. However, for those who
lived through the Civil War and to a lesser extent their descendants, this was not true. The Army
of Tennessee, despite its lackluster wartime record, occupied a prominent place in postwar white
Southern memory. This is not to argue that Lee was not the former Confederacy’s most popular
hero; he most certainly was. As the only truly brilliant army commander the South fielded during
the war, he stood foremost in the Rebel pantheon.5
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C. B. Denson, Address of Captain C. B. Denson, upon the Invitation of the Daughters of the Confederacy of North
Carolina, Delivered before the State Chapter, U.D.C., in Raleigh, October 10, 1900 (no place: no publisher, 1900),
7.
4
Minutes of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting and Reunion of the United Confederate Veterans, Held in the City of New
Orleans, LA. on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, April 25th, 26th and 27th, 1906 (New Orleans: Schumert and
Warfield, 1906), 42.
5
Gary W. Gallagher, The Confederate War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997), 8-11;
Gary W. Gallagher, Lee and His Generals in War and Memory (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1998), 3-20; Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate Nation: 1861-1865 (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 282;
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After the war, the image of Lee and his army was especially suited to embody multiple
aspects of the rapidly developing myth of the Lost Cause—a narrative of the Confederate
experience that developed as a result of the South’s defeat in the war. Numerous historians have
analyzed the origin, evolution, and legacy of the Lost Cause. While acknowledging that the myth
was neither monolithic nor static, most believe it is best conceptualized as a collection of
convictions or tenets: states’ rights, not slavery, was the foundational ideal of the Confederacy;
secession was a legal and justified response to Northern domination of the federal government;
Confederate soldiers and generals, especially Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, were
martially and spiritually superior to their Yankee counterparts; the war was lost solely because of
the Union’s numerical and material advantages; the Old South was an idyllic society destroyed
by the war; and the Confederate homefront had consisted of contented slaves and white women
who fully supported the war effort. In constructing the story of the Lost Cause, white
Southerners performed what historian David Goldfield calls “mental alchemy” on the history of
the Civil War: “they spun the straw of defeat into a golden mantle of victory. Not that they
refused to accept the verdict of the war—the end of slavery and of southern independence—but
they rejected the idea of defeat and the guilt such a result implied.”6

Caroline E. Janney, Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2013), 18.
6
David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 2001), 34; Janney, Remembering the Civil War, 134; Karen L. Cox, Dixie’s Daughters: The
United Daughters of the Confederacy and the Preservation of Confederate Culture (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 2003), 1-2; Gaines M. Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the
New South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 4-8, 120-22; Thomas L. Connelly and Barbara Bellows,
God and General Longstreet: The Lost Cause and the Southern Mind (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1982), 4-5, 119-24; Gary W. Gallagher, Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten: How Hollywood and Popular Art
Shape What We Know about the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 17-24; Alan T.
Nolan, “Anatomy of the Myth,” in The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History, eds. Gary W. Gallagher and
Alan T. Nolan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 11-31; W. Stuart Towns, Enduring Legacy: Rhetoric
and Ritual of the Lost Cause (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2012), x-xi, 72-84; Keith D. Dickson,
Sustaining Southern Identity: Douglas Southall Freeman and Memory in the Modern South (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 2011), 226; Stephen W. Berry, All That Makes a Man: Love and Ambition in the
Civil War South (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 9; LeeAnn Whites, The Civil War as a Crisis in
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The Lost Cause myth helped white Southerners cope with the trauma of defeat. It did so
by providing a public memory that confirmed the white South’s cultural convictions. It justified
white supremacy as well as gender and class hierarchy. In a society that equated bravery and
battlefield prowess with manhood, it assured the defeated Rebel soldiers that they were still men.
It provided a sympathetic, escapist, and pious narrative that would, with time, give the white
South substantial influence over national history and memory and a way to cope with the threat
of industrialization and secularism. It was a story that perfectly suited the white South in the
postwar decades. As historian Michael Kammen points out, “societies . . . reconstruct their pasts
rather than faithfully record them, and . . . they do so with the needs of contemporary culture
clearly in mind—manipulating the past in order to mold the present.” The post-Civil War white
South was no exception.7
It is perhaps understandable that historians have assumed, and at times insisted, that the
white South always centered its memories of the war on Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia.
As W. Fitzhugh Brundage notes, “campaigns to remember the past by exorcising parts of it have
occurred in many times and places. Within collective memories a dialect exists between the
willfully recalled and deliberately forgotten.” It is not unreasonable to assume that Lee and his
army would have been “willfully recalled,” while other, less successful Confederate commanders

Gender: Augusta, Georgia, 1860-1890 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993), 3; David Goldfield, Still
Fighting the Civil War: The American South and Southern History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
2004), 19.
7
Blight, Race and Reunion, 65, 258; Janney, Remembering the Civil War, 154; Caroline E. Janney, Burying the
Dead but Not the Past: Ladies Memorial Associations and the Lost Cause (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2008), 3; William Blair, Cities of the Dead: Contesting the Memory of the Civil War in the South,
1865-1914 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 4, 131; Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy, 28,
35, 142-43; Connelly and Bellows, God and General Longstreet, 10, 13, 27; Kirk Savage, Standing Soldiers,
Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in Nineteenth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1997), 167-77; Charles Reagan Wilson, Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the Lost Cause, 1865-1920 (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1980), 14-17; Sarah H. Case, “The Historical Ideology of Mildred Lewis Rutherford: A
Confederate Historian’s New South Creed,” Journal of Southern History 68 (2002): 601; Michael Kammen, Mystic
Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 3.
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and armies would be “deliberately forgotten.” However, a close look at the evidence
documenting the white South’s public memory in the six decades or so after the war—which is
what this dissertation offers—shows that the Army of Tennessee was not forgotten.8
This dissertation argues for the prominence (but not the primacy) of the Army of
Tennessee in Confederate memory. Moreover, it reveals that the Army of Tennessee’s memory
was constructed, quite unlike that of the Army of Northern Virginia, in a fragmented manner that
allowed for the circumvention of its actual wartime record. In focusing their memories on
certain moments, contingencies, units, and individuals in the Army of Tennessee’s experience,
rather than its dismal record as a whole, postwar white Southerners managed to reconcile the
story of that army with the tenets of the Lost Cause.
Chapter one of this dissertation is a narrative overview of the army’s wartime operations.
Each of the four succeeding chapters examines a specific fragment of the memory of the army.
Chapter two looks at the postwar image of the army’s first commander, Albert Sidney Johnston,
who ascended to the highest echelon of Lost Cause idols. His untimely death won him a
universal popularity that was denied his successors and his passing became one of the most
significant contingencies in Confederate memory—one that proved therapeutic for a society
wrestling with the trauma of defeat. Chapter three focuses on the memory of the high command.
In remembering the army’s generals white Southerners constructed four archetypes that
circumvented defeat and confirmed Lost Cause convictions: the scapegoat, the unappreciated
military genius, the genteel man of faith, and the hyper-masculine anti-hero. Chapter four is
about the men of the army, as remembered both collectively (as units) and individually. This
memory looked past the army’s sorry record as a whole to celebrate the bravery, piety, nobility,

8

W. Fitzhugh Brundage, The Southern Past: A Clash of Race and Memory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2005), 5.
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and military prowess of selected soldiers and units and thus told a story of victory rather than
defeat. Chapter five examines particular moments and contingencies in the army’s history that
white Southerners pointed to when explaining defeat or proclaiming their cultural and martial
superiority over the Yankees. Chapter six, unlike its predecessors, is concerned with forgetting.
While the Army of Tennessee enjoyed prominence in postwar memory for several decades, by
the 1930s Lee, Jackson, and the Army of Northern Virginia had wholly displaced it. A number of
factors, some incidental and some the result of human agency, led to the banishment of the Army
of Tennessee from the realm of memory.

7

Chapter One:
Failure in the Heartland:
Wartime Operations of the Army of Tennessee

In the waning days of the Civil War, the Army of Tennessee—the Confederacy’s primary
army in the western theater—held its final grand review. Encamped around Smithfield, North
Carolina, it was a shadow of its former self. Years of campaigning, a nearly unbroken string of
battlefield defeats, and a revolving door of incapable, egotistical, and irascible commanders had
wrecked the army. This sad state of affairs was not lost on its soldiers. B. L. Ridley, a staff
officer, observed the review with a heavy heart. “I witnessed to-day the saddest spectacle of my
life,” he wrote in his journal, “the review of the skeleton Army of Tennessee.” It “filed by with
tattered garments, worn out shoes, barefooted, and ranks so depleted that each color was
supported by only thirty or forty men.” This stood in sharp contrast to the condition of the army
just one year before when it was encamped in Dalton, Georgia, looking to the coming campaign
with renewed confidence. Now devastated by “desertion, sickness, deaths, hardships, perils and
vicissitudes,” the army in its final review “looked like a funeral procession. The countenance of
every spectator . . . was depressed and dejected. . . . Oh! It is beginning to look dark in the east,
gloomy in the west, and almost a lost hope when we reflect upon that review of to-day!”1
Although the Army of Tennessee would not be permanently named that until November
1862, its genesis lay in the formation of the Provisional Army of Tennessee, organized by
Governor Isham G. Harris in spring 1861 and commanded by Gideon J. Pillow. The state army’s
life was short; in July it was turned over to the Confederate government. Over the next several

1

Bromfield L. Ridley, Battles and Sketches of the Army of Tennessee (Mexico, Missouri: Missouri Printing and
Publishing, 1906), 456.

8

months this force fought as part of a larger army operating under a number of titles, including the
Army of the West and the Army of Mississippi.2
From the war’s outset the army faced a daunting task. Its theater of operations stretched
four hundred miles from east to west and encompassed 225,600 square miles—ten times the size
of the Virginia theater. In further contrast to Virginia, rivers in the west generally flowed north to
south or south to north, serving as avenues of invasion as opposed to natural defensive barriers;
and, too, the region’s rail network was less developed. Early in the war, western commands
struggled to arm their soldiers; later they struggled to equip them with modern arms. Even in the
war’s last year, 11 percent of the infantrymen were fighting with smoothbore muskets.
Furthermore, because the Confederate government focused on defending Richmond, its capital, it
often neglected the western theater. At any given time the Army of Tennessee typically numbered
twenty to twenty-five thousand fewer men than Lee’s army.3
The army’s high command also suffered by comparison with the Army of Northern
Virginia. Not only had fewer of its generals served in the antebellum army or militia, but fewer
of its officers had college or military education. Also unlike Lee’s force, the Army of Tennessee
was constantly embroiled in political squabbles involving Confederate president Jefferson Davis.
Of its five commanders, two—Albert Sidney Johnston and Braxton Bragg—had the unyielding
support of their friend Davis. Arguably a third, John Bell Hood, could be added to the list.

Following Thomas L. Connelly’s lead, to avoid confusion I will refer to it throughout this dissertation as the Army
of Tennessee. See Thomas L. Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1967), xiv; Richard McMurry, Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate
Military History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 73-86.
3
Connelly, Army of the Heartland, xi; Stephen E. Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of
Confederate Command in the West (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), xii, 21-22, 54; Larry J. Daniel,
Soldiering in the Army of Tennessee: A Portrait of Life in a Confederate Army (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1991), 44-47; McMurry, Two Great Rebel Armies, 14-16, 26-29, 56; Bradley R. Clampitt, The
Confederate Heartland: Military and Civilian Morale in the Western Confederacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 2011), 2.
2
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However, two others—Joseph E. Johnston and P. G. T. Beauregard—were among the
administration’s harshest critics and feuded incessantly with Davis. Suffering repeated
battlefield defeats, all these generals found themselves at odds with pro- or anti-administration
political blocs within the Confederacy. The Army of Northern Virginia, with its numerous
victories and universally revered commander, was free of such liabilities. Furthermore, from the
war’s beginning the Army of Tennessee had to face at the very least capable, and often superb,
federal commanders.4
While the Army of Tennessee’s soldiery was in most ways like that of its counterpart in
Virginia, it did have a distinctive character. The typical soldier in the west was poorer, less
educated, more egalitarian, and less disciplined than he who fought in Virginia. If the higher rate
of venereal disease in the western army is any indication, its troops were also more susceptible to
temptation. At one point the army’s chaplains, convinced they were fighting an unwinnable war
against vice, considered resigning in mass. Some men of the cloth went so far as to argue that
the army’s lack of piety in the ranks, especially when compared to its sister army, was the
primary cause of the battlefield defeats.5
In the war’s early months the army, commanded by Albert Sidney Johnston, was tasked
with shielding the Confederacy from invasion along the Tennessee-Kentucky border. However,
after Union forces captured Forts Henry and Donelson, the army was forced to abandon this line
of defense and retreat, eventually consolidating with other Confederate forces at Corinth,
Mississippi. The people of the Confederacy expected great things from Johnston, and these

4

McMurry, Two Great Rebel Armies, 34-43, 98-105, 109-115.
Daniel, Soldiering in the Army of Tennessee, 12-15, 99; G. Clinton Prim Jr., “Born Again in the Trenches: Revivals
in the Army of Tennessee,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 43 (1984): 251; Traci Nichols-Belt, “Chaplains in the
Army of Tennessee, C.S.A.: Warring Disciples Carrying the Gospel,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 63 (2004):
239-40.
5
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setbacks hurt his public image. (Johnston’s reputation and role early in the war will be explored
in chapter two.)6
Hoping to reverse the army’s fortunes, Johnston planned a surprise attack against Ulysses
S. Grant’s federal army encamped at Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee. While this strategy was
Johnston’s decision, the specific battle plan was the brainchild of P. G. T. Beauregard, his
recently arrived second-in-command. Born into a Creole family in Louisiana and trained at West
Point, Beauregard had served with distinction as an engineer in the Mexican War. In command
of successful Confederate operations at Fort Sumter and the Battle of Manassas, he emerged as
the South’s first military hero. He eventually butted heads with President Davis, however, and
was consequently sidelined for much of the war. In fact, it was likely his conflict with Davis,
even more than the government’s desire to salvage the war in the west, that prompted
Beauregard’s transfer from the east. Regardless, his arrival in the west was hailed
enthusiastically by soldiers and civilians.7
An ardent admirer and emulator of Napoleon, Beauregard devised a plan that was overly
complex, especially for an untested army. Moreover, it was markedly different from what
Johnston had envisioned and communicated to Davis. Beauregard also seemed to lose
confidence in his own designs and, on the eve of battle, advocated calling off the attack,

6

The best treatments of the Forts Henry and Donelson Campaign are Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Forts Henry and
Donelson: The Key to the Confederate Heartland (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988), and Stephen D.
Engle, Struggle for the Heartland: The Campaigns from Fort Henry to Corinth (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2001).
7
Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 129-130; Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals, 72-78; McMurry, Two
Great Rebel Armies, 121-22. Beauregard’s sole scholarly biography is T. Harry Williams, P. G. T. Beauregard:
Napoleon in Gray (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1955). For a balanced assessment of his wartime
generalship see Charles P. Roland, “P. G. T. Beauregard,” in Leaders of the Lost Cause: New Perspectives on the
Confederate High Command, eds. Gary W. Gallagher and Joseph T. Glatthaar (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania:
Stackpole Books, 2004), 43-69.
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convinced that Grant was aware of the Confederate’s approach. Johnston would hear none of it,
and the attack commenced.8
The Battle of Shiloh initially went well for the Confederates, but the initiative slowly
slipped from their grasp. Although the enemy army was surprised, most of Johnston’s men were
novice soldiers lacking the training, discipline, and combat experience necessary to continue the
attack. Union resistance stiffened, Johnston was killed in action, and Beauregard soon ordered
his forces to halt. Confident that his army would defeat Grant’s force the following morning,
Beauregard informed Richmond that he had achieved victory. But that night Grant received
reinforcements and prepared to go on the offensive at daybreak. Beauregard, failing to
appreciate his own army’s disorganization and the growing strength of the Union forces, made
few preparations. The next day, the Rebels resisted strongly but were ultimately unable to repel
Grant’s attack. Beauregard ordered a withdrawal.9
The army retreated to Corinth and eventually to Tupelo, thus surrendering fifteen
thousand square miles of territory to Union control. Plagued by a chronic throat ailment,
Beauregard took an unapproved medical leave and turned command temporarily over to corps
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Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 157; Earl J. Hess, The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the
Appalachians to the Mississippi (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012) , 45; Bruce S. Hass,
“Beauregard and the Image of Napoleon,” Louisiana History 5 (1964): 185-86; John R. Lunderg, “‘I must save this
army’: Albert Sidney Johnston and the Shiloh Campaign,” in The Shiloh Campaign, ed. Stephen E. Woodworth
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2009), 19-21; Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals, 9697.
9
Timothy B. Smith, Shiloh: Conquer or Perish (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 247; Hess, Civil War
in the West, 46-48; Daniel, Soldiering in the Army of Tennessee, 150; Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 171;
Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals, 102-104; Grady McWhiney, “General Beauregard’s ‘Complete
Victory’ at Shiloh: An Interpretation,” Journal of Southern History 49 (1983): 433. Smith’s book is the best analysis
of Shiloh to date; other strong works are Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh: The Battle that Changed the Civil War (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1997); Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside, 1974); and James Lee
McDonough, Shiloh: In Hell Before Midnight (Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1977). On the battle’s
effects on soldiers see Joseph A. Frank and George A. Reaves, “Seeing the Elephant”: Raw Recruits at the Battle of
Shiloh (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989). T. Harry Williams defends Beauregard’s generalship at Shiloh in
his biography and “Beauregard at Shiloh,” Civil War History 1 (1955): 17-34. For a more negative assessment of the
general’s role see, Wiley Sword, “General G. T. Beauregard’s Role at the Battle of Shiloh: Hero or Villain?,” in
Confederate Generals in the Western Theater, eds. Lawrence Lee Hewitt and Arthur W. Bergeron Jr. (3 vols. to
date, Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 2011), 3: 39-59.
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commander Braxton Bragg. President Davis, long dissatisfied with Beauregard and now
persuaded that the defeat at Shiloh was his fault, relieved him and placed Bragg in permanent
command.10
A North Carolinian of humble origins, Bragg too was a graduate of West Point and a
veteran of the Mexican War. Unlike Beauregard, however, he enjoyed Jefferson Davis’s favor.
Methodical, gruff, and prickly, Bragg would command the Army of Tennessee longer than any
other general. His insistence on strict discipline and thorough training did not endear him to the
rank and file but it did help the army maintain cohesion through the remainder of the war.
Although he was an ardent patriot and a capable strategist, Bragg lacked the ability to inspire his
lieutenants and soldiers and displayed severe deficiencies as a field commander; in battle, he
often seemed disengaged and indecisive.11
In the fall of 1862 Bragg’s army joined that of Edmund Kirby Smith in an invasion of
Kentucky. Happy to be on the offensive, the army was in good spirits and Bragg was confident
the tide would soon turn in the west. Moreover, the rapid Confederate advance caught Union
forces off guard. But Bragg’s supply and communication lines became more tenuous the more
deeply he advanced into the Bluegrass State, and he confronted a numerically superior Union
army under General Don Carlos Buell. Worst of all, disputes between Bragg and Smith led to
the two forces operating independently of one another.12
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Further complicating matters was the army’s command structure. Bragg divided his force
into two wings commanded by Leonidas Polk and William J. Hardee. At the time this seemed a
wise decision, for both generals were West Pointers and had solid reputations as leaders.
However, the two were prickly personalities in their own right, exerted a poisonous influence on
the army for the duration of the war, and would display insubordination inconceivable in other
Civil War armies.13
Dubbed “the Fighting Bishop,” Leonidas Polk in fact had little aptitude for military
affairs. The North Carolinian had resigned from the army just months following his graduation
from West Point to pursue a calling to the Episcopal clergy—and thus did not serve in the
Mexican War as did many of his comrades of equal rank. Had it not been for the Civil War, Polk
would likely have spent the remainder of his life as an educator (he cofounded the University of
the South) and man of the cloth. But with the outbreak of hostilities he offered his services to his
old West Point classmate and friend, Jefferson Davis, who immediately bestowed on Polk
responsibilities beyond his talents. Perhaps confident in Davis’s protection, Polk rarely hesitated
to criticize and disobey his superiors and had a penchant for submitting his resignation whenever
he felt slighted.14
Georgian William J. Hardee also had an undeserved nickname. “Old Reliable” had
studied military tactics in Europe following his education at West Point and served with

University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 22, 68. See also Lawrence Lee Hewitt, “Braxton Bragg and the Confederate
Invasion of Kentucky in 1862,” in Leadership During the Civil War: The 1989 Deep Delta Civil War Symposium:
Themes in Honor of T. Harry Williams, eds. Roman J. Heleniak and Lawrence Lee Hewitt (Shippensburg,
Pennsylvania: White Mane Publishing, 1992), 55-72. Noe’s book is the most comprehensive study of Perryville to
date. Another strong work is James L. McDonough, War in Kentucky: From Shiloh to Perryville (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1994).
13
Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 223.
14
Ibid., 47; Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals, 26-29. For a biographical treatment of Polk, see Joseph
H. Parks, Leonidas Polk, C.S.A.: The Fighting Bishop (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962). See
also Grady McWhiney, Confederate Crackers and Cavaliers (Abilene, Texas: State House Press, 2002), 209-21.

14

distinction in the Mexican War before returning to his alma matter as commandant of cadets.
While teaching at the Academy he authored what became the most popular infantry manual of
the era, Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics (generally called Hardee’s Tactics). Although this
publication brought him acclaim, it was merely a regurgitation of what he had read while in
France. Like Polk, Hardee found himself with great military responsibilities soon after secession.
Twice in the ensuing years he was offered command of the Army of Tennessee and twice he
refused, leading historians to surmise that he feared responsibility. Hardee and Polk formed the
nucleus of an anti-Bragg bloc that disrupted command relations in the Army of Tennessee.15
On October 8, 1862, Bragg fought a clumsy battle at Perryville, Kentucky, against Buell.
Unsure of the enemy’s strength, Bragg attacked an isolated wing of Buell’s army, forcing it to
retreat nearly two miles. Thanks to a curious “acoustic shadow” the remainder of Buell’s army
was unaware that a battle had commenced. However, despite this tactical success, Bragg could
not maintain the initiative and as the federal force began receiving reinforcements he ordered a
retreat into east Tennessee—over the protests of some of his lieutenants. There Bragg’s force
was reorganized, joined by other Confederate forces in the region, and renamed the Army of
Tennessee.16
Polk and Hardee, although themselves at least partly responsible for the Perryville defeat,
now commenced anti-Bragg machinations in earnest. Polk, via a secret correspondence with
influential figures in Richmond, criticized Bragg’s leadership and urged his removal from
command. In November he took these complaints directly to Davis, who ignored them for now.
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Meanwhile, Hardee did what he could to denigrate the commander within the officer corps.
Bragg’s reputation among the rank and file and the civilian population also began to decline.
Moreover, due to Davis’s support of Bragg, the general became the target of anti-administration
politicians and presses.17
In addition to political intrigue, the army underwent a flurry of reorganization. In an
effort to improve his cavalry, Bragg appointed Joseph Wheeler to command it. In doing so he
passed over the more experienced and accomplished Nathan Bedford Forrest. Born into poverty
in rural Tennessee, Forrest made a fortune selling slaves and real estate and became one of the
wealthiest men of the Old South. He had no prewar military training or experience but revealed a
natural aptitude for war and through his skillful reconnaissance and raiding became an invaluable
asset to the Confederacy. Oftentimes his relatively small-scale victories offset, in the minds of
Confederates, more strategically significant defeats. But his volatile and often violent temper,
coupled with his lack of military decorum, led to numerous conflicts with his superiors and
lieutenants.18
Deeming Forrest’s lack of military training a liability, Bragg turned to the West Pointeducated Wheeler, who shared Bragg’s fondness for drill. Only twenty-six years old in 1862,
Wheeler was a gifted writer and exceptional self-promoter. He had a cordial personal
relationship with Bragg and remained loyal to him—an increasingly rare phenomena in the upper
ranks of the Army of Tennessee. Although Wheeler’s early career was unexceptional, and he

17

Thomas L. Connelly, Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1971), 20-23; Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals, 160-61, 165-66; McMurry, Two
Great Rebel Armies, 134.
18
Clampitt, Confederate Heartland, 21-23, 35-37, 64-65. The best analyses of Forrest’s life are Brian Steel Wills, A
Battle from the Start: The Life of Nathan Bedford Forrest (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), and Jack Hurst,
Nathan Bedford Forrest: A Biography (New York: Knopf, 1993).

16

turned out not to be the disciplinarian Bragg hoped, the young Georgian became one of the war’s
more capable cavalry commanders.19
While Bragg restructured his army, the War Department interceded in the Rebel war
effort in the west. The failure in Kentucky indicated deficiencies in the Confederate command
structure. Many, including Davis, believed that if Bragg and Smith had been forced to cooperate
the campaign could have succeeded. To avoid repetition the president now appointed a theater
commander to direct the various forces operating in the Confederate heartland. The only two
generals with rank commensurate with the responsibility were Beauregard and Joseph E.
Johnston. The former was still persona non grata in the Davis administration and thus the latter
was appointed on November 24.20
Another West Pointer and Mexican War veteran, Virginian Joseph E. Johnston was
quartermaster general of the U.S. Army at the Civil War’s outbreak. The highest ranking officer
to resign his commission to enter Confederate service, he expected to be the senior officer in the
Confederate army, and was chagrined when Davis commissioned others ahead of him. The
president justified this decision by pointing out that Johnston had been a staff officer as opposed
to a field commander. And thus began a decades-long feud. Nevertheless, Johnston, along with
Beauregard, emerged as one of the South’s first heroes due to the victory at First Manassas in
1861. Until his wounding at Seven Pines in May 1862, Johnston commanded in Virginia, where
he consistently retreated in the face of larger Union forces. Seemingly paralyzed on occasion by
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fear of failure, Johnston could be prideful, secretive, paranoid, and jealous. Nevertheless, on
assuming command in the west, he enjoyed a superb, if undeserved, reputation.21
What he lacked was clear authority. So ambiguous was his mandate that Johnston
believed his promotion to theater command was part of Davis’s effort to keep him out of the war.
Individual commanders under Johnston, including Bragg, were allowed to communicate directly
with the War Department and were under no obligation to keep the theater commander apprised
of their location or plans. Moreover, when Johnston failed to do what Davis wanted—such as
dispatching troops from Bragg’s army to Vicksburg—the president sometimes did so himself.
Johnston chafed under these conditions and from the first day of his command petitioned
Richmond for reassignment. Indeed, Johnston played no meaningful part in the Army of
Tennessee’s forthcoming campaign.22
Attempting to protect Chattanooga, Bragg dug in at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and
awaited the arrival of William Rosecrans’s Union Army of the Cumberland. However, because
his cavalry was mismanaged, Bragg was ignorant of Rosecrans’s location and route of advance
and thus had to widely disperse his army.23
The ensuing Battle of Murfreesboro was rife with command confusion. It began on
December 31, when Bragg struck the approaching federals, forcing their right flank back.
Although some of Bragg’s subordinates failed to execute their orders, the battle seemed
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promising at first. Bragg hoped to interdict the Union supply line, forcing Rosecrans to retreat.
However, the Confederate momentum could not be sustained and by nightfall the armies had
disengaged and were eyeing each other from their trenches. Assuming that Rosecrans would
retreat in the night, Bragg telegraphed Richmond that he had achieved a great victory. But when
the new year dawned the Union army was still on the field. On January 2, Bragg tried to regain
the initiative, but to no avail. With the concurrence of Hardee and Polk, he ordered a retreat to
Tullahoma, Tennessee. There the Army of Tennessee remained until summer.24
Meanwhile the army’s internal feuding continued unabated. Bragg’s popularity, shaken
by Perryville, crumbled following Murfreesboro. As always, Polk and Hardee led the charge
against their commander. Bragg did himself no favors by issuing multiple circulars to determine
if he still held the army’s confidence. Hardee and his division commanders responded
emphatically in the negative; Polk—a shrewder politician—dodged the question while still
secretly advocating Bragg’s removal to friends in Richmond. Even Bragg’s own staff, when
confronted with the question, advised him to resign.25
Jefferson Davis now stepped in, ordering Johnston to Tullahoma to deal with the discord.
Again, however, Davis gave his theater commander ambiguous instructions. It was implied that,
if necessary, Johnston should assume direct command of the army, but he had no clear authority
to remove Bragg. Johnston was in an awkward position. He was unhappy with his current
position and craved a field command, but he had no desire to be associated with the anti-Bragg
coalition, for it offended his sense of military decorum. In fact he seemed rather sympathetic
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toward Bragg, arguing that the army’s recent campaigns had been handled with skill given the
circumstances. Consequently, Johnston conducted a half-hearted investigation, concluding that
although the army’s confidence in Bragg was shaken he should retain his command.
Unsurprisingly, reports of the army’s instability continued to pour into Richmond. Davis
therefore ordered Johnston to take command of the army. Concerned for his reputation, however,
and physically unwell, Johnston declined. Johnston’s feeble intervention in the Army of
Tennessee’s feud had managed to alienate both sides. Polk and Hardee were miffed at his
refusal to join their conspiracy, while his mere presence was an affront to Bragg’s honor.26
Bragg, unaware of the extent of disaffection in the army’s high command, fired back at
his enemies. In doing so, he alienated more officers, including two who were especially popular
and influential. Kentuckian John C. Breckinridge, one of Hardee’s division commanders, was
criticized in Bragg’s reports for poor generalship during the Kentucky invasion and at
Murfreesboro. Breckinridge had had a long career in politics, serving in the House of
Representatives before becoming James Buchanan’s vice president and subsequently a senator.
As the Southern Democratic presidential candidate in the 1860 election, he emerged victorious in
nine of the eleven states that became the Confederacy. These political credentials, more than any
military acumen, led to his commission. Although his war record was unremarkable, he had
influential friends in Richmond and great popularity among troops and officers from the Upper
South. Bragg, nevertheless, succeed in temporarily removing him from the army. 27
Tennessean Benjamin F. Cheatham also found himself in Bragg’s crosshairs. The
wealthy Mexican War veteran had had great success in the antebellum years as a politician in
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California and the Volunteer State. After the war’s outbreak, he quickly earned a reputation as
an egalitarian, profane, hard-drinking, and aggressive general. One of Polk’s division
commanders, Cheatham was accused of drunkenness at Murfreesboro. Whether the charge was
true or not, Cheatham’s drinking was common knowledge and his unprofessional demeanor
made him a natural enemy of Bragg. While his tactical skill was questionable, he was a bold
fighter and wielded considerable influence within the army—especially among Tennesseans.
While Bragg did raise questions about Cheatham’s character and generalship, he failed to get
him removed and did not damage his popularity with the troops.28
Conflicts in the high command were not the army’s only problems as the spring of 1863
approached. Confederate prospects at Vicksburg deteriorated, forcing Bragg to dispatch 11,500
men to Mississippi. Furthermore, Johnston’s ambiguous position continued to confuse Rebel
strategy. Transferred to Mississippi, he subsequently insisted that Bragg’s army was no longer
under his jurisdiction; Davis and the War Department, however, continued to regard him as
theater commander. Consequently, Johnston—who had previously urged reinforcing Bragg—
began neglecting the Army of Tennessee. Johnston’s terse, pessimistic communications with
Richmond during this period did nothing to improve his standing with Davis. Moreover, Bragg’s
efforts to get reinforcements from elsewhere failed.29
Unsurprisingly, the Army of Tennessee again retreated. Rosecrans moved against
Tullahoma, and due to the confusing road network, lack of communication in the high command,
and misuse of cavalry and scouts Bragg was again uncertain of Rosecrans’s route. Command
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problems affected not only the infantry but also the cavalry. Wheeler, commanding the army’s
horsemen, was more interested in conducting flashy raids than reconnoitering or hampering
Rosecrans’s advance. Bragg had other cavalry at his disposal, but for a number of reasons these
commands were little help. The famous raider John Hunt Morgan, primarily concerned with
getting his name in the papers, showed little interest in following orders. Earl Van Dorn,
temporarily attached to Bragg’s command, was dead before the campaign began—shot by a
jealous husband. By this stage of the war Bragg’s best cavalryman, Forrest, had quarreled
bitterly with numerous officers, including a hot-tempered lieutenant who shot the general in his
own headquarters, putting him temporarily out of action.30
Worse, Bragg declined to share his plans with his lieutenants, for he now thoroughly
distrusted them. Moreover, when it came time to act he balked, repeatedly reversing his own
orders. Consequently, in a near bloodless campaign Rosecrans maneuvered his army into
positions that forced Bragg to retreat eastward to Chattanooga. Bragg thus surrendered middle
Tennessee and north Alabama to Union occupiers with almost no opposition.31
Meanwhile low morale, desertion, and illness were wreaking havoc on the army and on
Bragg’s ability to formulate strategy and conduct operations. The army underwent a flurry of
changes while in Chattanooga. Johnston’s ambiguous office of theater command was abolished
and his influence on the Army of Tennessee, nominal as it may have been, ceased for a few
months. Much to Bragg’s delight, Hardee was transferred—a mixed blessing, for while Hardee’s
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insubordination hampered the army, he was the general with the most knowledge of the region’s
terrain, an asset Bragg would desperately need in the coming months.32
Hardee’s replacement, Daniel Harvey Hill, had a short tenure with the Army of
Tennessee. However, as a postwar writer and editor he had considerable influence on Civil War
memory. Born in South Carolina, he was a West Point graduate and Mexican War veteran.
Serving in Virginia for the war’s first two years, he earned a reputation as an aggressive
commander. However, his bouts with depression, his religious zealotry, and his fierce sense of
pride alienated many officers in Lee’s army. Unsurprisingly, from their first meeting Hill’s
relationship with Bragg was strained and the anti-Bragg coalition welcomed him with open
arms.33
Once again, by shrewd maneuvering, Rosecrans forced Bragg to abandon his position.
The Army of Tennessee retreated into north Georgia and the Union army occupied Chattanooga.
Both commanders craved battle following the city’s fall. Rosecrans had captured much territory
but had still not destroyed the Army of Tennessee; Bragg was desperate to turn the tide in the
west and recapture Chattanooga. As Rosecrans’s army moved south out of the city it divided to
travel on parallel roads. Bragg saw an opportunity to attack and defeat it in detail. However, the
mutual lack of confidence between the commander and his lieutenants prevented him from
seizing the advantage and three times he missed the chance to pounce on one of Rosecrans’s
isolated columns. Thus, Bragg faced a united federal army when he clashed with Rosecrans on
September 19, 1863, along Chickamauga Creek.34
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A number of factors besides its outcome made the Battle Chickamauga an exceptional
engagement for the Army of Tennessee. Having received reinforcements, the army fought with
numerical superiority for the only time in its history. Moreover, most of these reinforcements
came from Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. Bragg, Johnston, and Davis had long
desired such a troop transfer, but Lee’s reputation and active operations prevented it until the fall
of 1863. Now, for the first time in the war, the Confederacy conducted a rapid inter-theater
transfer of troops to gain local numerical superiority.35
These reinforcements were commanded by James Longstreet, Lee’s senior corps
commander. Along with thousands of soldiers and many capable officers, Longstreet brought to
the west immense prestige, an air of confidence, and more than a little ambition. A West Point
graduate and veteran of the Mexican War, he had a superb reputation as Lee’s second in
command. That reputation suffered after the war, but in 1863 he was considered one of the
South’s finest generals. Aware of the army’s internal problems, he likely hoped to replace
Bragg.36
When the battle commenced on September 19, Longstreet and many of his men had not
yet arrived on the field. Consequently, that day was like many others in the army’s history.
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Bragg, distrustful of his generals, issued few orders to them and those he did issue were vague,
poorly conceptualized, and often reversed. His corps commanders, for their part, showed little
initiative. Thus the army barely held its own on the nineteenth and the sole Confederate success
that day resulted from the individual initiative of a division commander, Alexander P. Stewart,
who was frustrated with the indecision and lack of communication in the high command.37
Stewart was a West Point graduate and he became Tennessee’s highest ranking
Confederate general but in the prewar years he had been a math and science professor. This
respite from the military apparently did no lasting harm to his martial abilities, for by 1863 he
had established himself as one of the most reliable division commanders in the army. At
Chickamauga, while his superiors sat idle, Stewart marched his men to the heart of the battle,
ordered his brigades to attack, and broke through the center of the Union line. Unfortunately his
superiors failed to exploit this success; none of his fellow division commanders came to his
support, and a good opportunity was squandered.38
Despite brutal fighting, the first day of Chickamauga was inconclusive. As night fell the
armies remained on the field, preparing to resume battle in the morning. Luckily for the Rebels,
Longstreet arrived during the night with more reinforcements. Bragg, however, went to bed
without sending any guides to Longstreet, who therefore had to rely on local citizens and the
sound of gunfire to find his way to the field. With Longstreet on hand, Bragg divided his army
into two wings commanded by Polk and Longstreet and ordered the former to attack at dawn.
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But the “Fighting Bishop” opted not to share this information with his subordinates and no dawn
attack was made.39
The battle was decided in Longstreet’s sector. Confident he could drive back the Union
right flank, and left to his own devices by Polk’s inaction and the lack of communication in the
high command, Longstreet attacked. Serendipitously for the Confederates, Rosecrans
simultaneously created a gap in his line. Consequently, Longstreet pierced the Union line and
Rosecrans and much of his army retreated toward Chattanooga. Determined resistance by
federals under George Thomas allowed the rest of the Northern army to escape, but the Army of
Tennessee could finally claim a major victory. This, coupled with the prospect of going on the
strategic offensive, buoyed the army’s morale.40
Some of Bragg’s lieutenants urged him to pounce on the retreating federals, but he chose
instead to place Chattanooga under siege, hoping to starve the enemy into surrendering. It
seemed that Bragg initially could not believe that his army had really won the battle. In any
event, he became more concerned with attacking enemies within his own army than those taking
refuge in Chattanooga.41
Unsurprisingly, Bragg’s first victim was Polk, whom he suspended from command,
charging him with insubordination and neglect of duty, and ultimately transferred him out of the
Army of Tennessee. With Polk gone, Longstreet assumed leadership of the anti-Bragg bloc,
holding secret meetings and drafting petitions to President Davis to have the commander

39

Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 211, 215-219; Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals, 235-36. For more on
insubordination in the high command see Stephen E. Woodworth, “Soldier with a Blunted Sword: Braxton Bragg
and His Lieutenants in the Chickamauga Campaign,” in Stephen E. Woodworth, No Band of Brothers: Problems of
the Rebel High Command (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 70-80.
40
Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 223-24; Hess, Civil War in the West, 190-192; Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His
Generals, 236-37; Robert W. Ikard, “Lieutenant Thompson Reports on Chickamauga: A Comparison of Immediate
and Historical Perceptions of the Battle,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 44 (1985): 437.
41
Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 225, 228-29, 234; Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals, 237-38.

26

removed. Forrest, increasingly critical of Bragg following Chickamauga, was ordered by Bragg
to turn over his command to Wheeler. Forrest responded by threatening Bragg’s life, declaring
he would never again serve under him, and resigning. Davis, interceded, however, and granted
the fiery cavalryman a transfer and promotion. Thus, Forrest’s relationship with the Army of
Tennessee ended for the time being.42
Jefferson Davis, concerned Bragg was more focused on purging his own army than
whipping the enemy, visited the Army of Tennessee, although he admitted privately that he had
no intention of removing the general. Arriving at Bragg’s headquarters, he called a meeting of
the corps and division commanders to discuss the army’s future. The meeting opened with a
discussion of strategy but degenerated into a lambasting of Bragg. Longstreet slammed Bragg’s
leadership and called for his removal, seconded by Cheatham, Hill, and others. But Davis sided
with Bragg, issued a public statement of support for him, and returned to Richmond.43
His confidence boosted, Bragg renewed his counterattack against his critics. D. H. Hill
was his next target. He held Hill responsible for some of the delays and confusion at
Chickamauga and, unfortunately for Hill, many others agreed. Having antagonized officers in
both main Confederate armies and thus devoid of allies, Hill was sidelined for the rest of the war.
More damaging to the army’s immediate prospects was Longstreet’s transfer. Now Bragg’s chief
critic, Longstreet became increasingly insubordinate, and when Davis suggested sending him to
Knoxville to recapture that town, Bragg readily agreed. Bragg also reorganized the army to
disperse his lower-ranking critics.44
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While the army high command feuded, the siege of Chattanooga disintegrated. Ulysses
S. Grant, now commanding all federal forces in the west, took command at Chattanooga and
devised a plan to break the siege. He managed to open an effective supply line, meanwhile
summoning reinforcements under William T. Sherman. The Army of Tennessee was now
severely outnumbered and had ceded the initiative to the enemy. Morale in the ranks plummeted
to an all-time low.45
The subsequent Battle of Chattanooga was a disaster for Bragg and his army. Driving
back the Confederate left at Lookout Mountain on November 24, Grant turned his attention the
next day to the Rebel’s right flank. Grant, hoping to envelope Bragg’s army, ordered Sherman to
attack the Confederates on Tunnel Hill commanded by Patrick R. Cleburne. An Irish-born
British army veteran, Cleburne had immigrated to the United States in 1850, eventually settling
in Arkansas and pursuing a career as a pharmacist and then a lawyer. With the coming of the
war, he cast his lot with his adopted state. A skilled and popular commander, he rose rapidly
through the ranks in the war’s early months, emerging as one of the best division commanders on
either side. His ability was clearly displayed at Chattanooga, where he repulsed numerous attacks
by Sherman.46
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The decisive action at Chattanooga came in the Confederate center on Missionary Ridge.
Union troops under George Thomas rose from their trenches without orders and charged the
section of the Rebel line held by Breckinridge’s men. Crying “Chickamauga! Chickamauga!,”
the Yankees overran the line, routing the Confederates. Hoping to exploit his victory, Grant
ordered Joseph Hooker to pursue the broken Rebel army as it retreated into northwest Georgia.
To counter this, Bragg sent Cleburne’s Division—one of the few units in the army still in one
piece—to act as rearguard. For five hours on November 27, Hooker’s men tried to break
Cleburne’s line at Ringgold Gap to no avail. Cleburne’s stand allowed the Army of Tennessee
and its supply train to escape to safety.47
The army settled in to winter quarters at Dalton, where Bragg resigned from command
and was replaced by Johnston. Despite his continued feud with Davis and lack of battlefield
success, Johnston managed to maintain his sterling reputation. During the early months of 1864
he worked hard to drill the troops and raise morale. He improved the food supply and instituted a
system of furloughs that the homesick soldiers hailed enthusiastically. When campaigning
resumed in the spring the army was arguably the most confident it had ever been. This renewed
hope in the ranks spread to the home front; Confederates looked to the coming campaign with
optimism.48
While the army’s conditions were improving, relations between its commander and
Richmond were deteriorating. Johnston and Davis still distrusted each other, communicated
infrequently, and declined to share their thoughts. Furthermore, Davis—ever loyal to his
friends—appointed Bragg as his personal military advisor and brought him to Richmond. Thus
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Davis, Bragg, and Lee developed grand strategy for the coming spring without consulting
Johnston. Meanwhile Bragg’s few friends in the army were sending him misleading information
from Dalton. Bitter over his experiences with the army and jealous of Johnston’s popularity,
Bragg began suggesting that Johnston do things that just a few months earlier he had argued
were impossible. In the coming months, he would be one of the primary advocates for
Johnston’s removal.49
In addition to Johnston’s training regimen, there were three notable developments at
Dalton. Two would be remembered, one forgotten. On January 2, Cleburne, responding to the
Confederacy’s manpower shortages and deteriorating strategic position, called a meeting of the
army’s high command in which he advocated emancipation for any slave who would serve as a
soldier in the Rebel army. While the officers of Cleburne’s division largely agreed with him,
reactions throughout the rest of the high command were divided; some accused Cleburne of
treason. Because Cleburne had been in the anti-Bragg camp, his proposal also got intertwined
with the army’s old command factions. President Davis was so alarmed by the idea that he
ordered it censored and it was decades before Cleburne’s motion became common knowledge.
The proposal was, at least in part, the reason Cleburne was passed over for corps command
multiple times.50
In late March, after five inches of snow blanketed the army’s camp, a snowball fight
broke out involving up to six thousand men. For soldiers from the Deep South, snow was a novel
sight. Units squared off against each other, with high-ranking officers such as Cleburne,
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Cheatham, and Stewart joining in the fun. For a few hours the culture of hierarchy and deference
found in any army was set aside as men from the rank of private to major general engaged in
harmless yet rejuvenating competition.51
A religious revival swept the army at Dalton, as well. While a similar phenomenon had
occurred during its encampment at Tullahoma, harsh weather and a shortage of chaplains had
limited it. The Dalton revival was massive and lasted well into the ensuing Atlanta Campaign.
The high command was not immune to the fervor: Polk, who rejoined the army in May 1864,
personally baptized Johnston, Hardee, and John Bell Hood. Some historians argue that the
revival was instrumental in maintaining the army’s morale for the remainder of the war. Had the
army’s fortunes reversed in 1864, its winter encampment at Dalton would, no doubt, be
remembered as its Valley Forge.52
With the arrival of spring, the reenergized Confederates faced three combined Union
armies under Sherman. The massive federal force marched south from Chattanooga in May 1864
with the goals of crushing Johnston’s army and capturing Atlanta, the most important city in the
Confederacy next to Richmond. Johnston, aware of his numerical inferiority, assumed a
defensive posture, hoping Sherman would launch costly frontal assaults against fortified
positions. Unfortunately for Johnston, Sherman preferred to win through maneuver.53
During the ensuing Atlanta Campaign, Sherman executed a series of flanking maneuvers
that forced Johnston to continually retreat south until he was locked in a siege at Atlanta.
Johnston chose not to attack as he retreated, all the while hoping Sherman would lose patience
and order an assault. With one exception, however, the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, Sherman
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refused to oblige him. While Johnston’s retreats were well executed, many feared he would
surrender the Gate City without a fight. The troops’ confidence in Johnston’s leadership also
waned the closer they got to Atlanta. Johnston seemed oblivious to these concerns. The army’s
morale had already suffered a severe blow in June when Polk was killed; despite his disastrous
record as a corps commander, he had been popular with the men. Making matters worse for
Johnston, some of his lieutenants were undermining his leadership.54
Most notable among these was John Bell Hood. Thirty-two in 1864, Hood was one of the
younger general officers in the Confederacy. Despite his youth, the Kentuckian had achieved a
stellar reputation as an aggressive brigade and division commander in Lee’s army. Transferred
west with Longstreet, he was partially responsible for Rebel victory at Chickamauga, where he
lost a leg (having previously lost the use of an arm at Gettysburg). By late 1863 he had emerged
as one of the South’s great military heroes. While convalescing in Richmond he became friends
with President Davis and rubbed elbows with other leading politicians.55
Recovered from his amputation, Hood was promoted to corps command and rejoined the
Army of Tennessee at Dalton. His promotion was greeted with near-universal approval; even
Johnston expressed his desire for Hood to join his command. However, as time would reveal,
Hood—like so many other generals in the army—had been promoted beyond his abilities.
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Nevertheless, in 1864 he was confident and ambitious. Even before the Atlanta Campaign, he
began a secret correspondence with Richmond criticizing Johnston’s abilities, overestimating the
army’s capabilities, and urging an offensive campaign. Basically, he disregarded reality and told
Davis what he wanted to hear.56
Davis, frustrated by Johnston’s repeated retreats and refusal to share his plans, removed
the general from command on July 17 and replaced him with Hood. Johnston had done little to
aid his own cause. The few communications he had sent Richmond were vague, secretive, and
petulant. After the war he insisted he had been preparing to go on the offensive, but there is little
evidence to support this claim. Furthermore, he seemed oblivious to the political significance of
Atlanta. Should the city fall, it would prove a great boon to Abraham Lincoln’s reelection
campaign and thus disastrous to the Confederacy’s hopes for a negotiated peace.57
For decades the conventional narrative of the Atlanta Campaign insisted that Johnston’s
removal was unpopular within the army. However, while Hood was never as widely admired as
Johnston, some recent scholarship shows that Hood’s appointment and his subsequent aggressive
actions were hailed by the army and that many soldiers interpreted his tactical defeats as
victories. Abandoning caution, Hood launched a series of attacks around Atlanta. While bold in
conception, the assaults were weak and poorly coordinated. Having failed to raise the siege,
Hood was forced to abandon the city on September 2.58
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As was custom in the Army of Tennessee following a defeat, the months after the fall of
Atlanta witnessed backbiting, deflection of responsibility, and the inefficient intercession of
Richmond. Hood proved no more adept than Bragg at making friends and a considerable
contingent of officers campaigned for his removal. Refusing to accept any responsibility, Hood
lashed out at his lieutenants and even the enlisted men. Jefferson Davis again visited the army
and again opted to maintain the army’s current leader while appointing a general as theater
commander. Having just relieved Johnston from field command, Davis had little choice but to
appoint his other long-time enemy, Beauregard, to the position. But he gave Beauregard unclear
directions and little practical power. Hood, in turn, felt little obligation to keep Beauregard
apprised of his plans or movements, and the theater commander was often ignorant even of the
army’s location.59
The disaster in Georgia did nothing to dissuade Hood from launching another bold,
aggressive campaign. Hoping to turn the tide of the war by recapturing Nashville, he invaded
middle Tennessee. Now attempting to liberate the army’s home state, the troops were heartened,
cheering as they crossed the border. When Sherman embarked on his “March to the Sea,” he left
forces under George Thomas and John Schofield to deal with Hood. Knowing that his best
chance of victory lay in attacking the two before they united, Hood ordered an assault on
Schofield at Spring Hill on November 29. The Confederate attack was poorly coordinated,
however. Schofield’s force escaped and entrenched at Franklin.60
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Enraged at his army’s failure to destroy Schofield and desperate to keep the two Union
forces from uniting, Hood ordered a frontal assault the next day on Schofield’s entrenchments at
Franklin. This attack would be unsupported by artillery and would take place before the whole
Confederate army was in position. Moreover, a combination of geography and fortifications
made Schofield’s position a strong one. Hood’s lieutenants were appalled by the rashness of this
planned assault and tried to dissuade their commander. In a fiery exchange, Forrest—recently
reunited with the army—pleaded with Hood to delay the attack and allow him to outflank
Schofield with his cavalry. Hood was unmoved and nineteen thousand infantrymen began the
charge.61
They were decimated. While Union lines were temporarily broken, the federal troops
rallied and repulsed the Confederates. Six Rebel generals were killed, including Cleburne, and
five were wounded. The army’s senior officer corps never recovered. During the night, Schofield
escaped to Nashville. The Army of Tennessee suffered over six thousand casualties, losses that
by this stage in the war could not be made up. But some soldiers again interpreted defeat as
victory and boasted that Hood’s northward movement would continue; after all, at battle’s end
the Army of Tennessee was in possession of the field.62
Hood too claimed Franklin as a victory, despite sacrificing nearly a quarter of his army
there, and he continued his march toward Nashville. He placed the city under siege, but his
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depleted force was unable to fully surround it. Thus, at the Battle of Nashville in December,
George Thomas achieved one of the most decisive victories of the war, shattering Hood’s army.
Only a well-conducted fighting retreat by the rearguard under Forrest allowed the broken
remnants of the army to escape into Alabama. After this disaster the soldiery turned completely
against Hood and he resigned from command.63
The double disasters of Franklin and Nashville destroyed not only Hood’s career but the
Army of Tennessee. The remnants of the army eventually retreated into Mississippi. From there,
units were transferred to various departments. The primary field army in the western
Confederacy no longer existed; comparisons were made between Hood’s retreat from Nashville
and Napoleon’s withdrawal from Moscow. Many units went to North Carolina, where they
joined up with other broken Rebel commands to form the Army of the South, which had the task
of trying to stop Sherman’s march through the Carolinas; Joseph E. Johnston was given
command. This army fought only one battle, a defeat at Bentonville in March, before being
reorganized and once again christened the Army of Tennessee. Following Robert E. Lee’s
capitulation at Appomattox Courthouse, Johnston surrendered the army to Sherman at Durham
Station, North Carolina, on April 26, 1865.64

63

Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 507; Hess, Civil War in the West, 255-57; Daniel, Soldiering in the Army of
Tennessee, 147; Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals, 301; Clampitt, Confederate Heartland, 122. On the
Battle of Nashville, see above works by Sword and Bailey, and James L. McDonough, Nashville: The Western
Confederacy’s Final Gamble (Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 2004).
64
Daniel, Soldiering in the Army of Tennessee, 161, 147; McMurry, Two Great Rebel Armies, 130-32; Clampitt,
Confederate Heartland, 10, 123-26; Stephen V. Ash, Middle Tennessee Society Transformed 1860-1870: War and
Peace in the Upper South (Baton Rouge, 1988), 168. Although it was a relatively small battle, Bentonville has been
well analyzed by historians. Some of the best studies are Nathanial Cheairs Hughes, Bentonville: The Final Battle of
Sherman and Johnston (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Mark L. Bradley, The Battle of
Bentonville: Last Stand in the Carolinas (Campbell, CA: Savas Publishing, 1996); and John G. Barrett, Sherman’s
March through the Carolinas (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956). See also Craig L. Symonds,
“Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina,” in Confederate Generals in the Western Theater, eds. Hewitt and Bergeron
Jr., 2: 238-51.

36

During four years of war under five commanders the Army of Tennessee had lost twelve
thousand men killed and sixty-five thousand wounded in battles that were almost all defeats. It
had left its dead strewn across six different states and had failed in its herculean task of
protecting the Confederate heartland. John Schofield, who spent considerable time fighting the
Army of Tennessee, said of the ill-fated Rebel force after the war that “I doubt if any soldiers in
the world ever needed so much cumulative evidence to convince them that they were beaten.”
Now, as the army’s soldiers returned home, they along with their families and other former
Confederates would have to confront that “cumulative evidence.” They would do so in a way
shaped by the emerging myth of the Lost Cause, which insisted, among other things, on the
martial, moral, and masculine superiority of Confederate soldiers. The former Rebels who
identified with the Army of Tennessee experienced little but defeat during the war; in the coming
decades they would remember little but victory. 65
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Chapter Two:
“His death may have lost the South her independence”:
Albert Sidney Johnston and Civil War Memory

On April 6, 1862, Confederate general Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding the soon-tobe christened Army of Tennessee, was seemingly on the cusp of a great victory over Union
general Ulysses S. Grant. Despite recent defeats that had tarnished his once sterling reputation,
Johnston managed to surprise Grant with an attack at Shiloh Church. Union forces soon
recovered from their initial shock, however, and began offering stiffer resistance. Johnston,
hoping to maintain the initiative, inspire his men, and no doubt restore his reputation and honor,
led from the front all day. Around two o’clock in the afternoon he took charge of a battered and
demoralized regiment. After riding along its line, tapping the tips of the men’s bayonets with a
tin cup, he called out, “I will lead you!” With their commanding general guiding them, the
reenergized troops surged forward, driving back the Union forces in their front. Despite this
localized success the battle continued, Johnston in the thick of it. But suddenly he reeled in the
saddle, having been struck in the right calf by a spent round. Quickly losing consciousness, the
general was helped off his horse by a staff member. Having sent his personal surgeon to tend to
Union wounded, Johnston was without medical aid and at two thirty died of blood loss. The tide
soon turned and Shiloh became one of the most significant Union victories of the war and an
indispensable step in the ascendance of U. S. Grant.1
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Twenty-one years later, aging Confederate veterans gathered in New Orleans's Metairie
Cemetery to decorate the graves of fallen comrades and observe the laying of the cornerstone of
an equestrian statue of Johnston. Charles E. Hooker, a Mississippi congressman and former
Rebel officer, gave the oration. “The records of the war show no more knightlier [sic] warrior”
than Johnston, Hooker declared. He went on to name the “triumvirate” of great Southerners who
he believed ranked above all others: Robert E. Lee, John C. Calhoun, and Albert Sidney
Johnston. On the platform with Hooker was former Confederate president Jefferson Davis who
in response to the crowd's demands rose to further eulogize Johnston. Davis had been friends
with the general in the antebellum years and his sentiments were well known. Like many others,
he believed that Johnston's death at Shiloh was an irreparable loss to the South—one that led to
ultimate defeat in the Civil War. Voicing a belief common in the postwar South, the old
commander-in-chief assured the crowd that “had [Johnston] lived but half an hour longer, Grant
would have been a prisoner.”2
Albert Sidney Johnston occupies an anomalous position as a Lost Cause icon. Several
prominent historians have noted that his untimely death at Shiloh, one of the war's great
contingencies, made Johnston a Confederate idol. Thomas L. Connelly argues that, for postwar
white Southerners, “Johnston would epitomize the might-have-been situation” while T. Harry
Williams likens him to “the promising artist who dies young.” Yet assertions such as these,
usually appended as a coda or mentioned in passing, are where historians' analyses stop.
Moreover, foundational studies of Civil War memory and the Lost Cause have altogether ignored

2

Fayetteville (North Carolina) Observer, April 26, 1883; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, April 8, 1883.

39

Johnston's place in the ideology of the former Confederacy, insisting on the primacy of a trinity
of supreme Confederate heroes: Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and Jefferson Davis.3
While Johnston's image never eclipsed those of other Lost Cause deities like Lee or
Jackson, it did occupy a prominent place in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century
Confederate memory that historians have ignored. Moreover, Johnston, who commanded the
Army of Tennessee for less than a year and never won a battle, enjoyed a postwar fame far more
disproportionate to his accomplishments than did many other generals. While the “might-havebeen” aspect of Johnston's image undoubtedly explains its postwar allure, historians have yet to
place that posthumous image under the scholarly microscope. Several important questions need
answering. What purposes did the myth of Albert Sidney Johnston serve? Who were its
architects? What were their motivations? And why, despite its overwhelming presence, have
historians failed to acknowledge it?
Johnston has received little historiographical attention compared to most Rebel officers
of comparable rank. His sole scholarly biography is half a century old, and serious discussion of
Johnston has been largely devoted to his and P. G. T. Beauregard’s respective culpability for
Rebel defeat at Shiloh. Regardless of who was responsible, for many ex-Confederates there was
a direct link between Johnston's death and Confederate defeat, both in the battle and the war.
Southern whites after the war constructed an image of Johnston that not only helped explain their
defeat in the Civil War but helped assuage the shame that accompanied it.4
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Johnston’s image, in addition to being useful to the Lost Cause, fit comfortably within
nineteenth-century white Southern culture. Few qualities were more valued by white
Southerners than masculinity and honor. Johnston’s posthumous advocates relied heavily on the
tropes of masculinity when crafting his mythology, and his noble death in battle made easier his
incorporation into the ranks of Confederate idols. As one historian argues: “Death in combat
assured an eternal life on earth. A man’s death and subsequent rebirth in the masculine
community of fellow fallen soldiers manifested itself in the community’s collective memory,
where he achieved immortal manhood.” If, as some historians have argued, the outcome of the
Civil War provoked a crisis of manhood in the former Confederacy, Johnston’s image served as
welcome evidence that the South could produce masculine heroes.5
While the myth of Albert Sidney Johnston reached its full flowering only in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its foundations predated the Civil War. By 1861
Johnston was a soldier of considerable reputation. He had graduated eighth in his class of 1826 at
the United States Military Academy and subsequently served as an officer in the Black Hawk
War, as a brigadier general in the Texas army, and as Texas's secretary of war during its period
of independence. Leading a regiment of Texas volunteers during the Mexican War, he earned
distinction at the Battle of Monterrey and won the high praise of both Winfield Scott and
Zachary Taylor, the most prominent American commanders of the war. In 1855, then Secretary
of War Jefferson Davis, Johnston's former West Point classmate, appointed him colonel of the
2nd U.S. Cavalry Regiment—a famed unit that claimed Robert E. Lee, George Thomas, John
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Bell Hood, Edmund Kirby Smith, and William J. Hardee among its antebellum officers.
Johnston led federal troops in a successful and largely bloodless campaign against the Mormons
during the Utah War before being breveted a brigadier general and appointed commander of the
Department of the Pacific. Lee, an accomplished soldier in his own right, was among those who
praised Johnston in the prewar years. Johnston’s achievements even garnered him a flattering
profile in an 1857 issue of Harper's Weekly.6
Johnston was at his headquarters in San Francisco during the secession crisis. Although
born in the politically divided border state of Kentucky, he considered himself a Texan and when
his adopted state seceded he resigned from the army, offered his services to the Confederacy,
made a daring overland journey to Texas, and ultimately reported to his old friend Confederate
president Jefferson Davis in Richmond. Johnston’s star was on the rise even before he arrived at
the capital. The Richmond Enquirer, on learning of his resignation, reported that Johnston was
“one of the most skillful and accomplished officers in the U.S. Army” and other papers
recounted his trek to Virginia. A Confederate officer in Texas at the time later recalled that “for
days I had been looking to the West as for a Military Messiah in the person of Albert Sidney
Johnston.” A group of Memphians petitioned Davis to give Johnston command of the western
theater.7
The president needed no prodding. Convinced that Johnston was the South's best soldier,
Davis commissioned him a full general and placed him in command of Department No. 2, a vast
area stretching from the Appalachians to the Mississippi River. News of this appointment was
greeted with universal approval. “It is useless to reiterate what we have repeated over and over
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again—that this appointment will give the most universal satisfaction throughout the Southwest
as one most eminently fit to be made,” declared the Memphis Appeal. A Georgia newspaper
wrote that the people of the South were confident in Johnston's abilities and looked to his
department “feeling assured that there no disaster will be encountered which energy of character,
military skill or superior generalship can in any manner avert.” Others bestowed on Johnston the
sobriquet “lion of the west.” A year after the war, Richmond journalist Edward Pollard recalled
that Johnston “was popularly expected . . . to take Cincinnati and march to the Northern Lakes.”
Many Southerners, especially those threatened with Union invasion, were coming to see
Johnston not just as a good soldier, but as a deliverer.8
As departmental commander, Johnston was responsible for defending the heartland of the
nascent Confederacy along a line of roughly four hundred miles. As discussed in chapter one,
the western theater presented the Confederacy with daunting challenges. Despite his impressive
record, Johnston had never exercised such responsibility. As one historian of the western theater
has noted, Johnston “faced a situation unprecedented in his experience or in that of any other
living American.”9
The Confederacy's fortunes in the western theater, unpromising to begin with, quickly
waned. The department's greatest asset at the war's commencement was Kentucky’s neutrality.
As long as that state remained noncommittal on secession and barred the entry of troops of either
side, the Confederacy would not have to defend Tennessee's northern border. Unfortunately for
the soon-to-arrive Johnston, Leonidas Polk was in temporary charge of the department.
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Convinced that the Union army was preparing to enter the state, Polk decided to preempt that
move by occupying Columbus, Kentucky. This disregard for the Bluegrass State's neutrality
gave the Union army the excuse to do the same and left Tennessee open to Yankee invasion.10
Johnston arrived on the scene a week after Polk’s ill-advised move. Thereafter the
Confederate position in the west continued to deteriorate, further tarnishing Johnston's
reputation. In September 1861 he spread his roughly forty thousand men along a defensive
perimeter across southern Kentucky and northern Tennessee in a desperate attempt to shield the
Volunteer State from invasion. This fragile line held only a few months. When Northern forces
captured Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862, opening the Tennessee and Cumberland
rivers to Union incursion, Johnston's position became untenable and he ordered his forces to
retreat into middle Tennessee. The subsequent abandonment of Nashville was an even greater
blow to Confederate morale. One of the most valuable cities in the Confederacy, it was the first
Rebel state capital to fall to the Union. That Johnston had failed to protect it was a profound
disappointment to the Confederate people.11
The press, the politicians, and the people, who just weeks before had sung the general's
praises, now called for his removal. Citizens stormed Johnston's headquarters demanding action,
concerned commentators insisted that Jefferson Davis take personal command of the western
army, and others argued Johnston should be replaced by another general. Aware of the
impending invasion of their state, Tennessee politicians were especially energetic in calling for
his removal. “The people, the army under General Johnston's command, and the people of
Tennessee had lost confidence in the military capacity of General Johnston,” insisted members of
Confederate Congress. A former Rebel officer reflecting on this deterioration of Johnston's

10
11

Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 46-55; Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals, 36-39.
Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 103-32.

44

image stated later that he went from being “Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Napoleon” to “a
miserable dastard and traitor, unfit to command a corporal's guard.” Even Johnston's own
lieutenants doubted his fitness for command. Davis was one of the few dissenting voices; his
confidence in his old friend never wavered. He responded to one demand for Johnston’s removal,
“gentlemen, I know Sidney Johnston well. If he is not a General, we had better give up the war,
for we have no general.” Johnston accepted the criticisms. “The test of merit in my profession,
with the people is success,” he wrote to Davis in March, “it is a hard rule, but I think it right.”
Johnston sometimes sided more with his critics than his president; at one point he attempted to
relinquish command to Beauregard.12
Aware of his reputation's downward spiral, Johnston also knew that further disaster
loomed on the horizon. Federal armies under Grant and Don Carlos Buell were in the process of
uniting. Combined, they would make a force of seventy-five thousand men. Johnston's only
hope of regaining the initiative was to attack these armies before they united. He ordered his
forty thousand spread-out troops to concentrate at Corinth, Mississippi, thirty miles southwest of
Grant's camp at Pittsburg Landing, in preparation for a counterstrike—the one that would
culminate in the surprise attack against Grant at Shiloh and Johnston's death.13
With Johnston dead, Beauregard took command and soon ordered his forces to halt. The
next day, Grant, reinforced by Buell's army, turned the tide. The Battle of Shiloh, despite
premature pronouncements of victory, ended in Confederate defeat. For the next three years, the
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South suffered defeat after defeat in the west. Success had not come under Albert Sidney
Johnston. Nor, however, did it come under his successors. The South possibly lost a major battle
because Johnston fell, but it certainly gained a martyr. Johnston’s significance in Confederate
history rests more on how others shaped his image after his death than on anything he did in life.
Military historians disagree about the role of Johnston’s death in Shiloh’s outcome, but there was
no debate among former Rebels in the postwar period. The myth of Johnston, like many other
myths, did not distinguish between correlation and causation: the Confederacy lost Shiloh, and
the war, when Albert Sidney Johnston breathed his last.
While Johnston's prewar reputation allowed his myth to take root, his death allowed it to
flower. His prestige, destroyed by his brief wartime career, was resurrected quickly in the wake
of his death. A poem published very soon after his passing chronicled the hardships facing the
South before concluding:

Yet a bright ray of sunshine,
Breaks through the vast darkness;
'Tis the spirit of Johnston,
Looking down from above;
He bids his brave soldiers,
To be firm and undaunted,
And trust in their God,
Full of truth, might and love!14
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Journalists, who just weeks earlier had ridiculed Johnston and called for his resignation,
now grieved his death. “The hero of the battle of Shiloh is fallen!,” lamented a North Carolina
paper; “The Confederacy contained few such men as Albert Sidney Johnston.” His death in
battle, the same paper stated days later, “will cause his name to be handed down as one of the
most illustrious of freedom's martyrs.” Reporting on his death, the Charleston Courier praised
Johnston's manliness and generalship and blamed the “cloud . . . lately cast over his fame” on
“the ignorant licentiousness of demagogues and . . . critics.” The Southern Literary Messenger
praised his “great military talents and chivalrous character” and ranked him first among officers
it lauded for selflessly resigning their commissions in the U.S. Army to come to the South's aid.
In a matter of months, Johnston had made the transition from deliverer to pariah to martyr.15
Over the next several decades former Confederates, and to a lesser extent their progeny,
elaborated and expounded the Johnston myth, which came to present the general as a potential
savior. This myth was especially suited for the Lost Cause, which in addition to serving
immediate political and social purposes explained Confederate defeat and helped whites cope
with it. The postwar Johnston myth argued that the Confederacy lost the war because the general
was killed before he could destroy Grant and his army. Moreover, for the war’s survivors,
ultimate defeat was easier to accept knowing it was the result of fate and not the actions of the
high command, the soldiers, or the people on the home front. As the general’s son and
biographer William Preston Johnston stated, victory was all but assured before Johnston fell “by
the chance of war.”16
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Jefferson Davis did more than any other person to foster the Johnston myth. Less than
two weeks before Shiloh, the commander in chief told his beleaguered general that “my
confidence in you has never wavered, and I hope the public will soon give me credit for my
judgment rather than arraign me for obstinacy.” Johnston's passing did nothing to change Davis’s
opinion. “Without doing injustice to the living,” he remarked on learning of Johnston’s death, “it
may be safely asserted that our loss is irreparable.” Davis also supposedly claimed that “upon
the brittle thread of that one man's life hung the destinies of the South”—perhaps an apocryphal
statement, but one similar to others he is known to have made. Nearly twenty years after
Johnston's death, Davis wrote in his memoirs: “In his fall the great pillar of the Southern
Confederacy was crushed, and beneath its fragments the best hope of the Southwest lay
buried.”17
Davis expressed these opinions for three reasons. First, he was genuinely convinced of
Johnston's abilities. Second, the two men had been friends for decades. Third, the Johnston myth
was inextricably linked to Davis's own image. While his postwar imprisonment aided his
popularity, Davis was still a divisive figure during and after the war; two of Johnston's
successors, Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston, were his harshest critics. However, neither of
them, nor Braxton Bragg nor John Bell Hood, was able to turn the tide in the west. Quite the
contrary, they led the Army of Tennessee from one disaster to the next. Davis has been censured

62-66; Janney, Remembering the Civil War, 134; Alan T. Nolan, “The Anatomy of the Myth,” in The Myth of the
Lost Cause and Civil War History, eds. Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2000), 11-34. The most comprehensive study of the political uses of Civil War memory in the former
Confederacy is Blair, Cities of the Dead; William Preston Johnston, “Albert Sidney Johnston at Shiloh,” in Battles
and Leaders of the Civil War (4 vols., New York: Century, 1887), 1: 564.
17
U.S. War Department, War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies (70 vols. in 128, Washington D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series One, 10 (2): 365;
Macon (Georgia) Daily Telegraph, April 12, 1862; T. H. Bowman, Reminiscences of an Ex-Confederate Soldier; or,
Forty Years on Crutches (Austin: Gammel-Statesman, 1904), 41; Jefferson Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate
Government (2 vols., New York: Appleton, 1881), 2: 67.

48

by contemporaries and historians for appointing these commanders and for his conduct of the
war in the west. But as Davis saw it, none of these men would ever have commanded the Army
of Tennessee had Johnston lived. Praising Johnston was a subtle way for Davis to rebuke his
critics and defend his record as commander in chief. Davis had trumpeted Johnston's abilities
from the war's beginning; the Johnston myth confirmed his wisdom.
Davis’s pronouncements about Johnston were well received; most former Rebels agreed
with him. Veteran John Garland James, the superintendent of the Texas Military Institute,
included one of Davis's eulogies of Johnston in his 1879 textbook The Southern Student's HandBook of Selections for Reading and Oratory. Nearly twenty years later, a contributor to the
Confederate Veteran magazine remarked that, “though Mr. Davis has been most severely
criticised [sic] for his determined upholding of Albert Sidney Johnston, his attitude towards that
great soldier was ably vindicated by the battle of Shiloh.”18
Certain other members of the Confederate high command likewise fostered the Johnston
myth in their postwar writings. “With him at the helm,” claimed Richard Taylor, “there would
have been no Vicksburg, no Missionary Ridge, no Atlanta.” Despite having served under both
Lee and Jackson, Taylor insisted that Johnston was “the foremost man of all the South; and had it
been possible for one heart, one mind, and one arm to save her cause, she lost them when Albert
Sidney Johnston fell on the field of Shiloh.” Similarly, Basil Duke stated that “it would be
difficult to induce the people of the South to admit that any other man . . . is worthy to be ranked
on the same level with General Lee. But if any of the great men of the Confederacy shall, in the
estimation of his countrymen or by the verdict of history, be accorded that extraordinary
eminence, it will be, I believe, Albert Sidney Johnston.” Officers of the Army of Northern
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Virginia echoed these pronouncements. William C. Oates of Little Round Top fame thought
Johnston “perhaps the greatest general the war would have developed.” John Brown Gordon
compared him to Lee and George Washington and lamented that “a great light had gone out
when Albert Sidney Johnston fell. . . . [I]n him more than in any other man at that period were
centered the hopes of the Southern people.”19
Lesser officers joined the chorus. Scarcely a year after the war’s end, Edward Fontaine,
Patrick Henry’s grandson and an ex-captain of a Mississippi regiment, wrote an impassioned
letter to the Natchez Daily Courier. With the wounds of defeat still fresh, Fontaine proclaimed
that “if [Johnston] were living, and in arms with Stonewall Jackson; and Robert E. Lee, Joseph
E. Johnston and Beauregard ready to take the field again, and I had to appoint one of these
illustrious heroes the generalissimo of our army, I would not hesitate to give him command of
the whole.” Convinced that Johnston would have been the South’s savior, John T. Crisp, former
commander of a Missouri cavalry regiment, compared him to William Wallace. In a postwar
interview, F. A. Shoup, William J. Hardee's chief of artillery, was asked if Shiloh would have
ended differently had Johnston lived. “It would indeed,” he replied. “In my opinion Johnston
was a new man from the moment he sent his Generals whirling to their posts with orders to
advance at dawn. . . . That battle won, he would have shown himself the great man he was.”
Fifty years after the war a former Confederate captain visiting Shiloh was reminded that
“Napoleon, standing by the grave of Frederick the Great, said: 'If you were living, I would not be
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here.' I imagined General Grant at Johnston's monument . . . saying 'If you had not fallen, I
would not have been President of the United States.'”20
While Jefferson Davis and former officers had a hand in creating the Johnston myth,
rank-and-file veterans also proved indispensable in deifying Johnston. One of many exConfederates to pay tribute to Johnston in verse following the war was C. E. Merrill, who had
served in the 49th Alabama Infantry Regiment at Shiloh. In 1895 he published these lines:

On Shiloh's field of death and blood
His bolted thunders fell at length!
The fires of vengeance, hot and red,
Far flashed where rode his knightly form;
And wreck and rout, and ruin spread
Where swept that day his battle storm.21

The most

physically prominent display of veterans’ adoration of Johnston is the general’s

bronze equestrian statue in Metairie Cemetery in New Orleans. The Association of the Army of
Tennessee raised twelve thousand dollars to construct the monument. Unveiled in 1887 on the
twenty-fifth anniversary of Johnston's death, the statue sits atop a tumulus containing the remains
of over two hundred veterans. As W. Fitzhugh Brundage points out, historians should pay
special heed to how groups take ownership of public space: “By insinuating their memory into
public space, groups exert the cultural authority, express the collective solidarity, and achieve a
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measure of the permanence that they often crave. To infuse objects and places with
commemorative significance is to combat the transitory nature of memories and underscore the
connectedness of the past and present.”22
For the crowd gathered in New Orleans there was to be nothing transitory about
Johnston’s image. Senator and former Confederate general Randall Lee Gibson gave the oration.
The veterans in the crowd, insisted Gibson, knew that Johnston's generalship and character
would be recorded “on the brightest pages of our country's history.” The orator also seemed to be
aware of the “what if?” appeal of Johnston's image, asking “who can look upon this bronze
image without recalling the early days of the war[?]” Of his leadership at Shiloh, Gibson argued
that “in any war,” you could count “on the fingers of your left hand” the number of commanders
with comparable abilities. Gibson evoked Johnston's masculinity as well, lauding him as “the
perfect type of manly grace and power. . . . [A] man who is a man . . . is the lordliest thing in the
universe.” Moreover, he insisted that Johnston was the Confederacy's Agamemnon and, besides
Robert E. Lee, the only leader who truly appreciated the difficulties the South faced after
secession. The orator criticized the Confederate people for turning against Johnston in his final
months and credited the general with carrying that burden with “trust in God” and “moral
courage.” Like many other Johnston storytellers, Gibson concluded his speech proclaiming that
it was “in the full tide of victory, that Albert Sidney Johnston received his death wound, and fell
like Wolfe on the heights of Abraham—as a true soldier would love to die—on the edge of
battle, in the moment of triumph.”23
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The equestrian statue was not the only way veterans commemorated their former
commander. Two simple acts by a former private and unnamed mourner were especially
enduring. While Johnston was temporarily buried in New Orleans, John Dimitry, a Shiloh
survivor, penned an epitaph on a plank and placed it at the grave. Johnston, it said, was

a man tried in many high offices and critical enterprises, and found faithful in all.
His life was one long sacrifice of interest to conscience. . . . Not wholly
understood was he while he lived; but, in his death, his greatness stands confessed
in a people's tears. . . . In his honor—impregnable; in his simplicity—sublime. No
country e'er had a truer son—no cause a nobler champion, no people a bolder
defender—no principle a purer victim than the dead soldier who sleeps here.

When a later graveside visitor discovered the fading paean she transcribed it and submitted it to
local newspapers. This brought it to the attention of the memorial committee in charge of
Johnston's grave, which subsequently designated it the official epitaph engraved at the base of
Johnston's statue at Metairie. Years later Marie Louise Benton Bankston, United Daughters of
the Confederacy (UDC) historian, called the epitaph “one of the most exquisite specimens of
English verse in our language.”24
While prevalent in stone, the Johnston myth was ubiquitous in print. The story of the
paean on the plank was the first tribute to a Rebel officer published in the Confederate Veteran.
Founded in 1893, this magazine had a circulation of over twenty thousand by the turn of the
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century. Its editor in chief, S. A. Cunningham, a veteran of the Army of Tennessee, accepted
contributions from other veterans, their wives, their widows, and their progeny. Even a cursory
examination of the magazine reveals that Johnston's memory had a prevalence historians have
failed to appreciate. In an article entitled “To Whom Honor Is Due” the Veteran posited that “in
all the war the man whose life was most tried, perhaps was that of Albert Sidney Johnston. . . .
Such agonizing as must have been his is hard to comprehend, and to him personally death at
Shiloh must have been great relief.” At the dawn of the twentieth century, Cunningham
proclaimed that “if Gen. Johnston had lived but three hours longer, the result of this battle would
have been differently written, and the eagles of victory would have perched upon the banner of
the Confederacy.”25
Former soldiers were eager to assume the panegyrist’s role in the pages of the Veteran.
Tennessean George E. Purvis recounted the military trials of the Confederacy. “The student,” he
stated, “in reviewing some of the great battles of our civil war . . . can scarcely resist becoming a
fatalist. He will be impelled to the conviction that the dismemberment of the American Union
was just not to be.” Illustrating yet again the centrality of contingency to the Johnston myth,
Purvis affirmed that, “Southern soldiers . . . won great victories on many fields. But there was
always that 'something' which prevented the reaping of the fruits of their victories.”
Conspicuously absent is any mention of often cited “somethings” such as Stonewall Jackson’s
death or Pickett's Charge. Purvis's first “something” was “Gen Johnston's death at Shiloh, just
when the field was won.” Quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, he concluded that “there are battles
with Fate that can never be won.”26
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Other aging soldiers expressed similar sentiments. In 1894, A. S. Horsley, a veteran of
the 1st Tennessee Infantry Regiment, told of Johnston spurring the morale of troops at Shiloh:
“The spectacle was an imposing one,” and “the soldiers were deeply impressed by the majestic
presence, the noble and kindly face, and impressive words of the commanding general. I would
give much, hard as times are, for a picture of that scene.” After inspiring the troops, the “king of
men” rode off toward the sound of battle. Had he lived, “all the histories of America today
would have to be rewritten.” Five years later, another Shiloh veteran came to a similar
conclusion. Had Johnston survived the battle, insisted James A. Jones, the Rebels would have
captured Grant's army, “chased Buell back into Kentucky and retaken Nashville and the State of
Tennessee. Let the result . . . be imagined.” However, “the God of battles was against us.” In a
memorial address the next year a former regimental surgeon declared that “had Albert Sidney
Johnston lived . . . Grant would have been annihilated . . . and history might have told a different
story.”27
Lowly privates who never more than glimpsed their commander and staff officers who
served by Johnston's side alike expressed such convictions. Thirty-five years after Shiloh,
George Withe Baylor, of Johnston's staff, reflected on the general's final hours: “I thought of the
dauntless warrior . . . whose very presence was an inspiration to those under its magic influence,
the personification of Southern chivalry. . . . He died as a soldier must like to die: at the moment
of victory.” Pondering the contingencies of the battle Baylor concluded that “if Gen. Johnston
had not been killed . . . why there would have been no 'ifs' about it; but the chances are that Gen.
Grant would have shared the fate of our own gallant leader and the horrors of the war would
probably have been prolonged for several years.” Similarly, J. B. Ulmer, an enlisted man at

27

Ibid., 2 (1894): 234, 7 (1899): 556, 8 (1900): 362.

55

Shiloh, insisted that had Johnston lived “General Grant would not have been at Appomattox to
receive General Lee’s surrender.” By referring to Grant as the “vanquisher of Lee,” Ulmer
subtly argued that Johnston was Lee’s superior as a general; had fate not interceded, Grant would
never have been the vanquisher of Johnston.28
R. R. Hutchinson, another staff officer, expressed a similar sentiment in his reminiscence
of Shiloh. He believed that “there was no man, not even excepting Robert E. Lee, who was more
loved and trusted by those under his command than Albert Sidney Johnston.” Like other
Johnston storytellers Hutchinson insisted that the general had died assured of victory and died a
good death—one that any soldier would desire. Moreover, Johnston's passing “was one of those
fateful incidents which seem to change the whole course of contemporary events. In all human
probability it alone saved one great army . . . and doomed another.”29
Civilians were also active in constructing the Johnston myth. Few individuals of the
wartime generation were more influential in shaping the public's perceptions and memories of
the Civil War than Mary Boykin Chesnut. Initially serialized in the Saturday Evening Post, her A
Diary from Dixie was published in book form in 1905. (Despite its title, the book was largely
written in the 1880s with the aid of Chesnut’s wartime journals.) Chesnut was one of the most
prominent consumers and distributors of the Johnston myth. On learning of Johnston's death,
she recorded that “my heart stands still. I feel no more. I am, for so many seconds, so many
minutes, I know not how long, utterly without sensation of any kind—dead.” Reflecting on
Confederate fortunes following his death, Chesnut observed that “there is grief enough for Albert
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Sidney Johnston now; we begin to see what we have lost. . . . Without him there is no head to our
Western army.”30
Johnston's image loomed large in her mind for the remainder of the war. Cautiously
optimistic about Lee's success in the Seven Days Battles, Chesnut admitted that “we do hope
there will be no 'ifs.' 'Ifs' have ruined us. Shiloh was a victory if Albert Sidney Johnston had not
been killed. . . . The 'ifs' bristle like porcupines.” Following the Army of Tennessee’s defeat at
Chattanooga and subsequent retreat into Georgia she exclaimed, “oh, for a day of Albert Sidney
Johnston out West!” As victory seemed less and less likely, Chesnut reflected on the character
of Confederate generals, asserting that in contrast to the uncivilized Lincoln and Grant, “General
Lee and Albert Sidney Johnston show blood and breeding. They are the Bayard and Philip
Sidney order of soldiers.” According to Chesnut, had Johnston lived the Deep South would have
been spared the onslaught of William T. Sherman; as the Yankee general prepared to embark on
his March to the Sea she exclaimed, “if Albert Sidney Johnston had lived! Poor old General Lee
has no backing.”31
The ubiquity of the Johnston myth, for a time at least, spanned generations. Born in
Kentucky in 1862, Joseph A. Altsheler, author of the popular “Young Trailers Series” of juvenile
historical fiction, espoused the Johnston myth in another series that dramatized the Civil War. In
The Guns of Shiloh: A Story of the Great Western Campaign readers are thrust into the war's
early months through the eyes of Dick Mason, a young Union soldier fighting with Grant's army.
The narrator praises not only Mason's chieftain but also Johnston, whom he portrays as a tragic
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hero and potential Rebel messiah, “the most formidable foe of all,” and “a general upon whom
the South, with justice, rested great hopes.” Mason’s sergeant, cautioning his men against
overconfidence on the eve of Shiloh, says:

An’ I tell you that General Johnston, with whom we’ve got to deal, is a great man.
I wasn’t with him when he made that great march through the blizzards an’ across
the plains . . . to make the Mormons behave, but I’ve served with them that was.
An' I never yet found one of them who didn't say General Johnston was a mighty
big man. Soldiers know when the right kind of a man is holdin’ the reins an’
drivin’ ‘em.

In the novel's final chapters, the narrator, resuming the omniscient perspective, remarks that “it
seemed that nothing could deprive the Southern army of victory, absolute and complete.”
Nevertheless, “fate in the very moment of triumph that seemed overwhelming and sure was
preparing a terrible blow for the South,” which resulted in “the most costly death, with the
exception of Stonewall Jackson’s, sustained by the Confederacy in the whole war.”32
Although most famous for his novel The Clansman and its film adaptation The Birth of a
Nation, Thomas Dixon echoed the Johnston myth in his later book The Victim: A Romance of the
Real Jefferson Davis, published in 1914. In it Dixon asserts that Davis, through his unyielding
support of Johnston, “inspired him to begin the most brilliant campaign on which the South had
yet entered.” Dixon’s portrayal of Shiloh has Grant's army retreating in panic in the face of
Johnston's onslaught. “The first great battle of the war had been fought and won by the genius of
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the South's commander” and Johnston's critics “stood dumb before the story of his genius.”
While fighting Johnston, Dixon claims, Grant and the rest of the Union army realized what the
Rebels were capable of. Shiloh was the bloodiest battle in U.S. history at the time and both sides
suffered tremendous casualties; however, “great as the losses were to the North they were as
nothing to the disaster which this bloody field brought the Confederacy. Albert Sidney Johnston
alive was equal to an army of a hundred thousand men—dead; [sic] his loss was irreparable.”33
The Johnston myth spanned generations in more than just fiction. Those who had lived
through the war were eager to pass their version of it down to their progeny. In the decades after
Appomattox Confederate heritage organizations such as the UDC, the United Confederate
Veterans (UCV), and the Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) exercised remarkable control over
the selection of textbooks used in Southern schools. In striving to insure that white Southern
children were taught a Lost Cause narrative, one Rebel hero they exalted was Johnston. In 1898
the UCV Committee on History declared that “to brand such men as Albert Sidney Johnston,
Stonewall Jackson, Robert E. Lee, or Jefferson Davis as traitors is not to stain the whiteness of
their lives, but rather to spoil the world for any useful purpose, to make of traitor a title which
Hampden and Washington might have born as well had the fortunes of war gone against them.”
Two years later a similar organization censured the popular children’s text Student's Cyclopedia,
which “devotes two columns to Gen. U. S. Grant” but “spares only one-third of a column to Gen.
Albert Sidney Johnston.”34
Heritage organizations not only condemned texts hostile to the Confederacy but
countered with a salvo of their own in the form of officially sanctioned schoolbooks that
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espoused the Lost Cause. For example, Susan Pendleton Lee, daughter of Robert E. Lee's chief
of artillery, authored A Brief History of the United States, an apologia for secession, slavery, and
the Confederacy that offered a streamlined version of the Johnston myth to Southern youth.
Johnston is presented as the hero of the Utah War and as a martyr whose death at Shiloh when
Confederate victory seemed certain “was an irretrievable loss to the Southern army and cause.”
Lee chose not to burden her young readers with any mention of the thrashing of Johnston's
reputation in the months preceding his death.35
Like most other Civil War generals, Johnston was especially popular in his home state.
Footprints in Texas History, a widely used textbook for second graders first published in 1901,
insisted that “every child should read History Stories at an early age, because they have great
value in forming the character of the young.” The author, schoolteacher Minnie G. Dill, chose
Johnston as the final biographical subject to include in her book. Chronicling his death, she
granted Johnston final words in verse that he was denied in life:

"Now, away," he cried, "your aid is vain.
My soul will not brook recalling;
I have seen the tyrant enemy slain.
And like autumn vine leaves falling.
I have seen our glorious banner wave
O'er the tents of the enemy vanquished;
I have drawn a sword for my country brave.

Fred Arthur Bailey, “The Textbooks of the 'Lost Cause': Censorship and the Creation of Southern State Histories,”
Georgia Historical Quarterly 73 (1991): 508; Cobb, Away Down South, 101-103; Susan Pendleton Lee, A Brief
History of the United States (Richmond: B. F. Johnson Publishing, 1896), 210, 254.
35

60

And in her cause now perish.
Leave me to die with the free and brave,
On the banks of my noble river,
Ye can give me naught but a soldier's grave,
And a place in your hearts forever.”36

In another state history for grade-schoolers, Katie Daffan, president of the Texas Division
of the UDC, ranked Johnston alongside Stephen Austin, David Crockett, and Sam Houston as
exemplars of “heroic achievement, adventure . . . sacrifice and martyrdom.” Johnston's
generalship, she avowed, was matched only by “his loving, tender heart, unaffected modesty and
purity of character.” She furthermore told her young readers that Johnston's leadership abilities,
self-control, and courage were evident as a child and that as commander of the west he faced
nearly insurmountable odds. At Shiloh he was struck down “when it seemed that Grant's army
would certainly be annihilated . . . and victory was crowning every attempt made by the
Confederates.” Daffan concluded her biographical sketch with the assurance that “men like
Albert Sidney Johnston make us proud of our kind.”37
School children outside of Texas were also instructed in the Johnston myth. Berrien
McPherson Zettler, in his book War Stories and School-Day Incidents for the Children,
published in New York in 1912, informed readers of the value of hard work, education, and
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states’ rights while assuring them that, had abolitionists not started the Civil War, Southern
slavery would have faded away. Moreover, Zettler, a veteran of Lee's army and superintendent
of schools in Macon, Georgia, wanted children to know of two fateful moments in Confederate
history. One was Stonewall Jackson's death at Chancellorsville, which led directly to Rebel
defeat at Gettysburg. The second was Johnston’s death: “if Albert Sidney Johnston had not
received a mortal wound at a critical moment in the Battle of Shiloh . . . General Grant would
never have been heard of after that battle.”38
John Lesslie Hall, an English professor at the College of William and Mary most famous
for his 1892 translation of Beowulf, embraced and propagated the Johnston myth in his book
Half-Hours in Southern History (Richmond, 1907). Taking readers from the colonization of
Roanoke island to Reconstruction, Hall intended to highlight “the salient features of Southern
heroism and achievement.” To him, Johnston was the paragon of Southern manhood. The
general is one of only sixteen men in all of Southern history honored with an illustration in the
book, and, aside from Lee and Jackson, the only Confederate commander to whom a whole
chapter is devoted. Hall insisted that “every Southern boy and girl should know about General
Albert Sidney Johnston. His death may have lost the South her independence.” Borrowing and
modifying a line from Thomas Campbell's poem “The Pleasures of Hope,” Hall averred that
“freedom shrieked when Johnston fell.” Like many other Johnston storytellers chronicled thus
far, Hall linked him with the Confederacy's supreme hero, Robert E. Lee: Johnston “was the
brother of Jackson. The latter was 'Lee's right arm;' [sic] the former, the greatest soldier of the
Southwest.” Johnston was the man capable of defeating Ulysses S. Grant before he became the
North's greatest hero and ultimate vanquisher of Lee; “if Johnston had lived to follow up his
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victory, there would have been no Vicksburg, no siege of Petersburg, no capture of Richmond,
no Appomattox.”39
In a 1901 memorial address, a former Confederate officer ranked Johnston in the highest
echelon of Rebel heroes, asserting that had the South had the manpower and resources of the
North, Lee, Johnston, Jackson, and Forrest “would have 'licked' them in almost as many months
as it took them years to 'lick' us.” Eccentric Kentucky-born columnist and essayist Eugene W.
Newman, publishing under the pseudonym Savoyard, saw in Johnston not only a peer of Lee but
also a useful role model of Southern manhood. An unreconstructed Rebel, Newman believed “in
a hell with fire unquenchable . . . where all Republicans are sure to go when they die.” His goal
was to write for the “benefit of intelligent boys,” for “youths of today must come to be the future
public servants of our great country.” He claimed that “if Robert E. Lee, the man, was as noble
as Sidney, and if Robert E. Lee, the soldier, was as brilliant as Montrose, Albert Sidney
Johnston, the man, was as heroic as Bayard and Albert Sidney Johnston, the soldier, was as
formidable as Conde.” Johnston was “the ideal cavalier of the South” and “a king of men.
Perhaps not even in the history of that war did any other commander accomplish so much with
means so inadequate.” Finally, “his career culminated and closed at Shiloh. It was a brilliant
victory. No Southern man can read the story of that first day without closing the volume with the
thought: 'It might have been.'"40
Government-sanctioned shepherds of memory likewise espoused the Johnston myth.
Tennessean DeLong Rice, the first non-veteran superintendent of Shiloh National Park,
expressed his admiration for Johnston after assuming his official duties. “It was [Johnston’s]
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mission,” declared Rice, “to bring to its highest pinnacle of hope, this new-born Nation of the
South. . . . That hope . . . [would] never again, in all the bloody years to follow, reach the altitude
of [that] hour” on the first day of Shiloh. As Johnston fell, Rice assured his readers, “the latest
sounds that [came] to him [were] sounds of victory.” Like many other white Southerners, Rice
saw fate or the hand of God in the bullet that felled Johnston. “It was here [at Shiloh] that
Destiny which is but the will of God, began the execution of plans then so veiled, yet now so
plain”41
Although her brand of Civil War memory was not as fixated on martial themes as those
of Rice and other Johnston storytellers, journalist Edith D. Pope also propagated the Johnston
myth. In 1913 S. A. Cunningham died and Pope, his long-time secretary and the daughter of a
Rebel soldier, became editor in chief of the Confederate Veteran. She subsequently feminized
the magazine by increasing coverage of UDC events and the number of profiles of prominent
Southern women; narratives of the “moonlight and magnolias” Old South abounded at the
expense of tales of battlefield heroics and great generals. Nevertheless, Johnston did not vanish
from the pages of the magazine. UDC member F. A. Inge, of Corinth, Mississippi, provided a
piece in 1915 asserting that when Johnston died “many seemed to think it but the beginning of
the end.” In 1928, A. M. Herald of the Tampa UDC submitted a short history of Shiloh in which
she claimed that “the death of General Johnston changed the result . . . and prevented the capture
of Grant's army.” Quoting an unnamed officer, she continued: “Sometimes the hopes of millions
of people depend upon one head and one arm. The West perished with Albert Sidney Johnston
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and the Southern country followed.” Furthermore, editor Pope chronicled in exhaustive detail
UDC’s effort to raise fifty thousand dollars for a Johnston monument at Shiloh—a goal it
accomplished by May 1917.42
Johnston was also present in visual expressions of Confederate memory. Civil Warthemed artwork proliferated after the war. While some historians argue that “only Beauregard
and [Joseph E.] Johnston shared some real iconographic importance with Lee and Jackson,”
Albert Sidney Johnston’s image in fact graced a number of canvases and prints. Aside from
simple portraits, such as the 1867 Albert Sidney Johnston by George Edward Perine, Johnston
appears side by side with other Confederate heroes in multiple prints. In the most popular of
these, Lee and His Generals, by G. B. Matthews (1907), Johnston occupies a more prominent
position in the foreground than J. E. Johnston, Beauregard, and other Confederate heroes
including Nathan Bedford Forrest, J. E. B. Stuart, and Wade Hampton. In 1867 the Southern
Publishing House of New Orleans produced a series of three portraits: Robert E. Lee, Stonewall
Jackson, and Albert Sidney Johnston; the publisher’s advertisement claimed that “three more
remarkable Generals than these—more able as commanders, or more noble as men—never
graced the pages of any history.”43
As time progressed and the reconciliationist spirit grew, some aspects of the Lost Cause
infiltrated the Northern memory of the war. Although historians disagree about how pervasive
that spirit was in practice, it is clear that Northerners and Southerners did at times come together
to express admiration for noble commanders and brave soldiers of both sides—often at the
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expense of confronting the war’s racial legacies. As David W. Blight argues, “Blue-Gray
fraternalism crystallized around the values of manliness, valor, sacrifice, and a mutual sense of
honor.” Although Johnston never became a national hero in the same way Lee did, his image
embodied these traits. On the fiftieth anniversary of Shiloh, members of the National Association
of Survivors gathered on the battlefield to commemorate the heroism of both blue and gray. The
oration, a discussion of the battle, its importance, and the bravery displayed there, was given by
Union veteran Samuel M. Howard. Of Johnston's death he said that “the greatest Commander in
all America, North or South, East or West, had joined the untold millions which throng the Great
Beyond. . . . [T]he South lost its greatest chieftain and military commander; and throughout all
the war, they were never able to replace him with an equal.” Veterans were not alone in
recognizing the reconciliationist potential of Johnston's image: the UDC saw to it that during the
First World War wounded soldiers of the American Expeditionary Force in France could find
themselves convalescing in hospital beds named in Johnston's honor.44
Why have historians failed to recognize Johnston’s prominence in postwar memory? The
primary reason is likely the magnetic power Virginia has exercised on Civil War scholars for a
century and a half. Only in recent years have military historians turned to the western theater to
explain Union victory. Johnston’s obscurity in more modern expressions of Confederate identity
is another possibility. A century and a half has done little to lessen white Southerners'
fascination with the Civil War or identification with the Confederacy; yet Johnston has all but
vanished from sight while Lee, Jackson, Davis, and Forrest still stand tall. No organization is
more energetic in propagating Confederate memory than the SCV. Of its thousands of camps
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nationwide only three are now named after Johnston, while eleven are named after Lee, nine
after Jackson, and thirteen after Forrest. Even James Longstreet, longtime Lost Cause pariah,
has four camps named in his honor.45
Johnston is conspicuously absent from another modern display of Confederate identity,
Civil War-themed artwork. Popular artists such as Mort Kunstler, Don Troiani, John Paul Strain,
and Don Stivers have illustrated countless episodes and leaders of the war. Gary W. Gallagher,
in his statistical analysis of modern Civil War art, shows that Confederate leaders are 250 percent
more popular than Union leaders. Nevertheless, Johnston—the highest ranking officer to perish
in the Civil War—is almost completely absent in these paintings. Lee and Jackson are the most
often portrayed; Forrest, Jeb Stuart, and George Pickett also appear frequently. With the notable
exception of Forrest, Virginia's magnetic hold on Civil War enthusiasts remains evident in these
prints. Troiani's Men of Arkansas, which depicts Johnston rallying troops shortly before his
death, is the only modern illustration of the general to achieve any popularity.46
The Lost Cause identified by past scholarship regards Lee, Jackson, and Davis as the holy
trinity of Confederate heroes. The Johnston image has been a sort of historiographical
Apocrypha—acknowledged, but marginalized. However, former Confederates themselves
idolized the fallen Johnston and summoned his memory as they tried to come to terms with
defeat. In the decades following the Civil War, when those who identified with the Confederacy,
whether Jefferson Davis, a veteran, or a member of the UDC, struggled to explain the failure of
their cause they often pointed to the death of Albert Sidney Johnston. The appeal of his postwar
image is anchored in contingency. It may be tempting to argue that Johnston's storytellers were
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simply suffering from the shame of defeat and grasping at straws, for nothing in Johnston’s
actual Civil War career suggested that he would emerge as the Confederacy’s savior; his short
stint as commander of the west was a disaster. However, many of the war’s most capable
commanders were less than successful early on. For example, had Robert E. Lee died in April
1862 he would be remembered primarily for a failed campaign in western Virginia. While it is
uncertain whether the Confederacy's fortunes would have improved had the general lived, it is
certain that Albert Sidney Johnston meant more to the people of the Confederacy in death than
he ever did in life.
Ever cognizant of the Civil War's hold on the white Southern mind, William Faulkner
evoked, in Intruder in the Dust, the most famous contingency of the Lost Cause narrative, taking
his readers back to the third day at Gettysburg in the moments before Pickett’s Charge. Lee’s
army had “all this much to lose and all this much to gain: Pennsylvania, Maryland, the world, the
golden dome of Washington itself to crown with desperate and unbelievable victory.”
Unbelievable victory would not be achieved, but, as Faulkner knew, that would not prevent
white Southerners in succeeding years from revisiting that moment in time when it was still
possible. In an oft-quoted passage, Faulkner wrote that “for every Southern boy fourteen years
old, not once but whenever he wants it, there is that instant when it’s still not yet two o’clock on
that July afternoon in 1863.” Likewise, for many white Southerners of the postwar decades it
was still not yet two thirty on that April afternoon in 1862 and Albert Sidney Johnston had not
yet fallen.47
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Chapter Three:
“On what models shall we mold the characters of our children?”:
Remembering the Army of Tennessee’s High Command

Over three days in June 1897, the United Confederate Veterans held its annual reunion in
Nashville, the site of the Army of Tennessee’s most disastrous defeat. Now it was a place for
aging soldiers to reconnect with old comrades, remember those who had died, and memorialize
the cause for which they had fought. If the 36,800 meals the hosting hotel prepared are any
indication, the event was well attended. In the activities of the reunion, it was apparent that
former Rebels remembered the Civil War beyond the campaigns of Robert E. Lee and his Army
of Northern Virginia. Governor Robert Love Taylor led the crowd in singing “Dixie” and gave a
welcoming address in which he reminded the attendees that they had convened to honor those
who had followed Albert Sidney Johnston and Stonewall Jackson, those who had died at Shiloh
and Gettysburg.1
After two more speeches in which a bishop and a judge assured the old soldiers that
defeat in the war had not degraded their masculinity, John Brown Gordon, the UCV commander,
took the stage. Noting that this was the second time Tennessee had hosted the organization’s
annual reunion, he asked his audience: “What state of those which formed the Confederate
Union is more worthy of this repeated tribute from these Confederate survivors? What state in
the whole American Union can boast a prouder record in war and peace?” Despite being divided
in sentiment during the Civil War, the state “furnished to the Southern army some of its most
dauntless divisions and brilliant leaders. Among these latter were her Frank Cheatham, whose
fiery ‘Forward, boys!’ sent his yelling ranks with resistless fury against the foe; her quaint and
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unrivaled Bedford Forrest, that wizard of war, that wiliest knight that ever straddled horse or
leveled lance; her bishop-soldier, Leonidas Polk, worthy to bear the name and be forever
associated in history with that great Grecian Leonidas, who won an immortality of fame in
defense of Greek freedom and the Greek confederacy.” The wartime record of the army that
bore the state’s name was seemingly inconsequential; in the Army of Tennessee there had been
generals who embodied Lost Cause tenets of martial superiority, piety, and masculinity.2
While Albert Sidney Johnston was the only commander of the Army of Tennessee to
ascend to the supreme echelon of the Lost Cause pantheon, other members of its high command
played important roles in the army’s memory. Perhaps nowhere was the phenomenon of
circumvention more prevalent than in the ways white Southerners remembered the army’s
generals. As a whole, the high command had been dysfunctional, contentious, and incompetent.
Its actual performance during the Civil War fell considerably short of the Lost Cause ideal of
Confederate leaders as selfless and pious patriots and capable and manly generals. But after the
war former Confederates constructed images of individual generals that circumvented the sad
historical truth. Four distinct archetypes emerged in the commemoration of the army’s high
command: the scapegoat, the unappreciated military genius, the genteel man of faith, and the
hyper-masculine anti-hero. Some leaders embodied multiple archetypes. For example, former
Confederates lauded Nathan Bedford Forrest for his rough-and-tumble upbringing and violent
wartime behavior while lamenting his relatively limited responsibilities during the war.
Some generals did not fare as well as Forrest in the decades following the conflict. If, as
Thomas L. Connelly and Barbara Bellows posit, postwar white Southerners rationalized Lee’s
defeat by ascribing it to “God and General Longstreet,” then “God and General Bragg” could, for
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many, explain the Army of Tennessee’s failure. While his rank and service won him some
admirers (and some military historians have recently begun rehabilitating his reputation as a
general), Braxton Bragg largely assumed the role of scapegoat in Confederate memory. The
Bragg fragment of the army’s memory, instead of circumventing defeat, confronted it head on
and laid the blame on the cantankerous North Carolinian.3
Bragg’s wartime reputation as a curmudgeon and a bumbling commander followed him
into the postwar period; his inaction following Chickamauga earned him the most scorn. George
E. Purvis, in the same Confederate Veteran article in which he identified Albert Sidney
Johnston’s death as the Confederacy’s most disastrous contingency, insisted that “the hesitation
and fatal delay of Bragg at Chickamauga” also contributed to ultimate defeat. Although
Chickamauga was a Confederate victory—the only important one in the Army of Tennessee’s
history—Purvis refused to give Bragg credit, claiming instead that the victory belonged to the
soldiery. Ignoring Forrest’s advice to immediately pursue the retreating Yankee army, Bragg
displayed a “stubborn refusal” that was “simply inexplicable” unless one acknowledged that the
Confederacy was fated to loose. William Mercer Otey, a staff officer under Polk and Forrest,
expressed similar bewilderment in his serialized reminiscences: “Why Gen. Bragg did not press
forward and reap the fruits of his victory is a matter of wonderment now as it was then.”4
While some storytellers gave credit to the men in the ranks, for others James Longstreet
was the hero of Chickamauga. In an 1893 speech to the Confederate Survivors’ Association in
Augusta, Georgia, former colonel Charles C. Jones presented the battle as a titanic clash between
noble adversaries. It was Longstreet’s initiative, not Bragg’s, that won the battle. Bragg had not
only failed to attack the Union army in detail prior to the battle but “in like manner he neglected
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to reap the legitimate fruits of this dearly-bought victory, contenting himself with seizing and
occupying the heights encircling Chattanooga.” Thanks to Bragg, the army’s singular triumph
was wasted.5
Similar convictions were conveyed to a younger audience a few years later in Susan
Pendleton Lee’s grade-school textbook. She awarded the laurels of victory at Chickamauga to
Longstreet and censured Bragg for failing to pursue the retreating federals. He had shirked
responsibility and, “unfortunately for the South, he was retained in his position, notwithstanding
the dissatisfaction of his army.” Lee also faulted Bragg’s generalship earlier in the war. She did
acknowledge that he had improved the army’s discipline after assuming command and that the
Southern people had expected great things from him at the outset of the Kentucky Campaign.
However, she credited Leonidas Polk for the Confederate success on the first day of Perryville,
asserted that “the South justly felt that with more rapid movements Bragg could have
accomplished more,” and concluded that Bragg “had misused his opportunities.” Likewise, after
Murfreesboro “the whole South was astonished to find him again falling back. Both the country
and the army lost confidence in him.”6
Other critics likewise attacked Bragg for blunders besides those immediately following
Chickamauga. An anonymous “ex-Kentuckian,” chronicling the 1862 invasion of Kentucky for
the Veteran in 1915, admitted that Bragg had conducted the early stages of the campaign well
and thus gained “some brilliant successes for the Confederates.” However, when it came time to
seize the initiative, Bragg had balked. A more aggressive general would have captured
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Louisville: “a Stonewall Jackson or an Albert Sidney Johnston would have dashed upon the city
and taken it by assault.” Moreover, the campaign’s climactic battle at Perryville “was a
burlesque.” The ex-Kentuckian lamented that the Confederate army had not been commanded
by “a Napoleon, a Frederick the Great,” or, again, “a Stonewall Jackson.”7
Two of the most often cited first-hand accounts of the Civil War also took aim at Bragg.
Reflecting on the Battle of Chickamauga, Mary Boykin Chesnut remarked that “Bragg and his
generals do not agree. I think a general worthless whose subalterns quarrel with him. Something
is wrong about the man. Good generals are adored by their soldiers. See Napoleon, Caesar,
Stonewall, Lee.” The subsequent siege of Chattanooga and defeats at Lookout Mountain and
Missionary Ridge only confirmed her low estimate of the North Carolinian. “Bragg begs to be
relieved of his command,” she opined; “the army will be relieved to get rid of him. He has a
winning way of earning everybody’s detestation. Heaven’s how they hate him!” Less vitriolic
than Chesnut, Sam Watkins presented Bragg not as detestable but as pitiable. Discussing the
battles at Chattanooga he recalled that “I felt sorry for Bragg. The army was routed, and Bragg
looked so scared. Poor fellow, he looked so hacked and whipped and mortified and chagrined at
defeat.” Bragg never gained the rank-and-file’s respect, wrote Watkins; had he done so “the
result would have been different.”8
Bragg was not entirely without defenders. An anonymous 1873 letter to the editor of the
North Carolina periodical Our Living and Our Dead insisted that “had Gen. Bragg been born in
the ‘Old Dominion’ . . . he would be classed somewhat higher by the people of that State than he
is now, and North Carolinians would have then rendered him justice, which they have not done,
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as a son of their own State.” Like some modern military historians, the letter writer believed that
many of the Army of Tennessee’s failures resulted not from Bragg’s blunders but from
insubordination among his lieutenants. Others were only lukewarm in their defense of Bragg.
An 1895 tribute praised his industry, organization, sobriety, and clear and concise writing but
concluded that “if he only had suavity of manner commensurate with his self-denying patriotism
and untiring industry, what a grandly successful man he would be!”9
While a few of Bragg’s contemporaries had kind words for him, he existed in postwar
Confederate memory largely as a pariah and a scapegoat. Former colonel William Oates
encapsulated Bragg’s postwar image in his 1905 history of the war, claiming that “the victory of
Chickamauga, won at a fearful cost, was rendered barren by the inaction and lack of enterprise of
the commanding general. I never did see or hear of any good excuse for it.” His image was the
inverse of Albert Sidney Johnston’s: instead of lamenting that he did not command longer, many
ex-Confederates regretted that he had risen to command at all.10
Interestingly, white Southerners’ memories of Bragg’s predecessor, P. G. T. Beauregard,
were much less negative, at least as they pertained to the Army of Tennessee. The logical
extension of the Albert Sidney Johnston myth would make Beauregard a pariah like Bragg, but
with a few exceptions this was not the case. This is probably because his relationship with the
western army was so fleeting and tenuous. When he was discussed in the postwar period he was
generally linked with Fort Sumter or First Manassas or cited simply as an exemplar of martial
ability and manhood without reference to specific military actions. Thus, Beauregard’s role in
the Army of Tennessee’s memory was less significant than that of any of the army’s other
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commanders. Nevertheless, on occasion his character and generalship were lauded in connection
with his short tenure as leader of the western army.
Colonel George C. Porter, former commander of the 6th Tennessee Infantry, embraced
the Albert Sidney Johnston myth without blaming Beauregard for Rebel defeat at Shiloh.
Portraying the scene in the immediate aftermath of Johnston’s death, Porter wrote dramatically
that “the supreme moment has arrived. The crisis is at hand. A painful silence is both seen and
felt. But no bugle charge is sounded.” However, he blamed Beauregard’s failure to maintain the
initiative not on his shortcomings as a general, but on the fact that he was “sick and feeble.” In
editorial commentary following Porter’s narrative, S. A. Cunningham further rose to
Beauregard’s defense, making it clear that this critique of Beauregard’s generalship, as mild as it
had been, would not have been published “except in explanation that General Beauregard was ill.
We are all human, and General Beauregard’s action was doubtless influenced by sympathy for
his men.” (Unfortunately for Braxton Bragg, the Veteran showed less hesitation when publishing
material that denigrated his reputation and generalship.) Susan Pendleton Lee offered a different
but still sympathetic explanation of Beauregard’s failure to press the attack. Children reading her
Brief History of the United States were assured that Beauregard was concerned for the safety of
his men as they would be coming into range of Union gunboats on the Tennessee River.11
Beauregard did have detractors. In his 1918 reminiscences of the war, Army of
Tennessee veteran Lot D. Young insisted that as evening approached on the first day at Shiloh
Grant’s men were huddled in fear on the banks of the Tennessee River and Confederate soldiers
were clamoring for the order to attack; “what a moment of grand anticipation and oh, how quick
the heart beat!” But the order did not come. Fully embracing the Albert Sidney Johnston myth,
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Young believed that Beauregard was “unwilling to finish the day’s work so gloriously begun and
so successfully executed up to the hour of [Johnston’s] fall,” and that “here in this hour was
sacrificed the opportunity of the Southland’s cause, here was thrown away, so to speak—the
grandest opportunity ever offered to any general in modern times. . . . [H]ere was lost the
opportunity of the ‘Lost Cause.’”12
Unlike Bragg, Beauregard had any number of defenders willing to come to his aid on the
relatively rare occasions that he was blamed for failure in the west. Y. R. Le Monnier, a former
Louisiana private and Shiloh veteran, did so in a 1913 pamphlet. He took exception to William
Preston Johnston’s (and others’) insistence that Shiloh was lost when Beauregard took command.
Le Monnier dismissed that claim as “most preposterous and ridiculous.” Instead, he wrote, defeat
could be explained largely by the army’s numerical inferiority, inexperience, and lack of
supplies. Moreover, Johnston was not blameless for Rebel defeat at Shiloh. Le Monnier also
argued that Jefferson Davis was a millstone around Beauregard’s neck, preventing the Creole
from accomplishing what he was capable of as a commander.13
Like other Confederate military heroes, Beauregard was lauded and defended in language
using masculine tropes. In his address to the Confederate Survivors’ Association in Augusta,
Charles C. Jones told his audience that Beauregard, who had recently died, was “of noble
lineage.” He was also a capable officer, as he proved in the Mexican War and at Fort Sumter,
and during the course of the Civil War became “a trusted leader of armies,—moved by valiant
impulses,—imbued with the loftiest patriotism,—observant of the most exalted conceptions of
civilized warfare.” Jones also reminded his listeners that he was present when the first and last
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shots of the Civil War were fired, but chose not to mention that Beauregard was largely
marginalized in the interim. He had always exhibited “the valor of the accomplished soldier and
the knightliest traits of the defender of the rights and honor of a beleaguered nation." He was
“without controversy one of the greatest of modern generals.”14
While Bragg’s image was largely negative and Beauregard’s, at least in its relation to the
Army of Tennessee, was somewhat ambiguous, postwar perceptions of certain other highranking western generals were undeniably positive. (Because their images were most often
linked with specific contingencies and moments, Joseph E. Johnston and John Bell Hood will be
discussed in chapter five). No general exemplified the unappreciated military genius archetype
better than Patrick R. Cleburne. Despite his stellar command record, Cleburne’s Irish heritage,
lack of a West Point education, and censored proposal to emancipate slaves in exchange for
military service led to his being passed over for promotion on numerous occasions.
Nevertheless, he was beloved by his men and in the postwar period he became an exemplar of
white Southern martial abilities. In 1866 a tribute to Cleburne appeared in the pages of The Land
We Love, a popular periodical edited by Army of Tennessee veteran Daniel Harvey Hill.
Devoted to agriculture, Civil War history, and literature, the magazine had a circulation of
twelve thousand by 1867. Cleburne, it said, “was the soul of honor, of courage, and of every
manly quality.” Unfortunately for the Confederacy, his introversion and humility “prevented his
extraordinary merits from being fully known”; yet twice he saved the “luckless” Bragg from
destruction. While he never rose above the rank of major general, “on the field of battle, he had
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an eye as rapid to take in every object as that of Forrest himself, and in the drill and handling of
his troops he had no superior and probably no equal in the Confederate service.”15
Sam Watkins’s oft-quoted Company Aytch also depicted Cleburne as a military genius,
pointing especially to his role at Ringgold Gap. Following the Chattanooga battles, said
Watkins, the Yankee pursuers were bent on capturing the entire Rebel army, marching on
Atlanta, and ending the war. Luckily for the Confederacy, Cleburne was assigned to stop their
pursuit. His men repulsed so many attackers that the battlefield “had the appearance of the roof
of a house shingled with dead Yankees.” Ringgold Gap was the army’s Thermopylae and
Cleburne its Leonidas. The battle proved Cleburne to be “the best General of the army of
Tennessee,” the “Stonewall of the West,” and his generalship during the subsequent campaign
was characterized by bold planning, “nerve,” and “pluck.” While the Army of Tennessee was
defeated at the Battle of Atlanta in July 1864, Cleburne’s performance there “was the finest piece
of generalship, and the most successful of the war.” Similar language was used by another
veteran, Missouri private Phillip D. Stephenson. Writing his memoirs in 1896, he claimed that in
the war’s early months Cleburne, despite his reticence and modesty, was “looked up to by the
whole army, as the ‘rising star!’” He was one of the true military geniuses the war produced;
“like Stonewall Jackson or Grant or Sherman, he never would have been heard of if it had not
been for the war. He was a born soldier—and nothing else. . . . [T]he army was his proper sphere
and war his necessary atmosphere.”16
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Other veterans likewise lauded Cleburne. In 1893, T. O. Moore, formerly of the 7th
Texas Volunteer Infantry, penned a letter to the New Orleans Picayune offering anecdotes about
the general during the Atlanta Campaign. Cleburne “was a gallant soldier,” he wrote, and “a hard
fighter, always kind and courteous to his men, who almost worshiped him.” Moreover, his men
had absolute faith in his generalship and “believed ‘old Pat’ could whip all creation.” Cleburne
was also a man of good humor who punished the deserving and rewarded the meritorious; “how
could we help admiring him?” Reflecting on Cleburne’s death at Franklin, Moore concluded
that “had he lived and the war continued, he was bound to have risen to great distinction as an
officer.”17
Southerners too young to have served in the war echoed such sentiments. Novelist,
humorist, and editor John Trotwood Moore was moved by the display of one of Cleburne’s battle
flags at the 1897 UCV reunion to write the poem “Cleburne’s Banner.” He made it clear that the
flag witnessed the finest moments in the Army of Tennessee’s history:

Shiloh saw it sweep from under
Like a tempest in its wrath;
Chickamauga heard its thunder,
Felt the lighting of its path.
Ringgold Gap, New Hope, and Dalton,
Peachtree Creek—Atlanta, too—
Till it kissed the bloody Harpeth,
Where it broke the ranks of blue—
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Till it kissed the bloody Harpeth,
And its blue was turned to red,
When it floated from the breastworks
Over gallant Cleburne—dead!

Moore concluded his poem with the claim that Cleburne’s banner, “fearless, and without a flaw,”
would always answer the call when freedom was threatened.18
Although not as prominent in Confederate memory as Cleburne, Alexander P. Stewart
was also praised for his martial abilities. Stewart had spent most of the war at the head of a
brigade or a division, but was thrust into corps command during the chaos of the Atlanta
Campaign. His actual record as a lieutenant general was checkered, but the memory of it was
laudatory. D. W. Sanders, in a serialized history of Hood’s Tennessee Campaign published in the
Southern Bivouac, discussed Stewart’s generalship in relation to the Spring Hill debacle. Hood
insisted that his subordinates, including Stewart, had failed to carry out his orders, but his
generals claimed that such orders were never issued. Sanders came to Stewart’s defense, writing
that he “was an able and accomplished general, with a reputation won on the fields of battle that
reflected the heroic deeds of the army of Tennessee in its grandest efforts.” Moreover, he
commanded brave troops who never failed in their duty; had Hood in fact ordered Stewart to
attack, it would have resulted in “one of the most brilliant and bloody episodes of the late war.”19
In 1895, B. L. Ridley, a former staff officer of Stewart’s, paid his commander tribute in
his serialized reminiscences. Ridley recalled that even as a major of artillery Stewart was a thorn
in the side of Ulysses S. Grant, and that it was on Albert Sidney Johnston’s recommendation that
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he received his brigadier general’s commission. While the 1864 campaign in Georgia was
disastrous for the Confederacy, Stewart’s generalship, particularly at New Hope Church, was
invaluable, resulting in the near destruction of a Union corps and the salvation of part of
Johnston’s army. “When other commanders found that Stewart was supporting them, on right or
left,” said Ridley, “all was well; and when he struck the enemy, there were frequently
heartrending scenes of carnage and of blood.” Stewart was also beloved by his men, who called
him “Old Straight”; they knew that “he would not willingly sacrifice them, whenever he said to
do so, they would leap into the very jaws of death.”20
Philip Stephenson too held Stewart in high regard. Although Stewart was “never
regarded by the men as having the qualities of greatness,” his steady climb through the ranks was
the result of merit; “he never seemed to make a mistake!” He was “of high Christian character,”
always concerned with his soldiers’ well-being, unflinching in battle, and an inspiration to
anyone who glimpsed “his calm tranquil face in a time of peril or doubt.” Reflecting on Hood’s
indecisiveness following the disaster at Nashville, Stephenson said that Stewart “seemed to be
our real leader.”21
A devout Christian who pursued a career as a professor before and after the war, Stewart
also embodied the genteel man of faith archetype. Members of the Association of the Army of
Tennessee paid tribute to the general after his death in 1908. They said that, as one who educated
young Southerners in his positions as chancellor of the University of Mississippi and
commissioner of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, he “showed the
great weight of his knowledge.” Modest and dutiful, he eschewed notoriety—as befitted a
Christian patriot. When Stewart’s wife, “a true specimen of the charming Southern lady,” died
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he shouldered the devastating grief “with that beautiful resignation characteristic of the true
Christian.”22
Other veterans likewise fondly remembered Stewart’s faith. In 1909 James W. Lee,
veteran of the 3rd Texas Regiment, provided the Veteran with an anecdote illustrating Stewart’s
piety. During the Atlanta Campaign some three thousand Confederate soldiers gathered for a
prayer meeting. An officer wearing general’s insignia arrived, dismounted from his horse, and
joined the soldiers. Always modest and unassuming, Stewart was unknown to many who saw
him there; “as he left every man stood in silence and lifted his hat . . . but before the sun went
down that day they all knew that it was Lieut. Gen. Alex P. Stewart, one of the bravest and best
corps commanders in the Army of Tennessee. The simple act of unostentatious humility and
piety on the part of an earnest Christian soldier did more good than many eloquent sermons.”
Lee concluded his tribute by noting that “many silent prayers, ‘God bless that general,’ went up
that day.”23
Some of Stewart’s admirers feared that his modesty and reticence would obscure his
image in the postwar decades. “Gen. Stewart,” wrote a Tennessee veteran in a 1904 tribute,
“with his lifelong persistency in avoiding notoriety, has kept himself out of sight.” But now “the
time has come when it is due Tennessee and the men he commanded that he allow those of us
who knew him long and well to speak the truth in part at least. He must permit the State to bear
the honors he won for her.” With Stewart’s health declining, the author feared that the general
would go to his grave without receiving his just praise; “he must grant the request of his old
students and soldiers to crown his closing years with at least a modest statement of the truth
evidenced by our best generals that there was no conflict between Christian faith and
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Confederate service. Of this fact there has been through the years no brighter example than Gen.
Alex P. Stewart.”24
The generalship and gentility that formed the foundation of Stewart’s image were best
captured in a tribute after his death by former Tennessee governor James D. Porter. The general
had been with the army from its inception as the Provisional Army of Tennessee until its
surrender at Durham Station, Porter noted, “and he never went upon the battlefield that he did
not distinguish himself.” Stewart loved his men and they loved him and he always had the
confidence of his superiors. He was courageous and modest; “a fine specimen of a man.” Simply
put, “Tennessee never produced a better soldier nor a more perfect gentleman.”25
In addition to serving as a symbol of white Southern martial ability, gentility, and piety
Stewart played a role in shaping the public’s memory of his fellow officers. In 1890 the
Secretary of War appointed him commissioner of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National
Military Park. For the next decade the aging general worked tirelessly to ensure that his old
comrades were immortalized in stone on those battlefields. On May 12, 1898, when
representatives from Stewart’s home state of Tennessee unveiled monuments and regimental
markers at Chickamauga, Stewart delivered an address. “Neither this nor any other country,” he
proclaimed, “has ever produced a race of men and women superior to the Southern men and
women of the Confederate times.” He praised the people of the South for their progress since the
war and assured the members of the audience that if they provided their children with role
models who displayed piety, intelligence, and morality the region would continue to prosper. He
continued: “Perhaps you will ask: ‘On what models shall we mold the characters of our
children?’” The South would never lack idols for its young, he said. They “will study the life and
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character of the peerless, the magnanimous, the majestic, the kingly Lee. . . . They will study the
life and character of the great Albert Sidney Johnston” and “that other astute, sagacious, skillful
Johnston whose men loved him.” There were other models as well—many of them associated
with the Army of Tennessee:

Then there was the chivalrous and scientific Beauregard, the brave Hood, the
gallant Frank Cheatham; the intrepid Christian soldier, Leonidas Polk . . . and that
untutored genius of war, ‘the wizard of the saddle,’ Nathan Bedford Forrest, who
bade defiance to every known rule of the science of war and created a science of
war for himself. . . . Let your sons study the lives and characters of these and of
many others of our great heroic men.26

Other “heroic men” who embodied the unappreciated military genius archetype could be
found among lower-ranking generals. William B. Bate began the Civil War as a private, but after
being elected colonel of the 2nd Tennessee Infantry he rose through the ranks, finishing the war
as a division commander under Benjamin F. Cheatham. Seriously wounded at Shiloh, he
recovered and went on to fight at Tullahoma, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Atlanta, Franklin,
Nashville, and Bentonville. Testifying to Bate’s martial prowess, George T. Fry, a colonel who
had served under him, stated in 1894 that “Mars was the god of war. Bate is Mars. I have seen
him on the battle’s crest leading Tennesseans to victory, to glory, and to death.” At
Chickamauga, despite still suffering from his Shiloh wounds, he behaved “like the lion-hearted
hero he was.” Fry concluded his tribute by expressing the conviction that had Bate commanded
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the Army of Tennessee at Chickamauga “Rosecrans’s army would not only have been routed
from the field . . . but would to a man have been captured at Chattanooga or drowned in the
Tennessee River, and thus would have changed the fortunes of the war.”27
After the war, Bate served as governor of Tennessee and U.S. senator. Upon his death in
1905 his colleagues in Washington eulogized him effusively. A Missouri representative called
him “a Christian gentleman of the old school.” Edward W. Carmack, Bate’s fellow Tennessee
senator, portrayed Bate’s life as “full of strivings and honorable ambitions. . . . In addition to all
this, and higher and better than all this, the Christian’s faith and hope were his; so that his
peaceful death, met with calm and quiet resignation was a fitting close to such a life.” Carmack
made it clear that Bate was also a man of war: “the martial, the military instinct in General Bate
was strong.” To go over his specific military accomplishments was unnecessary for “there are
volumes of eulogy in the simple statement that he entered the army as a private soldier and left it
as a major-general.” Such sentiments were echoed by others. A Virginia senator stated that “the
war records make enduring pedestal for the statue of his fame,” while a Tennessean noted that
from Shiloh to Nashville Bate “was a conspicuous and distinguished figure . . . always dashing,
gallant and courageous”—so much so that one of the army’s other unappreciated generals, A. P.
Stewart, bestowed on him the sobriquet “the Indomitable Bate.”28
Tennessee representative Walter P. Brownlow situated his praise of Bate within a
discussion of Confederate generalship and soldiers’ bravery. “If Tennessee’s Confederate
soldiers were less successful in battle than were their comrades of the Army of Northern
Virginia,” he professed, “it was not because they were inferior in any respect, but because it was
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not their fortune to have Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, and Gordon for leadership.” However, it was
their fortune to have such brave and capable lower-ranking generals as Bate. In fact, said
Brownlow, Bate was second only to Nathan Bedford Forrest in Tennessee’s pantheon of
Confederate icons. Perhaps the most energetic advocate of Bate’s generalship was Arkansas
representative Joseph Taylor Robinson, who took his audience through every battle in which
Bate participated. While the Army of Tennessee lost nearly all these engagements, Robinson
said, there was always a regiment or a brigade commanded by a capable commander, in this case
Bate, which stood firm and undaunted amid the chaos of defeat.29
While some generals were remembered primarily for their military acumen, others were
lauded more for their gentility and piety. Chief among these was Leonidas Polk. Few exConfederates applauded explicit episodes in his military record and even fewer felt that he
should have held greater command responsibilities. As Phillip Stephenson stated, Polk “was a
living monument to the purity of our cause” but, as a corps commander, “not brilliant, nor great
in any sense.” White Southerners focused on that perceived “purity” and constructed a memory
of Polk centered on his career as a man of the cloth and educator. After all, Christian piety was a
key tenet of genteel masculinity in the Old South. These themes were evident immediately
following the Bishop’s death during the Atlanta Campaign. His funeral service, held in St. Paul’s
Church in Augusta, Georgia, on June 29, 1864, was replete with the tropes of gentility and faith.
The eulogizer, Stephen Elliot, bishop of the diocese of Georgia, made many references to Polk’s
bravery and abilities as a soldier, insisting that Polk was an asset to the Confederate war effort.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Elliot and his audience were more moved by Polk’s Christian
character. Elliot told of the Fighting Bishop’s final minutes, in which he reconnoitered the
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enemy’s position with Joseph E. Johnston and William J. Hardee. At one point the general
paused, perhaps to take in the scenery, “or, as is more probable to spend a short interval in silent
communion with his God.” He was killed “as he stood thus occupied, his arms folded upon his
breast, and his face wearing the composed and reverent look of an humble and trusting
worshipper.” Even the violence of his death, argued Elliot, did not rob the Bishop of his spiritual
stoicism.30
Certain that Polk’s image would never vanish from history, Elliot assured his audience
that the general was an example for the ages and an instrument of God’s will. He was “of heroic
lineage, with the fiery blood of the Revolution coursing in his veins, of independent fortune, of
chivalric tone,” and “of high and noble impulses.” Polk’s genteel manhood made him the ideal
educator and minister. His decision to leave the military for the clergy was irrefutable proof of
his devotion to God. He was selected as the missionary bishop of the southwest because “the
Church needed a man of high social position, with the carriage and manners of a gentleman, with
the courtesy and grace of a well-bred Christian, to commend her to the consideration of men of
hereditary wealth, of great refinement, of cultivated accomplishments.” But Polk could minister
not only to his social equals but also to the lower classes; and he was the only man capable of
corralling the greed and immorality in the region. He wielded influence with those representing
the “extremes of established position, and of struggle for position—of old settled landholders and
of needy adventurers—of men with all the polish of foreign refinement and of men with all the
strength of unpolished intelligence. The Bishop who should go forth to conquer that country for
the Church must possess manners as well as energy—cultivation as well as Christian courage.”
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For decades after the war, clergymen such as Elliot found in Polk’s image a useful example for
their flock.31
Two years after Polk’s death he received tribute in The Land We Love. While there was
little love lost between D. H. Hill and Polk during the war, the editor still found much to praise in
the latter’s gentlemanly and Christian character. The profile suggested that Polk’s character was
marked by gentility even in his childhood and that “his sole aim at first was to do what was
becoming a gentleman.” At West Point, Polk was “admired for his character, which was free
from everything low and bad.” While a student, he was lucky enough to befriend Albert Sidney
Johnston, who became his surrogate older brother. Like those who emphasized that Stonewall
Jackson, J. E. B. Stuart, and John Brown Gordon were esteemed by Lee, Hill made it clear that
Johnston found Polk “worthy.” After sharing several anecdotes illustrating the Bishop’s
gentility, patriotism, wit, and piety, Hill concluded that “the memory of his single-minded
devotion to God and to his duty will never be forgotten.” Absent was any discussion of Polk’s
role in the Civil War. Perhaps Hill realized that mentioning that would mar the Bishop’s
memory. Or, because Polk had blamed Hill for some of the mishaps in the army’s career, the
latter may have realized he would be implicitly criticizing his own generalship if he discussed
the war.32
William M. Polk, the bishop’s son and first significant biographer, wanted to make sure
his father’s image as a Christian gentleman was well engrained in public memory. The majority
of his two volumes were spent chronicling and defending Polk’s Civil War career; yet the author
believed that his father was a clergyman first and a soldier second. Even amid the grand drama
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of the Civil War, “his dearest wish was to return to that chosen field [the ministry] as the
shepherd of a Christian flock.” The final words in the biography come not come from the author
but from Stephen Elliot’s oration at the Bishop’s funeral. At least for the Bishop’s son, words
first heard just days after Polk’s death still best described his father in 1915. “Born to large
hereditary estates,” Elliot stated, Polk “lived a life of almost entire self-denial.” While his career
as a soldier was characterized by violence and struggle, the battles “he waged against the pomps
and vanities of the world and the pride of life . . . were far more terrific than Belmont, or Shiloh,
or Perryville. These required qualities which were natural to him; those qualities which came
from the grace of God and the spirit of Jesus.” The son’s estimate of his father’s true
contributions to the South was shared by some of his readers. One reviewer, troubled by the
number of pages devoted to the war years, said “it was, perhaps, undesirable that so much space
was given to the military career of General Polk at the expense of the ecclesiastical career of
Bishop Polk.” Cutting to the heart of Polk’s postwar image, the reviewer concluded: “His
military work has gone; his episcopal and educational work remain.”33
Susan Pendleton Lee conveyed similar sentiments to the next generation of white
Southerners in her schoolbook. Perhaps as concerned with her readers’ moral education as she
was with their historical instruction, Lee assured students that Polk was a “brave” and “good
man.” Once again absent was any discussion of his generalship. Nevertheless, in his final days,
“he had been most earnest in the discharge of his religious duties.” She chronicled Polk’s
baptism of Johnston and Hood during the Dalton revival and mentions that, at his death, he had
four religious tracts in his pocket that were “soaked with his heart’s blood.” She concluded her
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discussion of Polk by affirming that “all who knew him testified that he was a noble, pure,
sincere, Christian man.” Revealing the true lesson of Polk’s life for children in the New South,
at the end of the chapter Lee suggested this quiz question: “How had [Polk’s] last days been
spent?”34
Another element of Polk’s memory was his image as an educator. For many in the Old
South, formal education was a key tenet of genteel masculinity; historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown
argues that “learning, especially of the venerable kind, marked the possessor as a gentleman.” In
Suwanee, Tennessee, in 1857, Polk and several other episcopal bishops founded the University
of the South, whose purpose was to provide white Southern students with collegiate education
free from Northern influences. While the disruption of the Civil War delayed the opening of the
institution until 1866, this scholarly endeavor was lauded by many former Confederates. An
1895 profile of the university stated that “had it not been for the war, Bishop Polk would
unquestionably have realized all his hopes for the University of the South!” While the war
robbed the South of one of its greatest philanthropic educators, the university eventually
flourished. It was a collaborative effort, yet “its foundation is undoubtedly due to the Right
Reverend Leonidas Polk, Bishop of Louisiana.”35
The pious gentleman archetype was exemplified in commemorations of lower-ranking
generals as well. Yale-educated Randall Lee Gibson was a colonel and brigadier general in the
army, serving at Shiloh, Perryville, Chickamauga, Atlanta, Franklin, and Nashville. After the
war he was elected to both the House of Representatives and the Senate and he was invited to
give the oration when the Association of the Army of Tennessee unveiled the equestrian statue of
Albert Sidney Johnston in New Orleans in 1887. After Gibson’s death, his colleagues in
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Washington were effusive in their praise; Gibson, they said, represented the best of what the
South had to offer civilization. No fewer than seventeen representatives and senators eulogized
him. As president of the board of administrators at Tulane University and a regent of the
Smithsonian Institution, Gibson, like Polk and Stewart, was lauded for his commitment to
education. One eulogizer called him “a great and good man” and an “example of a useful,
honorable, and patriotic life,” and noted that he was of “Revolutionary stock” and that “no defect
of early education was his.” His formative years were spent in a “refined and cultivated
atmosphere”; he was “born of a race of country gentlemen.” Despite his lack of military training,
he had served the army dutifully, honorably, and courageously. After the war, “the charm of his
personality” and “the breadth of his cultivation” aided Gibson in his goal of helping reunite the
North and South.36
In addition to emphasizing his gentility, Gibson’s eulogizers made clear that he was a
man of faith. One of his colleagues, Edward Douglas White of Louisiana, mentioned coming
across Gibson reading the Psalms in the days before his death. This had led to a conversation
about the hereafter in which Gibson revealed that he had “reached the conclusion that outside the
broad principles of religion there is no hope for mortals here below or hereafter.” Thus, the
speaker guaranteed his audience, “as the Angel of Death came to bear [Gibson] from the land of
Time to the land of Eternity, he passed fortified and blessed by the consolation of a faith in the
infinite mercy and wisdom of God.” White concluded by quoting Matthew: “Blessed are the
pure in heart, for they shall see God.” These sentiments were echoed by former Army of
Tennessee cavalry commander Joseph Wheeler of Alabama, who told his colleagues and the
deceased’s friends and family that when he passed from this world he did so with “confidence in
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all that Christians believe of the life to come.” Charles J. Boatner of Louisiana encapsulated
Gibson’s memory in the closing lines of his eulogy: “A brave and loyal soldier, a faithful
representative of the people, a devoted husband and father, a benevolent and self-sacrificing
friend and Christian gentleman has gone to his rest.” While his eulogizers praised his military
service, it is clear that the traits in Gibson that they found most worthy were his faith and
gentility.37
The masculine ideal in the South wore two faces. Some leaders were lauded not for their
piety and gentility but for their temper, vices, and violent behavior. The purest example of this
hyper-masculine, anti-heroic archetype was Nathan Bedford Forrest. The language employed to
describe Forrest in the postwar decades contrasted starkly with that describing such generals as
Lee, Jackson, and Polk. For example, in 1896 the Reverend John R. Deering, a former Rebel
scout, wrote a letter to the Harrodsburg, Kentucky, Democrat criticizing the lack of
reconciliationist spirit in the ranks of the Grand Army of the Republic. It was only a matter of
time, he claimed, until all humanity recognized the virtues of Confederate leaders. Jefferson
Davis was “stainless,” Lee was “peerless,” Jackson was “mighty,” Turner Ashby was “modest,”
Polk was “sainted”—but Forrest was “terrible.”38
Scholars have noted the “terrible” image of Forrest; the controversial cavalryman is one
of the few aspects of the western theater whose memory has been analyzed by historians. Court
Carney posits that “to many [white Southerners], he was the quintessential Confederate hero,
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whose rough-hewn, unschooled martial style reflected the virtues of the southern ‘plain folk’;
others, in contrast, found him an ambiguous figure at best, preferring instead the stoicism of
Robert E. Lee over the more unruly Forrest.” Ironically, as Carny points out, the qualities that
earned Forrest scorn in the North—his “reckless ruffianism and cut-throat daring”—earned him
praise in the former Confederacy; some white Southerners saw in Forrest “an antidote to the
elitist eastern military institutions.” Paul Ashdown and Edward Caudill reach similar
conclusions in The Myth of Nathan Bedford Forrest. They identify three tenets of the “Forrest
myth.” First, what they label “the great if”: Would the war’s outcome have been different had
Forrest been given more strategic responsibility? Second, his “tough guy” image and Horatio
Alger-like life story. Third, his natural aptitude for war. 39
Forrest was also the only Confederate leader in the western theater to receive ample
attention from biographers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While these
storytellers lauded his martial abilities, rags-to-riches life story, and fiery temper they also
emphasized the role of the frontier in Forrest’s formative years. In these biographies and other
stories of Forrest the primitiveness of his upbringing was overstated. While middle Tennessee
and north Mississippi were certainly rural in the 1820s and 1830s they were not the untamed
wilderness presented by his storytellers, who insisted that Forrest came into the world on the
fringes of civilization. For some white Southerners trying to set themselves apart from the
North, there was something appealing about a man untainted by the niceties of established
society. An 1866 biography written by former officers Thomas Jordan and J. P. Pryor began and
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ended by emphasizing these tropes. During his formative years in rural Tennessee and
Mississippi Forrest was “trained to the hardest manual toil, practiced as a hunter of the game of
the country, and hardened by the manly exercises of the border.” Likewise, John Allan Wyeth,
the general’s most influential biographer of the nineteenth century, wrote that “for three
generations the Forrests had belonged to that restless race of pioneers who in search of home and
fortune had followed close upon the heels of savages.” Former captain J. Harvey Mathes, in his
1902 biography of the general, also emphasized the role of the frontier in Forrest’s youth. “The
Forrests were plain, honest people who were in the vanguard of fearless pioneers,” he claimed;
“they followed the bridleways of civilization.” Forrest and his family survived the frontier only
through hard work, practicality, and daring. Like the Southerner stereotyped in W. J. Cash’s
Mind of the South, Forrest was individualistic, violent, practical, and ruled by his passions. And
white Southerners loved him for it.40
A product of his “frontier” origins, Forrest’s particular brand of primal masculinity was
another key aspect of his postwar image. He was not like the chivalrous and saintly Lee or Polk.
Reflecting on his Civil War career, Jordan and Pyror concluded that Forrest was “endowed by
nature with as stormful, fiery a soul as ever blazed to heat and flame in any soldier. . . . A strong
man of action, of sleepless temper, strenuous, aggressive, and to whom war was a killing manner
of thing.” W. H. Brands, one of Forrest’s former staff officers, published a lengthy tribute to the
general in August 1866 in which he expressed similar assessments. Unlike other famed
Confederate horsemen such as Turner Ashby, who had “an inborn love of glory” and a “love of
the chivalrous, not practical,” or John S. Mosby, who reveled in senseless danger, Forrest
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possessed the practical grit to be successful in any walk of life. Brands maintained that Forrest’s
rise from obscurity to greatness through his own resolve paralleled that of the South as a whole.
He painted a violent image of Forrest’s generalship, describing it as “dash, mingled with
chivalric recklessness,” a “furious plunge, vivid as lightning and unexpected as the thunder’s
crash.” Moreover, “his doggedness of resolution . . . was like the grasp of death”; his victims
often witnessed “terror in the charge.”41
Forrest’s ferocity was manifested in both his character and his generalship. Of the
former, Brands admitted that “rough he undoubtedly was. This roughness we do not admire—do
not defend.” Nevertheless, the author proceeded to spill much ink defending this “roughness,” if
not overtly lauding it. Forrest was “truly a diamond of the first water—rough, unpolished, just
from its native quarry.” While he lacked “the culture of a Stuart or [Wade] Hampton,” his
roughness was the result of his hardscrabble formative years, not any inherent character flaws.
His violence and temper were bestowed by nurture, not nature. He was “frequently filled with
passion,” “knowing no control,” and “quick as powder,” and he indulged in personal combat
“oftener than wisdom justified.” However, his temperament moderated as the war progressed.
While he was impetuous, he was also calculating. And despite, or perhaps because of, his
ferocity, Forrest “was every inch a man in the darkest hour of the storm.”42
Forrest’s supposed lust for close-quarters combat was very much a part of his postwar
image. Reportedly having personally killed thirty Union soldiers and having had twenty-nine
horses shot out from under him, Forrest liked to jest that he came out of the war a horse ahead.
In 1897 Arkansas minister E. C. Faulker wrote of his last encounter with Forrest, shortly before
the war’s end. During an engagement at Dixie Station, Alabama, Forrest, having just killed a

41
42

Jordan and Pryor, Campaigns of General Nathan Bedford Forrest, 684; TLWL 1 (1866): 268-71.
TLWL 1 (1866): 268-71.

95

Union soldier in personal combat, had gashes on his face, a horse near death, and a bloody saber.
“Boys, I have bloodied this old blade again,” Faulker quoted the general saying, “and the first
man that runs I will stick it through him.” The “boys,” for their part, were offended that the
general could think men of their unit, the 8th Kentucky, were capable of such cowardice.43
That Forrest embraced violence was well known and often celebrated in postwar
memory. In a lengthy profile written for Confederate Veteran, J. P. Young lamented that Forrest,
despite being “a central figure in the great martial drama of the war between the states,” had not
received more biographical treatments. While he praised the work of Jordan and Pryor, he was
convinced that only those who had fought beside Forrest could be capable of conveying “the
heroic mold and fiery energy of this equestrian son of Mars.” Alluding to Forrest’s violent
proclivities, he stated that “no general officer ever dreamed of taking liberties with his hair
trigger temper.” Those under his command knew that to “disobey orders” or “abandon the field
in the presence of the enemy” would provoke “a wrath that was truly frightful.” Nevertheless,
Young made clear that these outbursts were not arbitrary and never directed at women;
moreover, Forrest was always approachable and appreciated a good joke, even if at his own
expense. Although not a pious man during the war, Forrest never disrespected religion and
eventually became “devout.”44
In addition to his egalitarian and anti-heroic qualities, Forrest’s natural gift for warfare
was a key aspect of his postwar memory and, in that respect, his image exemplifies the
unappreciated military genius archetype. Senator John W. Daniel of Virginia encapsulated this
in his 1892 address at the annual reunion of the UCV in New Orleans. Forrest was a natural
warrior, Daniel averred; “he felt the field as Blind Tom touches the keys of a piano. ‘War means
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killing,’ he said, ‘and the way to kill is to get there first with the most men.’ There is military
science—Napoleon, Stonewall and Lee—in a nutshell. He was not taught at West Point, but he
gave lessons to West Point.” Similarly, J.P. Young’s tribute praised Forrest as a soldier “without
training, but by instinct a very master of the art of war.” His rearguard action following the
defeat at Nashville, for example, saved the army from destruction and prolonged the
Confederacy’s life; “Forrest’s mailed hand was everywhere and struck steady, deadly blows.”
Moreover, “this masterly achievement has only its parallel in the heroic Ney, who covered
Napoleon’s beaten columns in the retreat from Russia.”45
While the rough-hewn Forrest was never as popular with white Southern women as were
the gentlemanly leaders like Lee, he did have his female admirers. In 1900 Mrs. T. J. Latham, on
becoming president of the Tennessee Division of the UDC, proclaimed that the erection of a
Forrest monument was her first priority; subsequently the Women’s Forrest Statue Association
was formed. The Veteran helpfully publicized the association’s efforts. A general of “matchless
genius,” “most daring courage, indomitable will and marvelous success,” said Cunningham,
Forrest should be immortalized in stone for the benefit of future generations. The editor added
that “it is well known that the military genius of Forrest was acknowledged in Europe before it
was recognized in America and that both Gens. Grant and Sherman realized his wonderful
capacity before it was appreciated by the Confederate generals.” A similar conviction was
expressed fifteen years later in a short piece about Civil War contingencies that stated that “the
greatest ‘if’ of all of the Confederacy was: If—they had recognized the true worth of Forrest
before it was too late.”46
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Latham accomplished her goal on May 16, 1905, when an equestrian statue of Forrest
was dedicated at Forrest Park in Memphis. Thirty thousand spectators watched as the general’s
great-granddaughter unveiled the monument and Judge J. P. Young, called on once again to
eulogize his former commander, gave the address. The Forrest he presented to the audience was
a man of contradictions, capable of both “vehemence in battle” and “soulful tenderness.” For
those under his command the war “was no holiday parade. It cost something to ride with
Forrest.” It meant suffering hardships and inflicting violence with a ferocity few outsiders could
understand. “It meant . . . to plunge, mounted, into the seeming vortex of hell. . . . It meant to
meet death face to face like a drillmaster, to look into his dread eyes, to toy with the horrid
trappings of his trade, to scorn the deadly chill of his breath, and to turn away unscathed or sink
into the oblivion of his eternal embrace.”47
The dual themes of violence and military brilliance were part of Forrest’s image
throughout the postwar decades. A 1900 tribute to his chief of artillery, Captain John Watson
Morton, marveled at Forrest’s use of cannon: “He entered the army knowing no more about
artillery tactics than a crusader of the Middle Ages.” Moreover, he succeeded in passing
something of his own gifts to the men under his command. Forrest was not leading professional
soldiers but common citizen volunteers who answered their country’s call and became, under his
firm guidance, warriors. “Who [else] could take a body of men, as did he, untutored, undrilled,
and unskilled, and make them to the enemy’s imagination so dreadfully persuasive and, in fact,
so terribly effective?” H. R. Hill of the 3rd Mississippi Infantry stated in a short submission to
the Veteran that “had Stonewall Jackson lived and been given 50,000 infantry, and Forrest given
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15,000 cavalry, they would have wiped the thing out and ‘carried the war into Africa,’ instead of
standing on the defensive and being worn out, as we were.”48
There was an anti-intellectual appeal in Forrest’s image as well. An oft-repeated anecdote
had Forrest supposedly saying, “I never see a pen but what I think of a snake.” Colonel John
Laws, Forrest’s former school teacher, presented the general in a similar light. Asked about
Forrest’s behavior in the classroom, Laws responded, “Bedford had plenty of sense, but would
not apply himself. He thought more of wrestling than his books.” While gentility stressed
education over ignorance, frontier masculinity stressed practicality over the theoretical. Having
explained the link between education and gentility, Bertram Wyatt-Brown goes on to point out
that “there was a strongly anti-intellectual streak in Southern society.” Some white Southerners
found this aspect of Forrest’s image highly appealing; exaggerated stories of Forrest’s ignorance
were repeated over and over. His oft-quoted military axiom “get there first with the most,” for
example, became “get there fustest with the mostest.” While the general did struggle with the
English language, there is no evidence that he ever expressed his personal military doctrine in
that manner. Not all of his admirers, however, were comfortable presenting their hero as a
bumpkin. J. G. Witherspoon, a member of the 9th Tennessee Cavalry, freely admitted that
“Forrest was a man of limited education” and used language that was “stronger and more
impressive in times of excitement . . . than it is necessary for a teacher of a Bible class in a
Sunday school to use.” Still, he found the folksy reinvention of Forrest’s famous maxim absurd.
In fact, he had doubts that even the unmodified dictum was accurate, for General Forrest’s
bravery and abilities were not influenced by the enemy’s numbers. And like many other
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disseminators of the Forrest myth, Witherspoon felt that Richmond failed to appreciate Forrest’s
abilities until it was too late.49
In Confederate memory Nathan Bedford Forrest was a violent, profane, practical,
common man with a natural aptitude for war that went unappreciated. John Allan Wyeth
summed up the Forrest image well, characterizing him as “not an angel by any means.” And
therein lay Forrest’s appeal.50
Another officer who fit the anti-hero archetype was Benjamin F. Cheatham. The harddrinking, card-playing, profane, aggressive general who often treated his men as brothers was
never depicted as a man of gentility, piety, or strategic brilliance; but former Rebels loved him
anyway. Nashvillian Philip B. Spence, of Polk’s staff, recounted in his 1900 reminiscences what
was allegedly a reoccurring scene involving Cheatham and Polk. “On the battlefield Gen.
Cheatham’s favorite expression was: ‘Give them hell, boys! Give them hell!’” This language
obviously offended the Bishop’s piety. Nevertheless, Polk often energetically responded with
“boys, give it to them like Cheatham says!” Cheatham’s proclivity for profanity was known
even among former Confederates who had served in Lee’s army. John Brown Gordon reflected
fondly on Cheatham in his reminiscences, calling him “one of the most furious fighters of
Johnston’s army.” The Georgian continued: “Cheatham, when the furor of battle was on him,
was in the habit of using four monosyllables which were more expressive than polished, but in
his case they expressed with tremendous emphasis the ‘gloria certaminis.’ These four
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monosyllables, which became notable in the army as ‘Cheatham’s expression,’ were: ‘Give ’em
hell boys!’”51
Cheatham was the subject of a lengthy 1883 profile in The Southern Bivouac written by
James D. Porter, former Tennessee governor and the general’s wartime chief of staff. The
general’s top priority, said Porter, was the care and comfort of his troops. “The men observed
this and very soon were so identified with him in feeling and sympathy that they knew no
organization but his division, and to this day the veterans of his command will tell you that they
belonged to Chatham’s division, never mentioning brigade or regiment.” Moreover, Cheatham
was humble and devoid of personal ambition. His folksy image was captured in an anecdote
shared in the profile. After Joseph E. Johnston assumed control of the army at Dalton, Cheatham
presented the new commander to the men of his division. “With a heartiness as genuine as it was
unmilitary,” Cheatham placed “his hand upon the bare head of the chief of the army, he patted it
two or three times; looking at the men, he said: ‘Boys this is old Jo.’” A later version of the
story added that Cheatham was the only officer in the Army of Tennessee who could have gotten
away with such a breach of military decorum. Despite his unprofessional manner, Porter argued
that Cheatham’s sole character defect was his eagerness to accept blame for mistakes made by
those under his command.52
The egalitarian relationship between Cheatham and his troops was a key aspect of his
postwar image. A story appeared in the Veteran in 1897 about the general and his men in the
days before Johnston’s surrender to Sherman at Durham Station. The soldiers, sensing something
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was amiss, knew they could count on Cheatham for answers. He was indeed frank with them,
even though, as he told them, he “would jeopardize his position as their commander” and “might
be cashiered under usual conditions.” He assured the men that he trusted them; “he knew them;
he knew that if he told all that was going on, and they were called upon to go into battle the next
day, they would do it.” The soldiers were devastated on hearing of the surrender negotiations, but
assured Cheatham that he could “continue to depend upon them under all circumstances.”53
Others had similar recollections. The Reverend M. B. De Witt, former chaplain of the
8th Tennessee Regiment, told of running into Cheatham in Nashville after the war. The exgeneral “marched straight to me and put those strong arms around me and squeezed me, and said
to the gentlemen present: ‘This is one of my boys, who, whenever I wanted him, could be
found.’” Like Cheatham’s other “boys,” De Witt was forgiving of the general’s questionable
habits: “Dear old Frank! He had his faults, but we boys loved him.” Philip Stephenson
encapsulated the Cheatham image best, describing “Old Frank” as “the personification of your
bluff, cursing, swearing trooper—a sort of Blucher. A good soldier and fighter . . . but too fond
of whisky and a brawler when drinking . . . fond of his men . . . and they fond of him!”54
In stark contrast to the genteel Robert E. Lee, Leonidas Polk, and A. P. Stewart, men like
Cheatham and Forrest exemplified W. J. Cash’s “hell of a fellow.” While historians and literary
critics have refuted many of his conclusions, Cash convincingly shows that gentility was not the
only masculine ideal in the Old South. He sums up the appeal of Forrest’s and Cheatham’s more
primal, anti-heroic masculinity:
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Great personal courage, unusual physical powers, the ability to drink a quart of
whisky or to lose the whole of one’s capital on the turn of a card without the
quiver of a muscle—these are at least as important as possessions, and infinitely
more important than heraldic crests. In the South, if your neighbor overshadowed
you in the number of his slaves, you could outshoot him or outfiddle him, and in
your own eyes, and in those of many of your fellows, remain essentially as good a
man as he.55

In 1905, Arkansan and former colonel Asa S. Morgan gave an oration at a monument
dedication in Little Rock. Like many other Southern speeches of the era, Morgan’s was an
apologia for secession and a tribute to the steadfast devotion of Confederate women, the bravery
of the common soldier, and the character and brilliance of Southern generals. Morgan, a veteran
of the western and trans-Mississippi theaters, found heroes in all Confederate armies. Not only
did he evoke Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson; he also listed Forrest, Stewart, Cheatham,
and Cleburne as “immortal names not born to die.” With the notable exception of Forrest, the
Army of Tennessee’s generals have largely vanished from popular Civil War memory. But for
the wartime generation, and to a lesser extent their descendants, they were powerful symbols that
validated white Southerners’ cultural convictions. Collectively, the Army of Tennessee’s high
command failed in war. However, in memory it proved to be greater than the sum of its parts.
In fragmenting the popular memory of the army’s generals into archetypes, former Confederates
could prove to themselves and their progeny that their leaders had been capable, pious, genteel,
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masculine, and warlike. The scapegoat, the unappreciated military genius, the genteel man of
faith, and the anti-hero helped make the Lost Cause victorious.56
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Chapter Four:
“That gallant, human rampart”:
Remembering the Army of Tennessee’s Common Soldiers

On August 13, 1900, Company C of the 16th Louisiana Infantry Regiment held a reunion
in Shreveport. When the unit marched to war in 1861 it had numbered 113 soldiers. Nicknamed
the “Caddo Fencibles,” it fought in all the Army of Tennessee’s major campaigns before
surrendering at Meridian, Mississippi, in 1865 with fourteen men. Thirty-five years later only
eight survivors were able to attend the reunion. Despite the paltry turnout, for four hours the
veterans reminisced and listened to former officers give speeches. The company, proclaimed
former lieutenant T. G. Pegues, was “as gallant a body of men as ever shouldered muskets.”
When they marched to the front, Pegues insisted, they had only one thought: “If it were a sin to
covet honor, then we were the most offending souls alive.” Aware of the paucity of survivors,
Pegues asked his audience, “Where are our comrades who stepped forth so gayly [sic] to battle
for Southern rights?,” then answered his own question: “ask the spirits that keep vigil over the
gory fields of Shiloh, Perryville, Murfreesboro . . . Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge, Dalton,
Resaca, New Hope Church, Kennesaw Mountain, Atlanta, Jonesboro, Franklin, [and] Nashville.”
Most of these battles were defeats for the Army of Tennessee, but that fact did not tarnish the
memory of the fallen men of Company C. In the minds of these former Rebels, they had fought
bravely and capably for a just cause, “for a principle that is as eternal as the stars.” They might
lie in unmarked graves, said Pegues, “but they lay [sic] like warriors taking their rest, with their
martial cloaks around them.”1
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The common soldier’s centrality to Civil War memory has been recognized since the
conflict’s end. Those who lived through the war believed that the soldier would be the exemplar
for future generations. In 1898 the UDC declared that the “nobleness, the chivalry, the selfdenial, the bravery, and the tireless endurance of the Confederate soldier should be instilled into
every Southern child.” Historians also acknowledge the common soldier’s pivotal role in the
war’s popular memory. As David Blight argues, commemorating the valor of white Civil War
veterans helped foster a sense of reconciliation between North and South while relegating race to
the margins of national memory.2
Scholars have noted other purposes in memorializing the men in the ranks. Kirk Savage
says that in commemorating the common white combatant both North and South endeavored to
rehabilitate the image of the citizen-soldier. This image had long been central to American
mythology but, according to Savage, it did not survive the Civil War. The regimentation and
hierarchy of army life challenged the masculine ideals of independence and personal agency,
while the horrors of battle destroyed men physically and mentally. Moreover, the slavery-like
subordination of the enlisted men blurred the line between privileged whites and servile blacks.
By creating monuments of idealized white males, standing ever vigilant, white Americans could
counter these threats. Gaines Foster, in his foundational study of the Lost Cause, argues that
commemorating the discipline of the Rebel private was a tool with which the white middle class
sought to shape the behavior of the lower classes. Others historians suggest that the image of a
warrior from a bygone era brought comfort to a nation in the throes of industrialization.3
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The Army of Tennessee’s common soldiers certainly served all these purposes in the
postwar decades. But they also served another: circumventing the army’s dismal wartime
record. Just as the high command as a whole had failed, the army as a whole had failed.
However, in selectively remembering brave individual soldiers and steadfast individual units, the
Army of Tennessee was transformed into a capable military force, one that confirmed Lost
Cause convictions. By conceptualizing the army’s wartime operations microscopically rather
than macroscopically, ex-Confederates constructed a counter-narrative that told a story of victory
instead of defeat. Moreover, this perspective was a natural consequence of the army’s repeated
defeats and turnover in command, which (as noted by historians such as Larry J. Daniel, Thomas
L. Connelly, and Keith S. Bohannon) discouraged the soldiers from identifying with any unit
above the division level both during and after the war.4
Of all the Army of Tennessee’s “common” soldiers, none was more exalted in white
Southerners’ memories than Sam Davis. Born in Rutherford County, Tennessee, in 1842, Davis
was only nineteen when the Civil War broke out. A private in the army, in 1863 he joined
Coleman’s Scouts. With middle Tennessee occupied by Union forces, the unit largely operated
behind enemy lines. In November, while attempting to deliver valuable information regarding
Union troop movements to Braxton Bragg, Davis was captured near Minor Hill, Tennessee. He
found himself in a perilous position between scout and spy. Like the former, he wore a Rebel
uniform and carried Confederate identification papers. But he was operating behind enemy lines
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and collecting confidential information, as would a spy. During the Civil War a clear distinction
was made between scouting and spying; the latter could be punished by death.5
Davis was delivered to Union general Grenville Dodge, who was anxious to learn who
was leaking information to Rebel scouts. When Davis refused to reveal his source Dodge
charged him with espionage and ordered a court martial. In a matter of days Davis was found
guilty and sentenced to hang. Numerous times he was offered a pardon in exchange for naming
his source; each time he refused. The night before his execution he sang hymns and prayed with
a Union chaplain. While he was being marched to the gallows Union soldiers reportedly lined the
road pleading with him to divulge his source so they would not have to go through with the
execution. Moments before his death, he was once again offered a deal, to which he allegedly
responded: “I would rather die a thousand deaths than betray a friend or be false to duty." He was
then executed. 6
Davis’s story was relatively obscure in the immediate postwar period; historians have
shown that it was due to the tireless efforts of Confederate Veteran editor-in-chief S. A.
Cunningham that Davis’s image became ubiquitous. However, it was making its way into
Confederate memory even before Cunningham became its chief disseminator. Joseph Buckner
Killebrew, a Tennessee planter, lawyer, and editor, published a tribute to Davis in 1871 that was
widely reprinted in the following years. Sometimes titled “Every Inch a Hero,” the piece
presented Davis’s final days much as they would be presented for the next several decades. He
had been a scout carrying letters, not a spy; thus his execution was an atrocity. He was a brave,
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loyal boy on the cusp of manhood who had spent his final days in spiritual self-reflection with
only one regret: he would not live to continue fighting at his comrades’ sides. “He died,”
Killebrew assured his readers, “with the calmness of a philosopher, the sternness of a patriot, the
serenity of a Christian, and the courage of a martyr.”7
While his tribute was widely disseminated, Killebrew’s efforts to deify Sam Davis paled
in comparison to those of Cunningham. First hearing of Davis at a lecture in 1894, Cunningham
immediately took it on himself to use his magazine to spread the story to former Confederates
and raise money for a monument to Davis. In short order, Davis evolved from heroic common
soldier to the “Boy Hero of the Confederacy.” Not only did Cunningham publish his own
narratives of Davis’s life and death, he also solicited contributions from his readers. These
submissions came in droves. Veterans who had served beside him at Shiloh and Perryville wrote
in attesting to his bravery and manhood, fellow scouts insisted that he had been unjustly accused,
and even Union veterans provided pieces affirming the nobility Davis displayed in his final days
and expressing regret for the actions the war forced on them. Well into the early twentieth
century former Confederates, led by Cunningham, were sanctifying Davis. There are too many
inconsistencies in these anecdotes for them all to be true. Nevertheless, certain themes are
common to all of them: manhood, sacrifice, duty, morality, and—most importantly—Christian
faith. Indeed, the religious imagery in commemorations of Davis rivaled that in laudations of
Lee, Jackson, and even Polk.8
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While Davis had admirers all over the South, he was especially popular in Tennessee. In
1897 the Nashville UDC was presented with Davis’s overcoat. During the ceremony the
Daughters recited the Lord’s Prayer. The sight of the coat overwhelmed them with emotion.
“When it was shown,” said Mackie Hardison, the chapter’s secretary, “every heart was melted to
tears, and there we sat in that sacred silence. . . . It was a time too sacred for words, for we
seemed almost face to face with that grand and heroic man, the noblest son of the South and our
own Tennessee.”9
Others insisted that Davis was a national hero. An anonymous veteran in Knoxville
submitted a tribute in 1896 lauding Davis, despite his humble origins, as one of America’s
greatest sons. Davis’s refusal to divulge secrets, said the author, was especially valorous given
his age. Unlike a child who thinks only of the present or an old man who thinks only of the past,
Davis must have had his potentially bright future on his mind as he marched to the gallows:
“Wealth holds out in seductive promises all its magnificence and luxury. Love stretches forth her
arms to embrace him. The vision of a loving and lovely wife and frolicsome babes, in a peaceful
home, looms up before him, and the music of their voices sounds in his ears. He hears the
benedictions of his aged parents, who are receiving his tender care. ” Such prospects would have
made a lesser man give in; “if this was an age of saints, Sam Davis would be a saint.” 10
Even “saint” was praise too faint for some of Davis’s admirers; for many former
Confederates he became nothing short of a Christ-like figure. In one of his earliest tributes to
Davis, Cunningham assured his readers in 1895 that the young man’s sacrifice had “never been
excelled in the history of man. In faith to principle it is almost divine, and recalls even the
sacrifice of the Galilean whose hands and feet were nailed to a cross.” Similarly, at a speech
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given at the unveiling of Davis’s monument in Nashville in 1909, Governor Malcolm Patterson
portrayed Davis as a stainless martyr: “He seemed to have filled every conception of the flower
and chivalry of young manhood, and his very presence was suggestive of romance and valorous
deeds.” When Davis walked to the gallows “his heart was pure as Arthur’s of the Round Table”
and “his courage as high as all the legions of Julius Caesar”; as he breathed his last breath, he did
so “unspotted with sin.” Making explicit the similarities between Davis and Christ, the governor
declared that

On Calvary the Son of God died with cruel nails driven through his quivering
flesh, the crown of thorns pressing down upon his agonized brow, and since then
the cross has been the Christian’s sign in every land; and which of us has the right
to say that He who created the earth and the sky and every living thing on sea and
land, whose mysteries baffle, but whose providence is over all, could give the Son
of Mary to teach men how to live could not also give this son of Tennessee to
teach men how to die?11

Thanks in part to its themes of piety and masculinity, the Davis image fit comfortably
into the larger Lost Cause myth. At the UCV’s’ 1929 reunion, A. T. Goodwyn, the
organization’s president, gave a speech that took his audience practically step by step through the
Lost Cause. The South had not wanted war, he insisted, nor had it fought to maintain slavery. He
called for an unbiased history of the war—one undistorted by Northern lies. In unabashedly
white-supremacist language he mocked the notion of arming African Americans as soldiers. He
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also insisted on the cultural supremacy of the Old South, which had produced men such as
Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis. This same “rich heritage” had also “enabled our dear
comrade, Sam Davis, to symbolize to the world that honor is more sacred than life. I challenge
the student of military history to recall such supreme self sacrifice to exalted duty as displayed
by this martyred hero.”12
White parents saw in Sam Davis a useful role model for their children. An 1895 tribute
argued that while some soldiers had been motivated to enlist by ambition, desire for adventure,
or lust for glory, Davis had been driven by “a passionate love for the South and Tennessee.”
Spurning the temptation offered by his Union captors, he had chosen death over dishonor. “He
knew not that his sacrifice would ever be known.” Nevertheless, he “mounted the scaffold,
looked for the last time at the skies of Tennessee, refused for the last time the offer of life and
safety, closed his eyes and swung off into eternity to meet that God who has said ‘whosoever
loseth his life shall find it,’ . . . leaving to all generations an example as priceless as it is unique.”
Similar sentiments were expressed by a Nashvillian two years later when he donated to the Sam
Davis Monument Fund in the name of his two sons. “If at any time my boys are ever reminded of
the importance of maintaining their integrity in the time of some great temptation,” he said, “I
shall feel that the money could be put to no better use.” A monument to Davis, he went on,
would serve as a constant reminder of true courage and make young children better citizens. “I
wish that every boy in the Southland knew of the sad and glorious death of this Pulaski hero.”
Three years later the Atlanta Constitution declared that Davis’s bravery rivaled that of anyone
throughout human history. “Had he lived in Roman Times, he too would come down to us a
sainted hero. There are the Knights of Damon and Knights of Pythias, and there ought to be
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Knights of Sam Davis.” If only Abraham Lincoln had known of Davis’s circumstances, the
editorialist lamented, Davis would have been spared. At the end of the 1800s the Women’s Club
of Atlanta was offering prizes to school children who wrote the best essays about “The Idea of
Duty as Illustrated in the Life of Sam Davis.” Nearly twenty years later a Tennessee history
schoolbook concluded its brief discussion of Davis by telling its young readers that “such a life
should be regarded as Tennessee’s most priceless possession.”13
Students seemed to accept Davis as their role model. In 1900, William Leidtke, speaking
at his graduation from Gainesville High School in Texas, proclaimed Davis his generation’s
“best example of true courage, true manhood, [and] true patriotism.” Moreover, he was a
reminder of more heroic times, when the students’ fathers went to war to defend hearth and
home. “The name of Samuel Davis” he continued, “stands without parallel in history.” Just as
white Southerners remembered Stonewall Jackson as a “noble Christian soldier,” they should
remember Davis. And he should be a hero not just for Tennessee but for the whole country;
Texas in particular “should cherish his memory as she cherishes the martyrdom of [James]
Fannin, [James] Bowie, and David Crockett.”14
While all argued that Sam Davis’s character was laudable, some former Rebels insisted
that it was not exceptional. In 1896 Cunningham wrote that “he is acknowledged as the typical
patriot and his death a patriot’s death.” The ranks of the Rebel army boasted many men as heroic
as Davis, but “no other was offered such a shining opportunity to manifest fealty to honor and
the Southern cause.” He continued to remind his readers of this fact, a year later declaring that
“the heroic death of Samuel Davis deserves attention in the Veteran until every son and daughter
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of the South is elevated by his sacrifice.” Davis’s actions were “typical of the Confederate
soldier’s valor and character. However, while his name deserves the highest place on the scroll
of fame, it should not be isolated from his fellow Confederates. Under a similar test, many others
would have sacrificed life deliberately and ‘in cold blood’ as he did.” An anonymous
Tennessean contributing to the Veteran seemed to agree with Cunningham, expressing
satisfaction in the ubiquity of Davis’s story and the erection of a monument to his honor but also
frustration because other Confederate heroes were vanishing into obscurity. He argued that
David Dodd, for example, had died under similar circumstances. “Alike they were young; alike
arrested, court-martialed, convicted, and executed because they refused to betray their respective
trust,” he wrote; “alike they should be honored after death.”15
B. L. Ridley echoed these sentiments in his 1906 history of the Army of Tennessee. He
quoted at length one of Davis’s fellow scouts, who declared Davis “one of the sublimest and
noblest characters known in history,” whose martyrdom “in future ages will be pointed to as an
act worthy of emulation.” Then, in his own words, Ridley assured his readers that Davis “died
the death of honor in the arms of glory. There may have been soldiers who would have done as
he did, yet we know that under the most trying circumstances he sealed his faith with his blood
and offered up his life on the altar of duty rather than betray his friends and country.” Suggesting
that Davis had become somehow both exceptional and unexceptional, Ridley claimed that “the
coming ages will place his character forward as a typical Confederate and as an American—it
will enlist the admiration of the world.”16
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Many white Southerners appreciated Cunningham’s crusade. The Nashville Christian
Advocate opined that “whoever rescues from oblivion the name of a noble man performs a
service to humanity. We therefore commend with all our heart the effort now making by Mr. S.
A. Cunningham.” This Methodist newspaper, like other Davis storytellers, saw in the pious,
selfless, brave, and youthful-yet-manly “Boy Hero” a useful role model. “In due time,” it
confidently predicted, “we may look to see a proper monument of the stainless young hero set up
in the capital city of Tennessee, to teach our young men forever that it is better even to die rather
than prove false to a trust.” A Georgia judge wrote to the Veteran expressing similar gratitude.
“You are doing good work for the South,” he stated; “the memory of our gallant dead should be
perpetuated in song and story, to officer and private alike.” Linking Davis with the supreme
Confederate martyr of the western theater, he concluded: “Albert Sidney Johnston and Sam
Davis both died heroically, gloriously, for the same cause, and each in his sphere represented
true Southern manhood and patriotism. They were heroes, and not traitors, and our children
should be taught to honor their memories.”17
Although Cunningham and the Veteran were the most powerful forces in converting Sam
Davis into a folk hero, he was commemorated elsewhere as well. W. D. Fox, a lawyer and
politician from Murfreesboro, Tennessee, wrote a stage play dramatizing Davis’s life. Fox’s
Davis is loved by his comrades, by women on the home front, and by slaves. On learning of his
court martial, Davis replies, “I quail not from your sentence. . . . I do but what my God and
much-loved country do require of me.” Davis’s love interest in the play calls him “God’s
noblest man.” Performed across middle Tennessee, the play received rave reviews from exRebels. Cunningham, initially doubtful that the play would be sufficiently reverential,
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eventually endorsed it in the pages of the Veteran. A similar Davis appears in Judge Christopher
W. Tyler’s 1911 novel The Scout. “The Boy Hero” marches bravely up the gallows’s steps
harboring no bitterness toward his executioners. The scene could not help but remind the author
of “another lonely Being, who with conscience void of offense, upon an eminence where all
might behold, died an ignominious death begirt by foes. This was in a far-off land, and nearly
two thousand years ago.” Tyler concluded his narrative of the execution averring that “when the
eyes of Sam Davis were closed for the last time to the scenes of earth, and his dauntless spirit
passed through the portals of death, Jesus of Nazareth was the first to greet him on the other
side.” 18
S. A. Cunningham’s biographer posits that the editor identified with Davis and fought so
tenaciously for his memory because it “released [him] from the psychological burden of [his
own] dismal war record through his identification with a hero.” Perhaps other Confederates who
identified with the ill-fated Army of Tennessee were doing something similar. From their
perspective, an army composed of such men as Sam Davis was an army of which to be proud.19
While Sam Davis was the Army of Tennessee’s most lauded individual common soldier,
none of its units was more commemorated for its wartime record than the Orphan Brigade.
Originally commanded by John C. Breckinridge, this band of Kentucky infantrymen fought in
most of the army’s campaigns. Although its sobriquet was ubiquitous by the last decade of the
nineteenth century, during the war and into the Gilded Age the unit was known simply as the
First Kentucky Brigade. The nickname’s origin is uncertain. Many have claimed that following
a disastrous charge at Murfreesboro in which the brigade was decimated and lost its commander,
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Breckinridge rode along the lines crying out “my poor Orphans! My poor Orphans!” Regardless
of its origin, the nickname’s meaning was explained by one of the unit’s earliest storytellers: “Its
attitude toward its native State—expatriated by reason of identification with a cause which
Kentucky had not formally approved; its complete isolation from its people.” Although their
state remained in the Union during the war and furnished the North with far more soldiers than it
did the South, after the war white Kentuckians largely embraced a Lost Cause narrative of the
war—one in which the Orphan Brigade played a prominent role. The brigade’s former soldiers
set about enthusiastically to record their wartime experiences and honor the unit in which they
served.20
Some veterans began commemorating the brigade even before it gained its famous
nickname. In his 1867 memoir, Conrad Wise Chapman, a former enlisted man, remembered his
tenure with the unit as the most formative experience of his life. Living in Italy as an artist in
1861, Chapman had returned to the United States after the outbreak of hostilities. He claimed to
have begun his journey to manhood only when marching off to war with soldiers from the
Bluegrass State. Recalling his feelings after enlisting, he professed that “it was a proud moment
to me when I could stand up and my hand in the air, swair [sic] to serve and never desert the
Confederate cause so help me God. I felt every inch a man, and a soldier.” While his time with
the Kentuckians was largely filled with drill, boredom, marching, hunger, and sickness, he
reminisced that “every day I felt more and more the reckless careless devil of a soldier, which do
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what I ever will in life I shall always be. My character was formed in the armies of the south and
for better or worse I must abide by it.” Chapman went on to serve in Virginia and South
Carolina, but his several months in the First Kentucky Brigade was the only period of his Civil
War career that he chronicled in his memoirs.21
Just one year later, former lieutenant Edward Porter Thompson published what was for
generations the definitive history of the unit. A 931-page tome, History of the First Kentucky
Brigade was revised and expanded into an even larger volume thirty years later. Thompson
began conceptualizing his book before war’s end. Even then he seemed aware of how the unit’s
veterans would recall their service. “However this war may terminate,” he predicted, “if a man
can truthfully claim to have been a worthy member of the Kentucky Brigade he will have a kind
of title of nobility.” Just as Cunningham assured his readers that Sam Davis was the typical
Rebel, Thompson argued that while the brigade was full of brave, “proud,” “self-respecting” men
of “old pioneer stock” they were but “representatives of their people.” The brigade fought at
Shiloh, Murfreesboro, Vicksburg, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and Atlanta. The hardships and
defeats it suffered in those actions and others “could not seriously depress and could not at all
disguise the intrepid spirits who were as ready in the almost hopeless days of 1865 to spring to
action at a word as they were in the first flush of their martial experience, when they had no
thought but that battle meant victory.”22
In returning to his work three decades after its initial publication Thompson provided an
addendum that he hoped would draw greater attention to the brigade’s common soldiers. He
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acknowledged that military historians had to refer to large groups of men by the name of their
commander or unit, but he feared that in doing so the heroism of the man in the ranks would be
lost. Thus he added 320 pages of brief biographical sketches of the brigade’s soldiers. These, he
hoped, would provide future generations with role models. Thompson planned to leave
“indisputable evidence to posterity that they were of the gallant band, and that their offspring
may justly claim the honor of descent from those who best illustrated Kentucky’s old renown for
adherence to principle, scorn of wrong and oppression, and a gallant defense of rights assailed.”
While he lamented that he could not grant each soldier equal attention and admitted that it might
make dry reading, he believed that his addendum “will form a kind of heraldic repository, where
future generations of men may seek for proof in support of claims to hereditary honors. It may
be a means of imbuing the children with the spirit of the fathers, and of teaching them that they
who rally at the bugle-blast, in the day of their country’s calamity, and stand fast by the banner
of their choice, shall ‘in nowise lose their reward.’”23
Although Thompson’s book is still the most exhaustive account of the unit’s wartime
exploits, it was far from the last word on the Orphan Brigade. Former private Gervis D.
Grainger published his memoir in 1902. In it he recounted one of the most often retold stories in
the unit’s history: its charge on the third day at Stones River. This battle ended in yet another
retreat for the Army of Tennessee, but Grainger made it clear that the Orphans distinguished
themselves on the field. Once the brigade was unleashed, he recalled, “our intrepidity
demoralized the enemy and they began to flee like blackbirds. Then came our turn. We
mounted their works from end to end and poured forth a deadly volley into the ranks of our
flying enemy. It was terrific! The ground for a hundred yards was covered with their fallen. . . .
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[I]t seemed not one of them would be left to tell the story.” Unfortunately for Grainger and his
comrades, they soon found themselves in the sights of Union artillerymen and were decimated,
losing nearly a third of their number in the charge.24
The Southern Bivouac was particularly active in commemorating the Orphan Brigade.
Published in Louisville, Kentucky, the periodical achieved a circulation of fifteen thousand
before being purchased by the Century Company in 1887. With its emphasis on the western
theater and submissions from common soldiers, it was a kind of mirror image of the much more
often cited Southern Historical Society Papers. No group of soldiers was more highly praised in
its pages than the Orphan Brigade—a fact perhaps unsurprising given that four out of five men
on the initial editorial board were veterans of the unit. 25
Fred Joyce of the 4th Kentucky Infantry became a regular contributor. In an 1883 letter
he lamented that so many of his old comrades had passed, but he assured readers that they were
“buried with our cause, in glory, but not forgetfulness. . . . [I]t is said with truth that war will
bring out the character of a man quicker than any thing [sic] else. We were fortunate in finding
so many good true men as we had with us. No wonder we love them and feel bound to them as
if with ties of blood.” Despite the bloodshed, hunger, hard marching, and boredom of the war,
Joyce insisted that veterans remembered those years fondly: “we were gay and happy, and
indulged in all the sarcasm and repartee that the rich enjoy in their opulence.” A few months
later Joyce told of the glee club of the First Kentucky Brigade. This “jolly, light-hearted ‘band’”
spread joy “from the hills of Tennessee and Georgia” to “the pines of Mississippi and South
Carolina.” In the midst of horrible conflict, the club was “petted by the ladies and flattered by
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our comrades.” Lest the magazine’s readers forget the Orphan Brigade’s martial
accomplishments, Joyce’s next article chronicled the unit’s role in the Atlanta Campaign. “The
‘Orphans,’” he claimed, “were not like hot iron, but more like steel well tempered.” Although the
Battle of Resaca ended with the Army of Tennessee retreating, “it was harvest time with the
Orphan brigade, and every available contrivance was used for reaping the field before us.” As
waves of Yankee soldiers approached the brigade’s lines “we turned loose on them, and death in
all its appalling forms, commenced by hundreds.” At battle’s end the men of the brigade
“peacefully laid down in the bottom of our trenches, and slept or listened dreamily to [the
enemy’s] incessant, though ineffectual cannonading.”26
The brigade was also remembered for playing a starring role in the army’s singular
victory, Chickamauga, where the Orphans were part of Polk’s wing. While the battle was
decided in Longstreet’s sector, Joyce insisted that the Kentucky regiments fought with such
ferocity that they drove the Yankees from their front. So successful was their advance that they
lost contact with the rest of the wing and were ordered to fall back to rejoin it. Later that day “the
Kentuckians once more drove everything across the Chattanooga road, and the Federal army was
in retreat to Chattanooga.” After the fall of Atlanta, the Orphan Brigade was converted into a
cavalry unit and its relationship with the Army of Tennessee ended. While many were relieved to
be joining the mounted arm, Joyce was not. “It was sad to think that our name would disappear
from the glorious achievements of the Army of Tennessee. . . . It was sad to think of heroes we
were leaving in the trenches to face the storm of twice their number, and to know that Cleburne’s
and Cheatham’s boys would miss us when they started for the enemy.”27
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In Owensboro, Kentucky, in 1900 the John C. Breckinridge Chapter of the UDC erected
a monument to local Confederate soldiers who had been mustered into the First Kentucky
Regiment. Congressman and Orphan Brigade veteran William T. Ellis gave the dedication
address, which highlighted the exploits of his old unit. “We stand again to-day,” he told his
audience, “with uncovered heads in honor of their unsurpassed gallantry as they followed their
immortal leader, John C. Breckinridge, in the bloodiest charge of the war over the frozen fields
of Stone River.” The unit was present at, and in many cases responsible for, the Army of
Tennessee’s brightest moments, said Ellis. Subtly scapegoating Braxton Bragg, he stated that
“we tenderly remember them as they charged over the enemy’s breastworks at Chickamauga,
where . . . many another valiant Kentucky knight fought and perished just in the dawn of victory
which if pursued to its logical results would have sent Rosecrans’s army flying like chaff before
a storm out of the States of Georgia and Tennessee.” The youth of today, he added, should be
directed toward the men of the Orphan Brigade when looking for role models. Well
exemplifying how ex-Confederates, through commemorating a unit, could construct a narrative
of victory out of a disastrous campaign, Ellis informed his audience of five thousand that “there
is not to be found in the military annals of the world a record which excels that which the Orphan
Brigade made in its last great campaign of one hundred days from Dalton to Atlanta.”
Furthermore, the brigade’s soldiers fought selflessly for their country, not out of a lust for
wealth, glory, or excitement. In erecting the monument white Kentuckians were ensuring that the
memory of the brigade would “defy the tide of time.” Indeed, he believed that “as time drifts us
farther away from that thrilling period . . . the splendid prowess and military fame of the
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command to which those in honor of whose memory this monument is erected belonged will
continue to grow brighter and brighter.”28
In 1918 Lot D. Young, a former lieutenant, joined Chapman, Granger, and Thompson in
writing a memoir. Dedicating it to the Kentuckians fighting in the American Expeditionary
Force in the First World War, he told his readers that the Orphan Brigade would be remembered
“as one of the brightest and most interesting pages in [Kentucky’s] history. And why not, since
[its soldiers included] so many of the noblest and best young men of the state and were led by
such men . . . whose names are a synonym of glory and greatness.” The brigade had suffered
staggering casualties in the war, but “as ‘the blood of martyrs is the seed of the church,’ so the
sacrifice of these Kentuckians is a diadem in the wreath that encircles her history.” While the
brigade was praised most for its deeds at Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, and Atlanta, Young took
more pride in its role at Shiloh. “Here,” he recalled, “were enacted scenes of sublime courage
and heroism that elicited the admiration and comment of the civilized world; here the soil of
Tennessee drank freely the blood of her elder sister, Kentucky.” In Young’s memories the unit’s
bravery was on display later in the war as well, particularly in the charge at Murfreesboro.
Holding Bragg accountable for the bloodletting the unit experienced there, Young derided him as
“a man that had never known anything of the art of war” and called the unit’s charge a “sacrifice
to stupidity.” Nevertheless, there the brigade earned a “name that will live throughout the annals
of time and crown the history of that dear little band with everlasting immortality.” At
Chattanooga, he lamented, the brigade was not put to good use due to Bragg’s “unwisdom.” At
another of the army’s defeats, the Battle of Dallas in the Atlanta Campaign, the brigade acquitted
itself well, in Young’s opinion; “But here again was displayed that daring, regardless of
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consequences, which had been so often displayed by this little band of Kentuckians on so many
fields from Fort Donaldson [sic] to this eventful day.” During that whole campaign, he declared,
General Sherman lived in fear of the brigade’s sharpshooters.29
These are but two examples. Every remembered episode in the Army of Tennessee’s
history had its Sam Davis and its Orphan Brigade. Regardless of the ultimate results of any
given battle, former Confederates recalled that there was always an individual or a unit on the
field displaying bravery, piety, or martial prowess.
At the Battle of Shiloh the army suffered over ten thousand casualties, including its
commander, and thus endured the first in what became long series of defeats. Nevertheless, in
the 1890s Methodist minister D. Sullins gave a lecture to the Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp of
the UCV in which he recounted the heroism of the 19th Tennessee Infantry during the battle’s
first day. He recalled that with a Louisiana regiment being decimated by Union artillery,
General John C. Breckinridge, desperate to help the Louisianans, cried out “is there a regiment
here that can relieve those men and take that battery!” The 19th’s colonel volunteered his
regiment “and in another moment a thousand East Tennesseans sprang to their feet with a yell
and swept down the hill like an unbridled cyclone.” Despite heavy casualties, they accomplished
the task Breckinridge gave them. “The hill is taken and those death dealing guns are hushed,”
Sullins wrote, “Hallelujah! Listen to that shout! And then cheer after cheer from the surrounding
heights made the young April leaves quiver with the vibrations. Well done brave men! You
assumed fearful responsibilities for home and honor, and have met them.”30
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A similar narrative was constructed around the 2nd Tennessee Regiment at a monument
dedication in 1905. Commanded by William B. Bate at Shiloh, the unit suffered heavy casualties
among enlisted men and officers. In one of the many speeches given on the battlefield at the
dedication, Judge S. F. Wilson, one of the regiment’s veterans, proclaimed that his fallen
comrades’ “bones and their patriotic blood enrich and ennoble the soil around and under us.”
While the 2nd Tennessee was the particular subject of the day’s commemorations, its behavior
was illustrative of the Confederate martial spirit. “We believe,” Wilson continued, “that their
heroism, their devotion to their cause and country, their endurance and sacrifices, illustrated,
exemplified, and exhibited as well by most all Confederate commands, constitute a heritage of
immortal glory for the present and future generations.” And yet there was still something
exceptional about the unit, “a regiment, whose men, although its government was overthrown
and its armies overpowered, never felt and acknowledged that they were whipped—we know it
was brave and heroic. . . . Aye, I believe that if each member of it on this field had possessed a
thousand lives, and their sacrifice would have won their cause, the sacrifice would have been
cheerfully made. Their record demonstrates what I say.” But again, this record “was duplicated
in spirit by the great rank and file of the early volunteers as well as by most of the later
volunteers in the Confederate armies.” In another speech, Basil Duke assured the audience that
“the gallant soldiers of the Tennessee Confederate infantry . . . never in all their history turned
back from a stricken field and never looked on one they did not consecrate by acts of heroic
courage . . . and among them all none were braver and more ardent or more entitled to immortal
remembrance than those in whose honor this shaft is uplifted.”31
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Conflicts between Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith had seemingly doomed the
1862 Confederate invasion of Kentucky from the start. But postwar Army of Tennessee
memorialists were able to claim victory even in defeat. An anonymous history of the 48th
Tennessee Infantry, which had served under both commanders during the invasion, gave the
minor victory at Richmond, Kentucky, more prominence than the campaign’s climax at
Perryville. The article insisted that men such as Cleburne, Forrest, and Jackson had attained
greatness only because of the soldiers who served under them. The soldiers of the 48th “were
brave and gallant men . . . whose blood made rich the soil on nearly every battle field [sic] of the
war, and who contributed so much to the honor and glory and just renown of General Patrick R.
Cleburne.” The field at Richmond “drank the blood of the bravest of the brave,” but the 48th
nevertheless drove the Yankees from their positions and chased them off the battlefield.
Although the regiment saw heavy action later at Perryville, that battle received only passing
mention in the article. A role in a victorious insignificant battle was a more satisfying memory
than a role in a strategically significant defeat.32
At Perryville, Bragg and his lieutenants had managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of
victory while suffering 3,400 casualties and dashing Confederate hopes of “liberating”
Kentucky. But twenty-two years later B. P. Steel, a former captain in the 1st Tennessee Infantry,
remembered proudly his unit’s deeds in the battle:

’Twas there, held in reserve, impatiently lay,
The First Tennessee, the ‘Knights of the Kid Glove,’
Eager and chafing to join the bloody fray—
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Help their brave comrades, and their own powers prove.
Soon was their impatient valor to be tried,
Soon were they to charge the cannon’s grim mouth—
Soon upon the battle’s crimsoned wave to ride—
Soon to prove themselves worth ‘Sons of the South.’

Once the regiment was unleashed, Steel recalled, his comrades “hurl[ed] death into the blue links
before them” and the Yankees fled in terror. It was only when things went wrong in another
sector of the battlefield that the 1st Tennessee was forced to retreat; and even then it was
“sending back defiance and death.” The battle ended in Rebel defeat and the men mourned their
dead comrades, but Steel concluded his poem on a triumphant note: “the height had been
carried.”33
Similar sentiments were expressed in regard to an individual soldier a decade later at a
Memorial Day service in Savannah, Georgia. Veteran and former senator Middleton Pope
Barrow gave the oration. He railed against the concept of the “New South” for its secularism and
materialism. The eras of the Old South and the Confederacy, he asserted, were the region’s
golden years, when its true heroes achieved glory. One of them was Tom Mosely, whose valor
was on display at Perryville. “Leading his company in a second, and then a third charge against a
battery of the enemy,” Barrow recounted, “his beardless face ablaze with the animation of battle,
and his youthful figure transformed into a hero’s stature, he fell as he mounted the works of the
enemy.” Though fierce in battle, Mosely was at heart a gentle lad; “the blue grass of Kentucky
was never reddened with nobler blood, and a braver boy or man never died.”34
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The Battle of Murfreesboro, despite its promising start, had ended in yet another defeat
and retreat for the Army of Tennessee. However, in 1900 J. M. Dunn, a veteran of the 29th
Mississippi Infantry, wrote to the San Antonio Express recalling the bravery of a common soldier
at the battle. Sam Moss “was a genial, social companion, always full of droll fun, but quiet and
unobtrusive. No duty was too hard for him to perform, and no privation too hard for him to
endure, without murmur or complaint.” These laudable character traits were on clear display at
Murfreesboro. At one point Moss found himself separated from his unit. Stumbling across six
Union soldiers filling their canteens in Stones River, he seized the initiative and ordered them to
surrender. By the time he returned with his prisoners to Rebel lines he had captured a federal
colonel as well. “True to his original characteristics,” Dunn concluded, “he never told his brother
or sister of his daring exploit on Stone’s River.”35
Moss was not the only soldier remembered for gallantry at Murfreesboro. After W. A.
Lowe of Cheatham’s Division died in 1899 he was eulogized by former colonel Josiah Patterson.
Lowe was a doctor; “he could have easily have avoided the duties of a soldier on the fighting
line, but, choosing the post of honor and patriotism, enlisted as a private.” He “was an epitome
of the life of a man as modest, brave, tender, and true as ever wore uniform of a Confederate
soldier.” This was illustrated by his actions at Stones River, where he was shot through the eye
and carried to the rear by his brother James. Regaining consciousness, he “immediately required
his brother to abandon him to his fate and return to the firing line. ‘Go back,’ he said; ‘you are
needed there.’” More concerned with his comrades at the front than with his own injury, Lowe
“displayed heroism almost without parallel.” In what was surely the highest praise for a
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Confederate veteran, Patterson maintained that “it was such men who made Lee, the Johnstons,
and Jackson possible.”36
Even during the retreat from Tullahoma, as the army surrendered a vast swath of territory
without a fight, bravery was on display. In 1897 the Veteran published a eulogy to James R.
Cumming, veteran of an Alabama artillery battery and brother of diarist Kate Cumming. “A
truer, braver soldier never enlisted in the Southern cause,” declared the anonymous author; “he
was brave to rashness.” On sick furlough when the army began its retreat, Cumming roused
himself in order to join his comrades. His sister tried in vain to get him to complete his
convalescence. She recalled that “he looked astonished at me and said: ‘Do you think I would
miss a battle?’” After several days with the army he returned home, even sicker than when he
left. Nevertheless, he seemed more frustrated with the army’s ill fortune than his own,
exclaiming: “This retreat was worse than the one from Kentucky! . . . [I]f Bragg had only let us
fight . . . I know that we would have whipped the Yankees.”37
Unsurprisingly, the memory of Chickamauga—the army’s only signal victory of the
war—is replete with examples of Confederate martial spirit and sacrifice. (The Battle of
Chickamauga as a memory that served to prove the army’s capabilities will be discussed in
chapter five.) In 1915 Mrs. J. D. Rudd recalled the bravery of Jimmie Arnold at the battle. A
fifteen-year-old Texas orphan, he “was the pet of his company and of his regiment. They were
proud of his courage and fidelity.” Rudd claimed that Arnold had a premonition of his own death
and pleaded with his colonel to let him sit out the battle. But, on being reminded of his duty, he
stoically marched into battle and to his death. He was “as brave as Leonidas, who defended the
pass of Thermopylae with his three hundred Spartans against Xerxes’s myriads of Persians. Who
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will say that his death was not as heroic as the Spartan king’s?” Leonidas was not the only
military leader whose heroism was rivaled by Arnold’s sacrifice. Rudd continued: “Who will say
that General Lee, Stonewall Jackson, Albert Sidney Johnston, Joseph E. Johnston, or any other
of our brave leaders was a greater hero than the little orphan boy, Jimmie Arnold[?]”38
Taking part in the Army of Tennessee’s only major victory of the war was not enough for
some participants; they wanted their unit recognized as the most important of the battle. In 1904
the Literary and Historical Association of North Carolina reported on the accomplishments of its
state’s soldiers in the Civil War. A. C. Avery, former major and Chickamauga veteran,
investigated the role of Tar Heel soldiers in the battle. He concluded that North Carolina
regiments advanced farther than any other Confederates on both days of the battle. The
association believed that Avery’s report “will have a peculiar interest because the deeds of North
Carolina soldiers in the Army of the West are less well known than the dauntless courage of the
North Carolina veterans in the Army of Northern Virginia.” One of the state’s slogans in the
postwar period was “first at Bethel, farthest to the front at Gettysburg and Chickamauga, and last
at Appomattox.”39
At the battles of Chattanooga the army was overwhelmed by forces under Ulysses S.
Grant and forced to retreat into north Georgia. An 1897 tribute to the 27th Mississippi Infantry,
however, remembered Lookout Mountain as proof of Confederate bravery, comradery, and
martial superiority. The unit was in the thick of things, it said, and contested every inch of
ground, losing multiple color bearers. At day’s end several men in the unit gathered around their
flag “and pledged that no ‘Yank’ should ever lay hands on it without passing over our dead
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bodies, and they never did. Strong men unused to tears, although accustomed to the cruel scenes
of war, cried like children.” Like many other regimental tributes it insisted that the battle was
lost in a different sector: “the next day the colors were fastened to a hickory pole and carried
triumphantly until the crisis came, and then the little remnant that was left of the Twenty-seventh
Mississippi followed that flag down the Mountain in perfect good order, while other regiments
left the Ridge in disorder.”40
Even on “the Ridge” there could be found steadfast and triumphant Rebel soldiers. In
1883 an anonymous former private published an article in Southern Bivouac. While he largely
approved of the periodical’s earlier pieces on the battle he felt that his unit, Maney’s Brigade,
had not received due credit. Although Missionary Ridge had culminated with George Thomas’s
Corps crashing through the Army of Tennessee’s lines, the private remembered his unit as being
victorious: “the issue of the conflict at this point was not, for an instant, doubtful. Numbers of the
Federals dropped their guns, and, with hands over head, rushed through our lines to surrender. . .
. The Confederates were, in all cases, the gainers.” The Yankees fled in confusion. The private
made it clear that his brigade bore no blame for the outcome of the battle. “Noon had long since
passed,” he recalled, “and still the private soldier on the right knew nothing of disaster, and
thought that a victory had been gained.”41
The Atlanta Campaign is now identified by historians as the Confederacy’s last real
chance to gain its independence, for a different result could have cost President Lincoln
reelection. But the city fell to the enemy, and did so on the Army of Tennessee’s watch. This
incurred no shame, however, in the minds of its veterans. In 1889, Company K of the 34th
Georgia Infantry held a reunion in Cany Head, Georgia. The orator, former lieutenant A. J.
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Hollingsworth, proclaimed that “although the army of Tennessee failed to accomplish the
gigantic task assigned to it, yet I ask no greater honor than to have it said to me: ‘He belonged to
the army of Tennessee.’” He went on to tell of the sorrow he felt when visiting the battlefields
around Atlanta. He asked his audience, “Where are all those who stood as a bulwark around that
devoted city?,” then answered his own question: “like the leaves of the forest assailed by the
bitter, biting blasts of autumn . . . [they fell] to enrich the soil from whence they sprang, [and] so
fade[d] that gallant, human rampart that disputed inch by inch every foot of the soil of their
native land.”42
As Sherman approached the Gate City, sixteen-year-old Isaac Newton Giffen was
convalescing from wounds, received probably at Murfreesboro. Under the care of Dr. and Mrs.
Francis O. Ticknor the boy was slowly nursed back to health before returning to the front.
Giffen’s noble character and bravery moved the doctor to author one of the more widely
reprinted poems of the era, “Little Giffen, of Tennessee.” Even while convalescing, the boy,
“smitten of grape-shot and gangrene,” thought only of his comrades at the front. His concern for
his fellow soldiers would lead to his death. News of Sherman’s advance on

Atlanta were too much for the boy:
Word of gloom from the war, one day;
Johnston pressed at the front, they say;
Little Giffen was up and away!
A tear, his first, as he bade good-by,
Dimmed the glint of his steel-blue eye.
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"I'll write, if spared!" There was news of fight,
But none of Giffen—he did not write!43

Some tributes honored a dying soldier who had displayed not only selfless bravery but
also piety. An 1897 Confederate Veteran article by G. H. Blakeslee, a Union soldier, chronicled
the final moments of William Hughes Parks of the 12th Tennessee Infantry in June 1864. The
two wounded soldiers found themselves lying side by side in a Union field hospital. As they
conversed, Parks, mortally wounded in the gut, expressed gratitude toward his captors,
remembered fondly his home and family, expressed sorrow over his fallen comrades and
seemingly doomed country, and humbled himself before God. “He fervently implored God to be
a father to his orphan sisters and protect them from the days to come. In feeling supplication, he
asked the Great Ruler to bless his beloved land and the rulers thereof, and prayed that the days of
danger and trouble would soon end in peace. . . . [D]uring the dark hours of night his soul went
back to his God.”44
Giffen and Parks were not the only boy soldiers remembered for their ultimate sacrifice
in the battles for Atlanta. In 1893 former officer E. L. Drake paid tribute to Billy Youree of the
2nd Tennessee Infantry. When he joined the army “he was [a] puny, sallow, undeveloped youth .
. . seemingly too weak to handle a musket or endure a march, but he never missed a battle.”
Despite feeble health, Youree “did his duty like the strongest.” As the Atlanta Campaign
progressed his health altogether failed and Drake ordered him to the hospital. Youree soon
returned to the front, however, protesting that he “would rather stay with the boys.” The decision
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cost him his life at Peachtree Creek. Drake assured readers of the Veteran that “Billy Youree was
a model character. He had none of the vices of camp. His Bible was his constant companion and
his morals pure; indeed he shamed us all by his example of patient, uncompromising fortitude
under the most trying circumstances.”45
In addition to bravery and piety, some individual soldiers were remembered for their
humor amid death, defeat, and deprivation. An anecdote published in 1868 told of a veteran
giving advice to a raw recruit during the Atlanta Campaign. The novice soldier held lofty ideas
about sacrifice and patriotism that the veteran found quaint. “That’s all well enough,” he told his
young comrade, “but I tell you a fellow may as well look out a little for himself.” Yesterday, he
went on, he had been tempted to shoot a Yankee soldier he had spotted; however, noticing the
man’s diminutive size, he concluded that he would not be able to wear any of his clothes and
thus opted to let that particular enemy live to fight another day. The next Yankee he encountered
was not so lucky: “I waited till a fellow of about my own girth showed himself, when I took a
sure aim upon him and here’s his boots!” More than three decades after the campaign’s end,
Confederate Veteran published a tribute to Lieutenant Isaac Lightner, a Missouri artilleryman
and “A gentleman by birth and by instinct.” Mortally wounded at Kennesaw Mountain, as he
was being carried from the field he supposedly crossed paths with Patrick Cleburne, saluted the
general, and “gaily asked: ‘General Cleburne have I not won promotion to-day?’”46
While military historians do not grant Hood’s Tennessee Campaign the same strategic
importance as Atlanta, for the Army of Tennessee it was even more disastrous. The dual
bloodlettings at Franklin and Nashville annihilated the army. Still, valor and martial ability were
on display. An 1884 piece in the Southern Bivouac hailed the ferocity of Ross’s Texas cavalry
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brigade at Franklin. Skirmishing with federal horsemen around the Harpeth River, the unit was in
danger of being overrun. In an effort to turn the tide, orderly sergeant “Old Billy Hell” called out
to his comrades: “Front into line, and holler like Hell!” Apparently this had the desired effect;
the piece concluded: “The Yanks fell back.” In 1897 a former member of the 6th Tennessee
Infantry wrote to the Veteran paying tribute to H. Clay Barnes, a diminutive soldier in his unit.
During the battle, the author recalled, Barnes mounted the Union breastworks, clubbed an enemy
color bearer, and dragged him and his flag back to Rebel lines. In another piece, the selfless
bravery of Sergeant Robert Bringhurst was chronicled. Although wounded during the Atlanta
Campaign, officially on furlough, and reliant on crutches, Bringhurst refused to part with his
brigade at Franklin. When asked what he hoped to accomplish, he replied that he wanted simply
to “cheer the boys on.” He was wounded eight times and died a few days later.47
Some former soldiers saw unit tributes as a zero-sum game; to exalt the role of one unit
in a given action was to denigrate another. A letter in the January 1900 issue of Confederate
Veteran praised the men of Cheatham’s Division at Franklin. W. H. Sales, a veteran of
Cleburne’s Division, took it as an insult to the men of his unit and responded with a letter of his
own, portions of which were published in the February issue. The editor, realizing that he had
inadvertently shamed some soldiers by honoring others, responded: “The Veteran would not
willingly be the cause of disparity between the gallantry and the faithfulness of these two
divisions, which ranked second to no others who fought for the Confederate side. During their
long, hard service in many terrible battles there was never aught but pride and good will for each
other.”48
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While the Battle of Nashville was a disaster for the Confederacy, there could still be
found in it shining examples of Rebel pluck. In 1905 former artilleryman E. W. Tarrant recalled
the difficulties facing his Alabama battery at the battle. Unlike other batteries, Tarrant insisted,
his was without infantry support, yet it still managed to hold off the Yankees for an hour and a
half and could have done so longer had the Confederate forces to its left not retreated in panic.
Only when they had no choice did Tarrant and his comrades spike their guns and join the retreat.
Apologizing to his commander, Tarrant was assured that he “had done everything that a man
could do.” Half a decade later, former major G. W. Garret recalled the valor of his regiment at
the battle. As the men prepared for action Garret addressed them: “I have been with you in many
battles, and have ever found you at your places ready for duty as courageous soldiers. Let this
day add fresh laurels to the fame of the 23rd Mississippi.” Although the Army of Tennessee was
virtually annihilated, the soldiers of the regiment “did their duty, and did it well, as the long line
of the enemy’s dead and wounded in our front was a solemn testimony.” 49
In Confederate memory, valor had been displayed even in the battle’s chaotic aftermath.
Former captain F. G. Terry paid tribute in 1905 to his unit’s role in covering Hood’s retreat from
Nashville. In the Army of Tennessee’s dying moments, Crossland’s Kentucky cavalry brigade
(fighting as part of Abraham Buford’s division) was its guardian angel. “From Hollow Tree Gap
through Franklin to Spring Hill, to Columbia, to Pulaski, there was not a day that Buford’s
division did not ‘lock horns’ with [Union general James H.] Wilson’s cavalry and not a night
they did not stand between Hood’s infantry and the enemy . . . but they could never break or
stampede us.” Indeed, Terry recalled that the brigade had earned “an enviable reputation for its
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loyalty, its fighting and staying qualities from the time it was assigned to Forrest’s Corps until its
surrender.”50
Even at Bentonville, where the meager remnants of the Army of Tennessee fought a
losing battle as part of the hastily assembled Army of the South, Confederate martial glory was
manifest. In 1878 G. B. Guild paid tribute to the valor of the 8th Texas Cavalry and 4th
Tennessee Cavalry, which counterattacked the advancing Union lines: “there can be no doubt
that this charge saved our little army from destruction at Bentonville. . . . It is almost incredible
to believe that two small regiments of cavalry could have accomplished this.” In 1895, G. K.
Miller, a former captain, recalled the same counterattack: The two units “with a yell bore down
upon the advancing Federals in as brilliant a charge as the war furnished,” capturing many of
them. “At Bentonville,” Miller concluded, “the last battle of the army of Tennessee, its halfclad,
ragged, footsore, hungry veterans displayed all of the high soldierly qualities that had
distinguished them from Belmont to Averysboro, and no part of it with more signal gallantry
than the 8th Texas and 4th Tennessee Cavalry.” These were not the only units remembered for
their intrepid deeds in the army’s final battle. “Comrades of the Army of Tennessee, do you
recollect Col. Anderson Searcy, who commanded the Forty Fifth Tennessee[?],” B. L. Ridley
asked readers of the Veteran in 1900. Although the battle ended in defeat and led to the army’s
capitulation, the colonel and his unit were remembered for how “they charged through the
Yankee lines in the battle.” This was not an exceptional episode in the unit’s history, claimed
Ridley: “follow [Searcy] and his regiment in the records of the rebellion, and you will find them
knocking away with credit to themselves from Bowling Green to Bentonville.”51
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In postwar Southern memory the largely unsuccessful Army of Tennessee became a
gallant legion of heroes who whipped the Yankees on every field. The army’s historical record,
examined with an impartial eye, belied some of the central myths of the Lost Cause. But the
selective memories of Sam Davis, Little Giffen, Jimmie Arnold, the Orphan Brigade, the Caddo
Fencibles, the 19th Tennessee, and others kept the myth alive.
In May 1905, the Confederate Veteran reprinted a letter by Brigadier General R. C. Tyler
of Cheatham’s Corps supposedly written in February 1865. Having just gone through disastrous
engagements at Franklin and Nashville, the Army of Tennessee for all intents and purposes had
ceased to exist. But Tyler was undismayed. He pledged that when the war was over he would
acknowledge without shame his membership in the army. “[T]he old Army of Tennessee is a
grand organization,” he wrote. “[I] am proud to be a member of it. . . . It is composed principally
of veteran troops, battle-scarred heroes, bronze visaged, sturdy sinewed, iron-willed, brave, and
self-sacrificing. They are a noble band.” In the memories of former Confederates, this “noble
band,” much like the army’s high command, proved to be greater than the sum of its parts.52
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Chapter Five:
“The battle fields rendered illustrious by your victories”:
Contingencies and Moments in the Army of Tennessee’s Memory

On July 10, 1878, the Association of the Army of Tennessee convened in Mississippi
City to bestow on Jefferson Davis honorary membership. James Lingan, veteran of the 11th
Louisiana Infantry and president of the association, informed the crowd that “we have assembled
here for the purpose of looking back on the past, in order to learn a lesson for the future. We
have assembled for the purpose of doing honor to the past, reviving memories of the dead and
paying honor to the living.” He then presented Davis with a badge and certificate and
surrendered the podium to the aging former commander in chief. Davis’s acceptance speech was
similar to countless others he gave in the postwar period; he reminded the crowd of the legality
of secession, the numerical superiority of the Yankee invaders, and the moral and martial
superiority of Confederate generals. He eulogized Albert Sidney Johnston, assuring the veterans
that they had “followed the greatest soldier, the ablest man, civil or military, Confederate or
Federal, then living. . . . When he fell, I realized that our strongest pillar had been broken.”
Before moving on to a sketch of American history as he saw it and a scathing indictment of the
federal government he told his audience: “I will not follow you through your long career of
honorable service, or pause to exult with you over the battle fields rendered illustrious by your
victories.”1
Battles, moments in time, and military contingencies loom large in Civil War memory.
Because the South was defeated, this is especially true of the memories of former Confederates.
The most famous and often evoked moment in the war’s popular memory was the Battle of
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Gettysburg—“the eternal southern moment” as it is labeled by historians of the Lost Cause.
Because the defeat at Gettysburg threatened Robert E. Lee’s stainless record as military leader
and, in turn, the Lost Cause, white Southerners espoused memories of the battle that laid the
blame elsewhere, whether it be the recalcitrance of James Longstreet or the fateful bullet that
felled Stonewall Jackson months earlier at Chancellorsville. White Southerners constructed a
narrative of Gettysburg that validated their belief in Lee and Confederate martial superiority.
Similarly, those who identified with the oft-trounced Army of Tennessee constructed memories
of episodes in its history that served to validate Lost Cause cultural convictions and explain how
the army or the Confederacy was defeated.2
Despite its wartime record, victorious moments abounded in the memory of the Army of
Tennessee. As chapter two shows, the most prominent moment was the death of Albert Sidney
Johnston on the first day of Shiloh. However, other episodes in the army’s history also played
important roles in its popular memory. The Battle of Chickamauga, the Dalton bivouac, the
change of command during the Atlanta Campaign, and the Battle of Franklin were all often
recalled in the postwar period. In white Southern memory, these moments served to prove
Confederate martial ability, piety, and manhood and, in some cases, to explain defeat.
Given the army’s dismal wartime record it is unsurprising that the Battle of Chickamauga
loomed large in Confederate memory. Indeed, in Davis’s 1878 speech before the Association of
the Army of Tennessee, Chickamauga was the only battle he cited as “one of the many proofs”
of the army’s capabilities. Over two days in September 1863 the Army of Tennessee, in memory,
demonstrated two things: first, that it was indeed capable of achieving a victory—one that, for a
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time, assured the Confederacy’s survival; and second, that it had taken part in one of the great
military clashes of modern times.3
A number of poets sought in the battle’s immediate aftermath to capture its drama. One
anonymously written poem presented Chickamauga as a climactic battle fought by brave Rebel
soldiers who were weary of defeat and aware that their cause was at a crossroads:

Long, with hearts subdued and saddened,
As th’ oppressor’s host moved on,
Fell the arms of freedom backward,
Till our hopes had almost flown;
Till outspoken stern valor’s fiat—
“Here th’ invading wave shall stay;
Here shall cease the foe’s proud progress;
Here be crushed his grand array!”

The poem conceptualized the battle much as it would be remembered for the next several
decades. It was climactic. And, even by Civil War standards, it was shockingly violent, and it
was thus described in near-apocalyptic terms. In addition to brave troops, Chickamauga was
fought by “Southern battle-giants” such as Breckinridge, Cheatham, Polk, Cleburne, Hill, and
Hood. The soldiers, whether in the ranks or the high command, had declared “ever will [we]
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unconquered be!” However, for the poet, the battle was more than anything a warning to the
Yankee invaders, who should “heed the story” and “ponder well your fearful lesson,” for it was
at Chickamauga they met their doom. Moreover, should they persist in trying to conquer the
South they would be whipped again and again:

Learn to shun the Southern vengeance,
Sworn upon the votive sword,
“Every stream a Chickamauga
To the vile invading horde!”4

Mollie E. Moore, a prolific young Texas poet, expressed similar sentiments. Seventeen
when the war began, she published poems in numerous Southern newspapers during the conflict.
Minding the Gap and Other Poems, the first anthology of her work, appeared in 1867. Despite
“those panting [Yankee] hosts,” her poem “Chickamauga” proclaimed, “our banner kept its
pride.” The “blood-stained stars” of their battle-flags proved the Rebel soldiers’ bravery. After
four stanzas her verses assumed the perspective of a manly Texas soldier who thought only of
home and family as he marched to battle. At Chickamauga he fell “as only Freedom’s own can
fall!” While his wife and children mourned his death, his comrades chose to remember his valor:

The camp-fire in the distant wood gleams red,
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The soldiers group about the ruddy light,
And count in softened tones the noble dead—
The dead! “It thinned our ranks so, that last fight!
The brave who fell like brothers, side by side!”
And then his comrades tell how well he fought, who died
By the River of Death!5

Like the anonymous poet mentioned above, veteran W. M. Marriner, in an essay
published in the Southern Bivouac in 1884, affirmed that the Confederacy was at a crossroads in
September 1863. Tennessee had largely been lost and Georgia was threatened by invasion. The
Army of Tennessee’s soldiers had these gloomy thoughts on their minds as they marched to
battle and, according to Marriner, were also burdened by their wartime record. “This is what
every soldier in the ranks could not but see,” he wrote, “but history says that a stunning
Confederate victory was necessary to give the Western army that prestige of victory that
rendered the army of Lee well nigh invincible.” While he acknowledged that Chickamauga was a
pyrrhic triumph, he maintained that “the victory is not forgotten” and “the rout of the enemy is
remembered.”6
Other veterans of the battle also remembered it in climactic terms; after all, the higher the
stakes the more impressive the victory. After attending a reunion in 1892 at which Raphael
Semmes’s widow requested that aging veterans recreate the “Rebel Yell,” Orphan Brigade
veteran Keller Anderson wrote a bitter column in a Memphis newspaper insisting that recreating
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the cry in civilian life was foolhardy. In fact, he implied that the yell, it its purest and fiercest
form, was heard only at Chickamauga—“one of the best contested battles of the times.”
Anderson recalled the battle’s climax after two days of bloodletting:

Then arose that do-or-die expression, that maniacal maelstrom of
sound; that penetrating, rasping, shrieking, blood-curdling noise,
that could be heard for miles on earth, and whose volume reached
the heavens; such an expression as never yet came from the throats
of sane men, but from men whom the seething blast of an
imaginary hell would not check while the sound lasted.

Rebuking Semmes, Anderson concluded his letter thus: “dear Southern mother, that was the
Rebel yell.”7
In 1894 W. J. McMurry, who had taken part in A. P. Stewart’s attack on the battle’s first
day, wrote that “no field of carnage was more stubbornly contested than was that of
Chickamauga during our civil war. There the flower of the West and the chivalry of the South
clashed in deadly combat.” The battle, once again, took place at a pivotal time; Tennesseans
longed to return home and Georgians were desperate to stave off Yankee invasion. McMurry
pondered: “What more incentive could patriots have to make them give grand battle?” After
Stewart’s attack began, “it seemed as if the earth had opened up all of her magazines, and not a
man would be left to tell the tale. . . . In five minutes all the horrors of war that a soldier ever
witnessed were there.”8
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Using similarly apocalyptic language three years later, former colonel George E. Purvis
remembered Chickamauga as a moment “when the very demons of hell seemed abroad, armed
and equipped for the annihilation of mankind.” Again and again Confederate brigades attacked
but “like great waves of the sea, [were] dashed and broken in pieces against lines and positions
that would not yield to their assaults.” In the face of Union artillery Forrest’s men “saw their
ranks melt as snowflakes.” Elsewhere on the field, the Orphan Brigade persevered “until three
men out of every four were either wounded or dead, eclipsing the historic charge at Balaklava
and the bloody losses in the great battles of modern times.” At Chickamauga Union soldiers
witnessed all that the Confederate soldier was capable of; “they looked down again on those
slopes, slippery with blood and strewn thick as leaves with all the horrible wreck of battle, over
which and in spite of repeated failures these assaulting Confederate columns still formed and
reformed, charging again and again with undaunted and undying courage.”9
In his 1918 memoirs Lot D. Young of the Orphan Brigade remembered Chickamauga in
mythical terms as well. “Early, very early,” he recalled, “the Fourth Kentucky Skirmishers had
the honor of firing the first shots in the opening that day of the greatest battle ever fought on the
American continent, if not the greatest in modern times.” Acknowledging the subjectivity of
such a claim he admitted that “this assertion may be called in question by critics, but if I mistake
not there were more men killed and wounded at Chickamauga than in any other engagement of
the war. . . . [H]ere the old and somewhat sacrilegious saying of ‘Hell broke loose in Georgia’
was fully and forcefully emphasized.”10
At times former Confederates’ conceptions of Chickamauga were confirmed by the
recollections of Union veterans. In 1886 former federal general Gates P. Thruston provided the
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Southern Bivouac with a lengthy narrative of the battle. Suggesting that certain publications
(presumably including the Southern Historical Society Papers) were enamored with battles that
featured Lee, Jackson, Grant, or Sherman, Thruston insisted that Chickamauga was exceptional:
“the war furnished no better test of the fighting metal [sic] of the American soldier.” Like other
survivors of the battle, Thruston drew parallels between Chickamauga and important battles in
European history. Longstreet’s attack on the second day was compared to Napoleon’s at the
Battle of Wagram. “No! there was no severer battle, east or west, than Chickamauga,” he
opined; “the history of the war will furnish no better illustration of the brilliant fighting qualities
and the enduring courage of the American soldier on both sides.”11
Similarly, an 1893 article by former Union general Henry V. Boynton insisted that
“nothing could exceed the valor of these [Rebel] troops”; they faced battle “with a courage
seldom equaled and which it was impossible to surpass. . . . [P]raise of the Confederate fighting
is in no sense exaggerated. In truth, language cannot exaggerate it.” Nevertheless, in clear
exaggeration, Boynton claimed that Chickamauga was not only the bloodiest battle of the Civil
War but bloodier than any battle in modern European history. (With 34,000 casualties in total, it
was indeed a bloody battle, but neither of those assertions was true.)12
Thruston, Boynton, and Purvis were not the only veterans who compared Chickamauga
to climactic battles in European history. In that respect, memories of the battle served to prove
not only that the Army of Tennessee was capable of victory but that it had participated in one of
the great military clashes of western civilization. In 1876 Joseph Wheeler incorrectly claimed
that “at Chickamauga we inflicted a loss on Rosecranz [sic] as great as the loss sustained by
Napoleon at Waterloo.” A 1914 military history of the war for students presented the battle in a
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similar light. Chickamauga, it claimed, “is considered one of the greatest battles of modern
times. It was exceeded in our Civil war [sic] only by Gettysburg and the Wilderness; [it]
compares with Waterloo, and [was] twice bloodier than Wagram or Austerlitz.” Moreover, “the
personal daring and courage displayed in the ranks of both armies has never been excelled on
any battlefield.”13
Memories of Chickamauga as a pivotal battle of grand-historic scale survived the
wartime generation. Thomas W. Dixon presented an exaggerated Chickamauga in his 1914 novel
The Victim. “At the end of two days of carnage,” he wrote, “the Union army was totally routed,
right, left, and center and hurled back from Georgia into Chattanooga.” The book, an apologia
for Jefferson Davis, even granted the typically scapegoated Braxton Bragg credit for the Rebel
victory, describing the battle as the most “brilliant achievement of military genius.” While the
two armies were, in fact, numerically about equal, Dixon claimed that “Rosecrans’ army of
eighty thousand men was literally cut to pieces by Bragg’s fifty thousand Southerners.” The
battle was not only exceptional among those of the Civil War but “was in every way as desperate
a battle as Arcola—and in all Napoleon’s Italian campaigns nothing more daring and wonderful
was accomplished by the Man of Destiny.”14
Similar sentiments were expressed by C. P. J. Mooney, the managing editor of the
Memphis Commercial Appeal, in a Memorial Day address in 1914. Mooney, who was born in
1865, pondered the tenacity of the Confederacy after the disasters of July 1863: “The marvel to
me is that after Gettysburg and after Vicksburg the Confederate soldier had the heart to fight at
Chickamauga. And yet before the shouts of victory and joy had ceased in the North . . . the
Confederates brought a magnificent fighting machine into play against another Federal army . . .
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and all but annihilated it at Chickamauga.” More than any of the Civil War’s other storied
engagements, it was Chickamauga that “nearly struck terror into the hearts of the brave men of
the North.”15
While Chickamauga was remembered for its climactic and even apocalyptic violence and
bloodshed, the Dalton winter encampment would be commemorated largely for its tranquility,
frivolity, and exhibition of Confederate piety. Historians argue that Joseph E. Johnston’s
assumption of command and subsequent reorganization and training regimen, a months-long
revival, and a massive snowball fight reenergized the army for its forthcoming work. Had it been
successful in the succeeding campaign, the Dalton bivouac would surely be remembered as its
Valley Forge.16
On March 22, 1864, with five inches of snow blanketing the army’s encampment,
thousands of soldiers took part in a massive snowball fight. It might seem odd that men who
suffered all the travails of Civil War soldiering would dwell on such a trifling episode, but for
decades after the war officers and enlisted men alike reminisced fondly about this brief
diversion. In history, the Army of Tennessee’s wartime experience was four years of irascible
commanders, privations, defeats, and retreats. In memory the snowball fight served to sweeten
this sour record.
Tennessean George W. Gordon, former general and one-time commander of the UCV,
claimed that many times in the postwar period he was asked: “General, do you remember the
snowball battle at Dalton?” Indeed he did, and he recounted it in a lengthy narrative that
appeared in multiple publications at the end of the nineteenth century. The sham battle he
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recalled was one of Tennesseans versus Georgians. Gordon, initially just a spectator, was lured
off the sidelines when some of his men assured him that he could lead them to victory. “The air
was white with whizzing and bursting balls,” he recalled; “men were tripped up, knocked down,
covered with snow, or run over.” It was all in good fun and at nightfall the soldiers “retired . . .
with the fadeless memory of a glorious day.” Subsequently it proved to be “rather a bond of
sympathy and union.” The bedrock of his reputation, Gordon testified, was not his actions on
bloody battlefields but his leadership during the Dalton snowball fight. Georgians in the Army of
Tennessee thereafter referred to him as the “Snowball Colonel.”17
In his 1868 history of the Orphan Brigade, Edward Porter Thompson was silent on the
snowball fight, stating simply that the Dalton encampment “had many phases peculiar to soldiers
long established in quarters, and it would require a little volume adequately to describe the
employments and diversions.” But his recollections of the army’s winter in Dalton were more
vivid when he revised his work three decades later, suggesting that the prominence of the
snowball fight was largely an artifact of memory construction. “The fun was contagious,” he
wrote, “and soon about every well man in the brigade was out and the Tennesseans also came on
in force. The excitement extended to field and staff officers, who hastily saddled up and rode out
to take command; and then there was shouting of orders with words of encouragement as well as
pelting.” At times the friendly competition got heated and “something that seemed too solid for a
snowball would hit a man, and of course there were charges that this or that side was violating
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the rules of civilized warfare.” That evening before taps the men sat around campfires talking
over the day’s exciting events.18
Thanks in large part to the temporary breakdown of the army’s hierarchy on that
occasion, Sam Watkins remembered the snowball fight fondly:

The effect was electric, boyhood frolics were renewed and the air
was full of flying snow balls. Brigades and divisions were soon
involved, and such a scene was never before witnessed on earth.
Many thousands of men were engaged in a snow ball battle. It
began early in the morning; generals, colonels, captains, and
privates were all mixed up. Private soldiers became commanders
and generals were simply privates, and the usual conditions were
reversed.19

The mock battle resulted in some casualties. “That snow-balling at Dalton,” wrote B. L.
Ridley, “I will never forget. It was the biggest fight—for fun—I ever saw and there was so much
rivalry between the troops that a number of soldiers had their eyes put out.” Fred Joyce,
apparently aware of some of the unfortunate consequences of the melee, described it as “the
heaviest snowball fight ever known—in which the whole army was engaged for hours, and
divisions and brigades were officered just like a real engagement. I . . . missed this great struggle,
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for which I was—am yet I trust—properly thankful.” Nevertheless, most commentators
remembered it as a much needed respite from war and military decorum.20
The snowball fight was not the only episode of frivolity remembered from the army’s
time at Dalton. Fred Joyce wrote that “all the devices known to the soldier, and they are legion,
were brought into play for the entertainment of the army and smoothing down the rough and
jagged routine of the soldier’s life.” He was referring to the cock fights, gambling, and roughhousing that abounded that winter. J. M Tydings likewise had fond memories of Dalton,
recalling that “a few choice spirits of the Orphan Brigade associated themselves together for the
purpose of relieving the tedium and monotony of camp-life by an occasional sociale [sic],
musicale, concert, serenade, etc.” In an effort to spread joy to Dalton’s civilian population, the
Orphans went caroling through town; “a number of ladies and gentlemen and a still greater
number of belated soldiers and urchins, attracted to the spot, soon drew around, quiet and
unobtrusive, but delighted auditors.” The men sang—at least in Tydings’s memory—like a choir
of angels: “The song went on, gathering sweetness and volume . . . till finally as the full-voiced
chorus burst out upon the tremulous air, it swelled into a perfect torrent of melody.”21
Dalton not only a site of fun, rest, and rejuvenation; in memory it was the scene of
incontrovertible proof that the Army of Tennessee was a Christian army. An 1867 article,
“Religion in the Army of Tennessee,” said of the Dalton revival:

The storm of war is hushed. The army goes into regular winter
quarters. Four months or more of profound quiet is given to us.—
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It is the chaplain’s time to work. In nearly every camp a church is
erected. With sacred song, and prayer and instruction in holy
things the men of God pursue their work. A revival is spoken of in
a certain brigade. At the next chaplains’ meeting we hear of others.
The Spirit seems to visit every camp. A general revival is enjoyed.
Then it is pleasant to see the great congregation. May we not trust
that many who laid down their lives in that long four-months’
battle from Dalton to Jonesboro’ [sic] had made their
preparation?22

In 1883 Fred Joyce reminisced that at Dalton “a revival of religion was kept up in the
army for quite a while, and hundreds were baptized. . . . Day and night one could hear the sweet
songs of the gospel and the persuasive eloquence of our chaplains.” Like others, Joyce believed
that the revival had stiffened the moral fiber of the soldiers. “I went over to visit a college mate
in a Louisiana regiment one day and expected, of course, to find him and his friends playing
poker,” he remembered. “What was my surprise to find him holding a prayer-meeting,
surrounded by a large crowd of anxious listeners. There was good done at Dalton.” A similar
scene was conjured up in a 1904 regimental history: “Revival services were carried on most of
the time while at Dalton, and many of the men professed religion and united themselves with the
various churches; and none of them were ever known to repudiate their faith while soldiers or
afterwards as citizens.”23
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Sumner Cunningham wrote rapturously of the revival in an 1893 issue of Confederate
Veteran: “[T]here has never been, even in the army of Cromwell or Gustavus Adolphus, a
stronger religious feeling than there was in the army under Joseph E. Johnston.” The fervor
seized him personally; after one meeting he retreated into solitude “in an agony of prayer,”
seeking comfort in the face of “the uncertainties of life.” Like others, Cunningham saw Dalton
as a turning point in the army’s moral history, claiming that “profanity, which is so common
among soldiers, was almost entirely given up. There were no scoffers at the religion that had
such a hold upon the army.” 24
Unsurprisingly, the revival loomed large in clergymen’s memories. In 1877 former
chaplain and superintendent of the Soldiers’ Tract Association William W. Bennett published a
history of revivals in Confederate armies. While devoting pages to each of the war’s theaters of
operations and many prison camps, Bennett underscored the special nature of the Dalton revival.
“The work at Dalton while the army lay there was almost without parallel. In the coldest and
darkest nights of winter the rude chapels were crowded, and at the call for penitents hundreds
would bow down in sorrow and tears.” So voracious was the army’s spiritual appetite that the
chaplains could not distribute enough Bibles. But thanks to the chaplains’ tireless efforts “such a
revival flame was kindled as is seldom seen in this sinful world. Dalton was the spiritual
birthplace of thousands. Many are in heaven. Some still rejoice and labor on earth.” The anxiety
that precedes any campaign, said Bennett, was powerless to weaken the army’s spiritual fervor.
Quoting one of the army’s chaplains, he described a service in Dalton:
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[M]any Christians wept, and sinners looked seriously and
wonderingly on. It was so unlike the rude scenes of war. I shall
never forget, and I shall always feel it, when I remember how these
rough-bearded, war-worn, and battle-scarred veterans of three
years’ fierce conflict crowded around the log—the rude altar
improvised for the occasion—to celebrate the death of their
gracious and adorable Redeemer.

Thanks to its spiritual awakening, the army at the outset of the Atlanta Campaign was very
different from that formed in 1861-62. “Twelve months after this revolution commenced,”
declared another chaplain quoted by Bennett, “a more ungodly set of men could scarcely be
found than the Confederate army.” But in the wake of the Dalton revival “the utterances of oaths
is seldom, and religious songs and expressions of gratitude to God are heard from every quarter.”
The men now marched to battle as “Christian patriots” confident in God’s protection. Clearly
more concerned with the army’s spiritual than its terrestrial survival, the chaplain concluded that
“such an army may be temporarily overpowered by vastly superior numbers, but they can never
be conquered.”25
The most influential nineteenth-century work on religion in the Confederate army was
initially silent on the Dalton revival. The first edition of J. William Jones’s Christ in the Camp
(1887) was concerned only with the Army of Northern Virginia. In the 1904 edition, however,
Jones included appendices chronicling religion in other Confederate armies. He hoped this new
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edition would “prove useful in showing our young people the power of religion to promote real
manhood.” Quoting numerous Army of Tennessee chaplains and other witnesses, Jones
conveyed to his readers the scope and energy of the Dalton revival. “Great crowds gather
nightly,” one reported; “large numbers are seeking the Lord—forty to fifty every night.” Vice
abated, the revival seized all denominations, and “the Spirit of the Holy One is present and felt.”
J. J. Hutchinson, another chaplain serving at Dalton, made clear that the fervor took hold among
the officer corps as well as the ranks. “Never have I seen such a field for preaching the gospel
and inculcating religious truth,” he testified, “as the Confederate army now presents.” Even
active campaigning could not bring the revival to a close. In May 1864 one meeting was
interrupted with news of advancing Yankees, and in the words of a colporteur on the scene, “the
soldiers were called from their camps to meet the enemy. . . . [T]hey literally went from the altar
to their entrenchments—from their knees to the battle with their foes—singing the songs of Zion
and supplicating the throne of grace as they surrounded the fires of the bivouac, or waited to
receive the fire of the foe.” Jones also quoted a soldier in the ranks who was confident that in
short order “we will have a brigade of Christian soldiers fighting for Christ and their country.”
Furthermore, he said, the revival was spreading through the entire army. He looked to the future
with renewed optimism: “I hope and trust in God that this army will be converted into a
Christian army before this war is over.”26
There was a significant episode during the Dalton bivouac notable for its relative absence
in the Army of Tennessee’s popular memory: Patrick Cleburne’s motion to emancipate slaves in
return for military service. While Jefferson Davis’s efforts to bury the proposal were never
completely successful, it was not widely discussed in the immediate postwar period. Irving Buck,
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Cleburne’s adjutant general, claimed in 1904 that the “paper was suppressed by the Richmond
authorities, and save to those to whom it was read at the time, and to the War Department, was
only known by hearsay to the public until 32 years after.” But this was an overstatement. In
1878 the short-lived Nashville periodical Annals of the Army of Tennessee and Early Western
History publicized Cleburne’s proposal; editor and former lieutenant colonel Edwin L. Drake
acknowledged that it was “discussed at the time in the army . . . with bated breath” but claimed
that word of it had “never appeared in print before that we are aware of.” As shown in chapter
three, Cleburne’s emancipation plan was not an important factor in his postwar popularity. His
memory was constructed solely to validate white Southerners’ convictions of their martial
abilities.27
Cleburne’s motion was not entirely without memorialists. Editor Drake maintained that
“Cleburne’s views on the subject of slavery in 1864, places [sic] the mental endowments of this
splendid soldier in a light which strongly adds to his otherwise brilliant reputation.” The foreignborn Cleburne “was better qualified to form a just and correct opinion on the proposed measure
than our own people, whose feelings and interests were more deeply involved.” An 1898
biography of Cleburne by Charles Edward Nash, the general’s antebellum business partner,
argued that his motion “would have been the best plan to have [been] adopted.” Nash’s
endorsement, however, was motivated by his acceptance of Lost Cause arguments regarding the
war’s causes, white supremacy, and the benevolence of Southern slavery. His confidence in the
plan stemmed from his conviction that slave owners cared for their slaves, “considered [them] a
part of the household, and never allowed [them] to work in places of danger to life or health.”
Thus he claimed that the majority of conscripted slaves would have fought loyally for their
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masters. Those who opposed the motion in 1864, according to Nash, did so because “they were
not fighting for slaves but for a separate government.” B. L. Ridley was more restrained in his
approval, postulating that “had General Cleburne’s idea been carried out, it perhaps would not
have brought about the disintegration [of the Confederacy feared by some] and would have
counteracted the Federal idea of enlisting [slaves] in their ranks.” Despite these examples,
former Confederates identifying with the Army of Tennessee could have constructed a memory
that laid claim to a racially progressive legacy; they chose not to. For Southern whites in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who were aware of it, Cleburne’s motion was likely a
stain on his otherwise pristine image. Consequently, the proposal was largely forgotten and
Dalton was remembered solely in terms of frolicking and piety.28
If Dalton was a safe port in the storm of war, Joseph E. Johnston was its harbormaster.
His reforms of the army’s training regimen and organization and his generalship during the
Atlanta Campaign were invoked by his numerous defenders to produce a postwar image of a
paternalistic and capable general unfortunately removed from command before he could save the
Confederacy.
Following Johnston’s death in 1891 the Association of Ex-Confederate Soldiers and
Sailors eulogized him at a memorial service in Washington, D.C. Presiding over the ceremony,
former Confederate general Eppa Hunton lauded Johnston as “one of the greatest and best of our
leaders. . . . [He] led our armies to victory, or in defeat inspired them to greater deeds of valor. . .
. [W]hether at the head of a victorious or vanquished army, he was always the brave, skillful and
trusted leader.” Similar sentiments were expressed on that occasion by Virginia veteran Leigh

28

AAT 1 (1878): 50; Charles Edward Nash, Biographical Sketches of Gen. Pat Cleburne and Gen. T. C. Hindman,
together with Humorous Anecdotes and Reminiscences of the Late Civil War (Little Rock: Tunnah and Pittard,
1898), 190-93; Ridley, Battles and Sketches, 291.

157

Robinson, who gave the main address. “[T]he emulation of brave lives,” said Robinson, “and
the preservation of their images, is the wise instinct of mankind.” Johnston was among those
noble souls worthy of such recognition. Despite his Virginia roots, Robinson praised Johnston’s
role in the west no less than his role in the east. “Johnston went to the West, not to do brilliant
things for their own sake, but to win the cause of which he was the soldier.” Without mentioning
any specific wartime episodes to prove his point, Robinson asserted that as a theater commander
Johnston displayed strategic brilliance and consistently triumphed over larger enemy forces. 29
Johnston not only excelled in theater command, Robinson maintained, but also brought
the army itself to its peak of efficiency. After assuming command at Dalton, he proved to be
nothing short of a miracle worker. While his new position was “an unenviable throne” he “so
reorganized and reassured his dispirited force, that, when the campaign opened in the spring, the
poorest regiment he had was superior in effectiveness and drill to the best when he took
command.” From that point on, “no army in the Confederacy excelled, if any equaled it, in drill
and discipline.” Contemplating “the miracle which [Johnston] wrought in this transformation,
from complete route to complete confidence, from fatal chaos and dismemberment . . . to
compact order,” Robinson evoked the Book of Genesis: “As Johnston looked upon this work of
his creative week, he saw that it was good.”30
Like many other Johnston storytellers, Robinson marveled at the general’s masterful
retreat from Dalton to Atlanta and presented his removal from command as one of the war’s
great contingencies. His Fabian policy, condemned by some as cowardly or indecisive, was in
truth brilliant, “the wise discerning stroke of the new regime.” As the armies neared the Gate
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City, “Johnston felt himself daily growing stronger against an adversary daily growing weaker.”
Robinson’s Johnston was a chess master, always several moves ahead of Sherman, biding his
time until he could reach Atlanta—“a place too strong to be taken by assault and too extensive to
be invested.” There he would launch a counterstrike that would send Sherman reeling. But just
as “the goal had been reached, the victory organized,” Richmond interceded. Had the Richmond
authorities only been wiser and more patient and kept Johnston in command, “history would
have engraved for him the epitaph: ‘Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.’”31
In 1893 Virginia attorney Robert M. Hughes, Johnston’s grandnephew and personally
selected biographer, echoed many of Robinson’s opinions. At Dalton, Johnston assumed
command of a battered and broken army. His subsequent reforms worked wonders, “increasing
the comfort and discipline of the troops. . . . [T]heir spirits returned, laggards rejoined their
commands. . . . [The army’s] moral force had grown immeasurably.” Johnston, unlike Lee, was
facing confident federal soldiers who had known little but victory. His retreats were calculated
and “leisurely.” It was just as he was preparing to deliver Sherman a deadly blow that Davis
foolishly interceded to replace him with Hood.32
Such opinions were not mere platitudes expressed by friends and family in the wake of
Johnston’s passing. Similar sentiments were voiced long before and after his death. In an 1866
tribute to George Washington, Daniel Harvey Hill could not help comparing Johnston to the
American nation’s founder. “And how sublime too, was the conduct of that other Virginian, J.
E. Johnston, when superseded at Atlanta after what the country now recognizes as a successful
campaign.” Unselfish patriot that he was, Johnston surrendered his command with manly grace,
concerned only for the well-being of his soldiers and his country. None of the Confederacy’s
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military mishaps could be laid at Johnston’s feet, said Hill. Like Washington he realized the
wisdom of a Fabian policy:

He retreated from Dalton; but he inflicted day by day such heavy
losses upon Sherman that the disparity between their numbers had
almost ceased to exist. He was decried for his retreats, just as
Washington was for his. But time has already wrought a mighty
change in men’s opinion and we believe that history will enroll the
name of Joseph E. Johnston beside that of the man he so much
resembled in mind and character.33

One year later, Edward Pollard, in his book Lee and His Lieutenants, told how Johnston
devoted “himself with energy and assiduity” to the task of “creating an army from the fine
material before him” at Dalton. Of Johnston’s retreats, he opined that the general was “never in
strength to justify an assumption of the offensive. To have done so, would have been to discard
all the ideas of rational generalship and to gamble in the lotteries of war.” Like others, Pollard
believed Davis’s removal of Johnston was a great turning point of the war, one that spelled the
Confederacy’s doom: “The measure did indeed prove to be ‘the beginning of the end.’ Then
began the final and general ruin. It was like the opening of the fourth seal, and the appearance of
the pale horse of the Apocalypse—‘all hell followed.’” Sherman was overjoyed at the news and
subsequently abandoned all caution, “and verily, the Furies were at that time let loose upon
Georgia and the ill fated Carolinas.” Johnston’s removal was an “evil moment,” and “the fall of
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Atlanta through the unskillful action of Gen. Hood was one of the worst calamities of the war.”
Hood went on to further disasters: “his army, after severe defeats in Tennessee, soon ceased to
be, as an army, among the things of the earth.”34
The replacement of the unpopular Bragg with the beloved Johnston was met with nearly
unanimous approval by soldiers during the war; thus it is little wonder that the moment loomed
large in their postwar memories. Orphan Brigade veteran Fred Joyce recalled in 1884 that “we
had General Joe Johnston in charge, and we felt safe. . . . We fairly worshipped him, and love
him yet, fondly and tenderly.” In short order, “Old Joe” transformed the dispirited and
disorganized Army of Tennessee into a powerful fighting force. “The metal [sic] of the soldiers
was plainly discernable, and never was a grander army led forth, or a grander chieftain at
headquarters. We were handled with as much care seemingly as an accomplished colonel would
drill a single regiment.” Like many other ex-Confederates, Joyce also lauded Johnston for his
conduct of the Atlanta Campaign, “a retreat that has never been equaled, and a series of military
movements unparalleled in any age.”35
By the end of the century Johnston was being further defended by two of the Army of
Tennessee’s most prolific and influential storytellers. In 1897 B. L. Ridley published a short
piece on the Battle of Resaca arguing that the Atlanta Campaign “displayed more military
strategy than any in the war between the states” and that “there was not a more skillful game
upon the military chessboard.” In that great struggle, Johnston faced nearly insurmountable odds,
yet displayed “vigilance and boldness.” Edward Porter Thompson expressed similar opinions,
calling Johnston a “wonderful man” and asserting that from the time he assumed command “until
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he was relieved, near Atlanta, the Army of Tennessee grew and strengthened.” Under Johnston’s
leadership, even in retreat, the army’s “strength was not impaired, and its spirit was wholly
unaffected—indeed, the men seemed to grow more and more confident that Gen. Johnston would
yet prove the destruction of Sherman and his apparently overwhelming host.”36
Praise of Johnston continued into the new century. Advocating for the erection of a
Johnston monument in 1910, the Bryan M. Thomas Chapter of the UDC wrote to the
Confederate Veteran: “Dalton is the logical site for a monument to him, as at Dalton he
reorganized his army and began there his retreat, the most masterful in the annals of warfare. No
general is more worthy of the respect and gratitude of the South than Joseph E. Johnston, and yet
no general has received less.” Alabama soldier and politician John Witherspoon Du Bose
Montgomery paid tribute to Johnston in a 1914 issue of the Veteran. Johnston’s confidence in
ultimate victory, claimed Montgomery, was unshaken by Sherman’s steady southward advance
and he would have triumphed but for the intercession of Jefferson Davis. Johnston “had issued
the orders to his corps commanders to bring on the battle. . . . [H]e expected to put Sherman to
rout equal to Napoleon’s retreat from Russia when . . . he received the telegram removing him
from command.”37
In 1918 Georgia veteran Frank Stovall Roberts praised Johnston’s reforms and proudly
recalled the grand review of the revitalized army at Dalton—an event, he said that “while
memory lasts I shall never forget.” Johnston had quickly gotten to work after assuming
command. “In a short time the evidence of his master mind were [sic] seen in the improved
condition of things . . . so that by the 1st of April a practically new machine had been evolved
out of the broken one that came limping from Missionary Ridge a few months previously.”
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Johnston looked every bit the soldier as he reviewed his army “and the men thrilled with pride as
they saluted their grand commander.” The general had infused the army with confidence, and
“that confidence was never wanting to the hour when he was removed from command.”38
For some, like Pollard, lauding Johnston went hand-in-hand with denigrating his
successor. In Susan Pendleton Lee’s 1896 schoolbook, the South’s children were told that
Sherman’s numerical superiority made it “impossible” for Johnston to do anything but retreat.
But the army’s morale improved despite the retrograde movements. “Just at this time,” she
concluded, “when Johnston was in a more favorable condition for fighting than he had been
before, the authorities in Richmond, not understanding his difficulties, relieved him from
command. . . . Events soon proved that the change was not a fortunate one for the South.”
Students learned something similar from Thomas Vineyard’s 1914 history of the war. “The
removal of Johnston from command is thought to have been a great mistake on the part of the
Confederate Government,” Vineyard wrote, “as his tactics had been in this campaign on the
defensive on account of his inferior numbers and equipment to that of Sherman, while that of
Hood was on the aggressive, and he maintained the idea of attacking Sherman’s army, which
proved to be the loss of Atlanta for the Confederacy.”39
The Confederate pro-Johnston narrative of the Atlanta Campaign was bolstered by some
reconciliationist Northern literature as well. Emma Wortman’s A Child’s History of the United
States, for example, maintained that Johnston was “a man of will” and “soldierly skill” who held
Sherman at bay until Richmond interceded. Biographer Gamaliel Bradford offered readers a
much more nuanced, yet still sympathetic, Johnston in his 1914 work Confederate Portraits.
Bradford argued that Johnston was capable yet cautious; his life was characterized by poor luck,
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but oftentimes “a larger element of Johnston’s ill-luck was just simply Joseph E. Johnston.” Yet
when the army was besieged at Atlanta, “at the greatest crisis of all, after retreating a hundred
miles to draw his enemy on, he at last made his preparations with cunning skill for a decisive
stand, which should turn retreat into triumph.” But “the order arrived, removing him from the
command and robbing him once more of the gifts of Fortune.”40
John Bell Hood suffered by comparison with Johnston in postwar memory. Historian
Richard McMurry has shown that Hood’s assumption of command and subsequent actions won
some approval among the men in the ranks, but their opinion of their erstwhile commander
declined in the postwar period. This was partly because Hood was scapegoated in the pages of
the Southern Historical Society Papers but mostly because he did something few other Civil War
commanders did after the war—he publicly criticized the men in the ranks. Army of Tennessee
veterans could hardly be expected to praise a general who questioned their courage, manhood,
and abilities. Veteran D. W. Sanders wrote in 1885 that “it is a matter of regret, that General
Hood, in writing the history of [the Tennessee] campaign, undertakes to stigmatize the courage
and efficiency of the troops under his command.”41
Others would be more acerbic in their responses to Hood’s allegations. Ever protective
of the men in the ranks, Benjamin Franklin Cheatham emerged as one of Hood’s fiercest critics
after the war, stating in 1881:

No chieftain, since the world began, has ever commanded an army
of men more confident in themselves, more ready to endure and to
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dare whatever might be required of them, or more capable of
exalted heroism, than that which obeyed the will of their general
from Peach Tree Creek to Nashville. The army of Tennessee needs
no defense against the querulous calumnies which disfigure
General Hood’s attempt at history.

Another of Hood’s former lieutenants, A. P. Stewart, while acknowledging that “Hood was a
brave soldier, a man of many excellent qualities and a good subordinate,” declared that “there
was never a single occasion during the entire campaign, and during the period Hood was in
command, and on to Bentonville, the last conflict of the war in which it was engaged, that the
‘rank and file’ of the Army of Tennessee failed in its duty.”42
While they were not as numerous as those of Johnston, Hood did have defenders. Sam R.
Watkins, like many modern military historians, believed that Hood had simply inherited a
disaster: “General Hood was just simply left in the lurch, and he, a poor cripple at that, who had
lost in the war the greater part of his body.” The Atlanta Campaign had already been decided by
the time the army was besieged in the city. “General John B. Hood did all that he could. The die
had been cast. Our cause had been lost before he took command.”43
Some commentators considered Hood superior to Johnston. In an 1893 address to the
Confederate Survivors’ Association in Augusta, Joseph Cumming criticized Johnston’s Fabian
policy, “which culminated in continued disappointment, and final disaster far reaching in its
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baleful influence.” Noting that the terrain should have aided the Confederacy and hindered the
federals, Cumming saw no justification for Johnston’s repeated retreats, which “impaired public
confidence in the ultimate success of Confederate arms.” While he admitted that changing
commanders in mid-campaign was “hazardous at best,” he judged Hood’s offensives “prompt
and earnest” and suggested that they buoyed morale in the army. The loss of Atlanta, said
Cumming, was largely Hardee’s fault. Georgia veteran Joseph Tyrone Derry echoed Cumming’s
assessments in his 1895 Story of the Confederate States. Dismissing some of Johnston’s selfserving claims as unlikely, Derry pointed out that, unlike Lee during the Overland Campaign,
Johnston had surrendered a vast amount of territory without offering battle. Hood, in his
opinion, was a bold and potentially successful general; “an army consisting of men filled with his
heroic spirit could never have been defeated except by annihilation.” He blamed the loss of
Atlanta on Hood’s lieutenants.44
No one defended Hood more rigorously than the veterans of his famed Texas Brigade. At
the behest of Hood’s Texas Brigade Association, Angelina Winkler, wife of a former colonel
who had served under Hood in Virginia, delivered an address in 1885 that lauded Hood’s
character and career. In Hood’s “military genius,” she stated, “you felt the most implicit
confidence.” It was thanks to his leadership that the brigade survived four years of war with its
spirit undiminished. “I know in the estimation of the brave men forming now only a remnant of
a once courageous band,” Winkler continued, “the Generals highest in your scale attaining
human perfection, were Robert E. Lee and John B. Hood.” The latter was honorable, patriotic,
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and loyal; “around no life of all who had rendered the ‘Lost Cause’ such noble service lingered
more poetry, romance and chivalry.”45
Winkler specifically defended Hood’s actions from Atlanta to Nashville. He had not
wanted command of the army, she insisted, and accepted it only reluctantly. Moreover, the army
was at that point demoralized after years of defeats and retreats. Like Sam Watkins, Winkler
believed that Atlanta was doomed before Hood assumed command. And even though the city
was ultimately lost, Hood’s offensive maneuvers succeeded in reviving the army’s morale. She
furthermore portrayed the Battle of Franklin as an unambiguous Confederate victory. The defeat
at Nashville, she claimed, was no fault of Hood’s, given the overwhelming numerical superiority
of the Yankees.46
Two and half decades later, the organization’s opinions were unchanged. “When we
reflect as to how and when General Hood consented to take command of the Army of
Tennessee,” declared one of its publications, “our admiration for this great hero of the South
becomes more intense, and his wonderful patriotism and love for the Confederacy, which far
exceeded ordinary human comprehension, is made manifest.” Confederate defeat could not be
ascribed to Hood. “That as commander of an army why he was not able to bring victory to the
Southern cause has been long fully understood by all fair-minded people and General Hood, like
General Lee, and like the gallant soldiers that fought under them, all did their best.” A
combination of overwhelming Yankee might and the Army of Tennessee’s worn-down condition
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due to its earlier wartime defeats absolved Hood of blame; “all that could have been done to
avert the calamities that befell this army was done by Hood.”47
In 1893 the Confederate Veteran featured one of the few postwar remembrances that
portrayed both Johnston and Hood fondly—perhaps unsurprisingly, given its policy against
publishing anything derogatory about Rebel leaders. Johnston, it said, was beloved by his troops
and his removal from command hit like a thunderclap; “so devoted to Johnston were his men that
[even] the presence and immediate command of Gen. Lee would not have been accepted without
complaint.” They consequently resented Hood—until the eve of Franklin. The invasion of
Tennessee and subsequent affair at Spring Hill “created an enthusiasm for [Hood] equal to that
entertained for Stonewall Jackson after his extraordinary achievements.” As the charge at
Franklin commenced the soldiers “had unbounded faith in Gen. Hood, whom [sic] they believed
would achieve a victory that would give us Nashville.” (The article was silent on Hood’s
standing with the rank and file following Franklin.)48
Unlike Johnston’s replacement by Hood at Atlanta, the Battle of Franklin was not
remembered as a great military contingency. Few former Confederates pondered the final result
of the Civil War had Hood’s army triumphed at that battle. What was remembered instead was
that the army marched undaunted into near-inevitable death at Franklin, a charge all the more
poignant because it was doomed from the start. Much like Pickett’s Charge with the Army of
Northern Virginia, Franklin was the grand tragedy in the memory of the Army of Tennessee, one
that served to prove the valor and steadfast devotion of the Rebel soldier. Former Rebels who
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identified with the Army of Tennessee were especially energetic in their commemoration of
Franklin.49
Alabaman I. M. Porter paid tribute to her brother, a lieutenant who fell at Franklin, in her
1867 poem “Shot Thro’ the Heart.” The battle was fought in the fall of 1864, but to Porter it
signaled the Confederacy’s winter. By that stage of the war “not half of the men who went to the
front/Can answer the muster call.” She wondered if her brother’s final moments were marked by
pain or pride and she longed to have his sword returned to her so she could give it to his son.
Ultimately, however, she was confident that her brother died with honor, exemplifying
Confederate valor:

Where, where is the sword whose gleaming blade
Flashed up against the sky?
And wrote in a broad, white steady line
How Southern men can die!
Thus martyrs grandly die!50

Porter’s brother was one of many Confederates remembered for their bravery at the
battle. Franklin’s participants described with particularly intense passion what they had
witnessed. In an 1885 regimental history, former private Thomas A. Head recalled that “the
Confederates came up to the work of death in a cool and fearless manner . . . and as darkness
began to envelop the scene the work of carnage was desperate almost beyond description.” A
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dozen years later, W. M. Cook of the 13th Tennessee Infantry recalled the ferocity of the handto-hand fighting at Franklin. “I was in every battle that the Army of Tennessee fought from
Shiloh to Bentonville,” he wrote, “but Franklin was by far the closest quarters that I was ever in.
Near and around this spot of which I speak the dead and dying were actually in heaps. God only
knows how any of us escaped.”51
Higher-ranking Franklin veterans recorded similar memories. In 1889, William B. Bate
gave an address celebrating the opening of Battle-Ground Academy, a preparatory school then
located on part of the battlefield. “The assault was made on the whole line with a courage and
vigor rarely equaled in ancient or modern warfare,” he declared; “that remnant of the army of
Tennessee, the pride and plume of our fated but devoted South, moved with intrepid step, under
a murderous fire, through the crucial ordeal of terrible battle, into the very jaws of death.” Bate
hoped that the academy’s students would be mindful of the historical epic that had played out on
the site of their own campus. “When the young student here, within the walls of Battle-ground
Academy, reciting his Latin, is charmed with that historic romance, the Aeneid, let him turn the
mirror of memory on this field, at the set of sun, on the 30th of November, 1864, and see the
reality of modern warfare in its bloodiest type, as the departing spirits of grander and real heroes
rise from the smoke of battle into their bright and eternal realms.” The Spartans had their
Thermopylae and the Athenians their Marathon, he reminded his audience, and Southerners had
their Franklin.52
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A decade later, thanks to the efforts of the local UDC chapter, a monument
commemorating the battle was erected in the public square in Franklin. Reverend J. H. McNeilly,
a chaplain at the battle, led his audience in prayer, thanking God “for the characters which were
purified by the war and for the example of those who didst not measure duty by success, who
preferred death to dishonor, and who showed to all the world how they valued the rights and
liberties thou didst give their land.” He furthermore asked that God not let succeeding
generations forget the example set by the men who had died at Franklin and who had gone to war
with “patriotic devotion, with unyielding courage to dare, to do, to die for God and native
land.”53
Another witness to the battle also paid tribute to the dead at Franklin that day. Former
brigadier general George Gordon sketched for the audience the events of November 30, 1864. As
the Army of Tennessee moved into position for the charge “it presented the most magnificent
and spectacular military pageant ever witnessed by that veteran army, or perhaps any other
during that great international war.” This marshaling of troops was so sublime a sight, said
Gordon, that the men forgot the impending danger. But as they advanced to the enemy lines the
field became “a scene of surpassing terror and appalling grandeur.” Then, brandishing the bloodstained battle flag of the 11th Tennessee Infantry Regiment, he praised the “prowess, courage,
and self-sacrifice that characterized the action of that valiant, war-worn, and battle-scared army
known in history as the Army of Tennessee.” More bravery was displayed at Franklin, he
claimed, than at Marathon, Waterloo, Balaklava, or Gettysburg. None should ever forget “the
patriotic virtues and splendid manhood of the brave and self-sacrificing officers and men who
died here.”54
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Other veterans also remembered the valor displayed at Franklin as exceptional. In a 1908
history of the battle, Robert Webb Banks of the 37th Mississippi Infantry Regiment opined that
“never . . . did men ever dare to do more than was done by the Confederates to whom it fell to
bear the heat and burden of that fateful day.” However, to truly appreciate the “prowess of the
Army of Tennessee at Franklin,” he said, one must acknowledge the army’s preceding trials and
tribulations. Every mile between Dalton and Atlanta had been “marked by the blood . . . of that
splendid body of men, composed of the flower and chivalry of the Southern States.” As the
army marched into Tennessee it was hungry, footsore, and ill-equipped. But when the troops
began their charge at Franklin “there were no recreants in their ranks. There was no dallying
because of the dangers facing them.” Afterwards, the dead were innumerable; “how many colorbearers nobly died will never be accurately known until the Angel Gabriel sounds the last
reveille to summon the quick and the dead to the final roll-call.” Motivated by the justness of
their cause, the brotherhood of their comrades, and their love of home, Rebels at Franklin had
displayed unparalleled valor. Encapsulating a key element in the memory of Franklin, Banks
summarized the battle as “that day of ordeals in which the spirit of every Southern soldier was
tested to the last extreme and, in every extremity found dauntless.”55
Non-veterans also remembered Franklin for its display of bravery and sacrifice amid
carnage. On the battle’s forty-fifth anniversary in 1910 Mrs. N. B. Dozier of the Franklin UDC
proclaimed that “no other battle was ever more grandly fought.” While every Rebel soldier who
served in the war deserved to be commemorated, Dozier said, those who fought at Franklin
deserved special tribute. Four years later, C. P. J. Mooney, in the same speech in which he
praised the Confederacy for persevering after Gettysburg and Vicksburg, compared Franklin to
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the former. “The Creator never put it into the hearts of men to do more than did those
Confederates who for three days gave battle at Gettysburg. But,” he added, “let me say that the
Confederate soldiers at Franklin gave an exhibition of courage, endurance, and daring which
resulted in an engagement unparalleled in the history of warfare.” Acknowledging that the war’s
outcome was already decided in November 1864, he asked his audience: “Why did men toss
their lives away as though life was a vain and empty thing?” The Civil War, he answered, “was
to be the epic tragedy of our country. And these Confederate soldiers were determined that its
climax should be such that through all the ages it would be the glory of our people. . . . And how
magnificently the Confederacy died!” Like others, Mooney believed that the Rebels’ efforts at
Franklin were especially poignant because they were doomed to fail: “the stuff that was in the
men who followed Hood into Tennessee was of that brand of courage that marks those who step
from the ranks to lead a forlorn hope.”56
In 1915, H. P. Figuers, a boy in 1864, published his reminiscences of the battle. Claiming
to have witnessed the clash from the roof of his house, he testified that both sides had fought
nobly: “no braver men ever met on any battle field.” But he gave the greater accolades to the
Confederates, asserting that “the men who wore the gray had faced such scenes before and were
not afraid. From the dawn of history until this day no braver army ever stood in line of battle.”
Like George Gordon, he remembered the beginning of the charge for its martial splendor—a
splendor that vanished when the Rebels came in range of the Union guns. “It is impossible to
describe or even to have an adequate idea of the fearful carnage and horror of that great battle. . .
. It was at once the glory and horror of war.”57
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The Army of Tennessee’s wartime record was marked more by horror than by glory.
Nevertheless, in the memories of former Confederates, victorious moments abounded. Climactic
battles, contingencies, and moments of valor and piety were remembered and recounted in the
postwar decades as proof of the army’s triumphs even in defeat.
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Chapter Six:
“The indifferent notice of neglected stepchildren”:
Forgetting the Army of Tennessee

In June 1929, the United Confederate Veterans’ rapidly thinning ranks convened in
Charlotte, North Carolina, for their thirty-ninth annual reunion. Army of Tennessee veteran and
UCV president A.T. Goodwyn gave an address that encapsulated the Lost Cause as it existed on
the eve of the Great Depression. He asserted that Reconstruction, now a vital part of the myth,
was an act of despotism by the federal government and the South had been right to overthrow it.
Moreover, he said, the Civil War had ended only when the enemy’s overwhelming numbers
forced the Confederacy to surrender. Robert E. Lee, unlike his Yankee counterparts, had waged
gentlemanly war that protected civilians from harm. The South had not wanted a war, Goodwyn
maintained, and secession had been a legal response to Lincoln’s election and subsequent
military aggression. “[N]ow in sober retrospection, in prayerful introspection, . . . we can say,
‘We thank God that at Appomattox we were with General Lee and not with General Grant.’” He
charged the veterans in the audience with writing true histories to show that the Confederacy’s
cause was constitutionally and morally just. “These facts are clearly illustrated in Statuary Hall
of our national capitol,” he declared, “where the statues of Washington and Lee stand side by
side, Washington in his Revolutionary uniform and Lee in his Confederate uniform, high
exponents of the same sacred principles.”1
Lee’s link with Washington was not his only admirable trait. “We are proud of our
leadership,” Goodwyn continued; “we confidently hold it up for the contemplation of the
historian as typical of the highest manhood.” But the Confederate leadership he lauded consisted

1

Goodwyn, Address, 1-7.

175

of Jefferson Davis, his cabinet, and Robert E. Lee. Like many other Lost Cause devotees in the
1920s, Goodwyn was at least as enamored with the character of his heroes as he was with their
leadership ability: “We challenge the student of the ages to produce their equals, in cultural
graces, in unselfish patriotism, in patient endurance, in inflexible integrity, in nobility of
character. We point to them with pride as exemplars of future generations.” In one of his few
allusions to aspects of the war beyond Virginia’s borders, he praised Sam Davis. When he noted
events outside Virginia such as Benjamin Butler’s infamous Order 28 in New Orleans or
Sherman’s March to the Sea, he used them to demonstrate Lee’s moral superiority. “Here you
have a clear indication of two types of men differing in their sense of duty.” In unabashedly
white supremacist language Goodwyn denounced the North’s arming of African Americans,
insisted on the benevolence of slavery, and proclaimed that the South went to war for the
principle of states’ rights, not to protect its peculiar institution. This was proven, he said, by the
words of Robert E. Lee, which revealed that “he fought to preserve not only for Virginia, but
every state in the Union—the American ideals of local self-government and a Federal Union
built upon State Sovereignty, in other words, a government, of the people, by the people, and for
the people.”2
By the end of the third decade of the twentieth century the embodiment of the
Confederate experience in white Southern memory was Robert E. Lee. This chapter addresses
two questions. First, why was the Army of Tennessee, which was so prominent in Southern
memory for decades following the war, eventually overshadowed by Lee and the Army of
Northern Virginia? And second, why have historians of the Lost Cause neglected the Army of
Tennessee’s role in Confederate memory?
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The march of time and the passing of the wartime generation played a pivotal part in
Virginia’s ascendance. But even while the wartime generation lived, those who had experienced
the western theater were aware of forces at work constructing a Virginia-centric narrative of the
Confederate experience. In 1893, S. A. Cunningham received a letter commending him for
paying “liberal attention to the Army of Tennessee.” The writer, a veteran of the army named
Vic Reinhardt, had noted that “in the papers it is not often the heroism and valor of our army
under Sidney and Joe Johnston, Bragg, Hood, and other gallant leaders of our Western army are
made known. It does me good to read these accounts of active service, much of it from the ranks,
and bearing the impress of personal experience.” A year later Reinhardt again expressed his
gratitude: “It rejoices me to see for once some prominence given the Army of Tennessee, which I
find in the VETERAN.” While not desiring to detract from the reputation of the veterans of the
eastern army, he did “want to see more mention of those boys who, without shoes, clothing, or
food, almost, endured the hardships and faced the enemy in the Army of Tennessee.” The Union
troops in the west, he claimed, were especially tenacious, but the Rebel army had never wavered.
Its veterans, he feared, were now in danger of becoming the unsung heroes of the Confederacy:
“These men have so long stood by, and many of them gone on into eternity, without hearing the
commendation their valor brought and the bravery and heroism their richest blood paid for. I
rejoice, too, with all other veterans in their marvelous achievements, even though our flag is now
lost in the folds of the stars and stripes.”3
Cunningham himself feared that the army in which he had served was being marginalized
in some expressions of Confederate memory. In 1910, his magazine published two articles about
Hood’s Tennessee campaign by George E. Brewer of the 49th Alabama Infantry. Cunningham,
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grateful for the submissions, appended to them his own editorial commentary. “It is remarkable
how little appears in our published histories of the deeds of valor and endurance on the part of
the soldiers of the Army of the [sic] Tennessee. All eyes seem centered on the defenses of
Richmond and in history we of the Western Army receive the indifferent notice of neglected
stepchildren, as we largely suffered the same fate in the campaigns of the war.” Cunningham
reasoned that commemorating the Confederate soldier need not be a zero-sum game. “I would
not detract one iota from the praise given to the valor and deeds of the Army of Northern
Virginia,” he avowed, “for they deserve all the praise they get. But that is no reason we should
be neglected, for I am sure soldiers never carried themselves better or did their duty more nobly
than did ours throughout the ordeal narrated.” Whether they fought at Richmond, Vicksburg, or
Nashville, all Confederate soldiers had earned the South’s praise: “Never was an army made of
better stuff, and they ought to command the veneration of every lover of country.”4
Fear of a Virginia-dominated Confederate memory was manifested elsewhere as well. In
response to the dedication of General Ulysses S. Grant’s tomb in 1897, New York businessman,
native Virginian, and Rebel veteran Charles Broadway Rouss proposed that the UCV erect a
“Temple to the Lost Cause.” Rouss’s proposal generated heated debate among different UCV
chapters. One of the most contentious issues was the location of the proposed memorial.
Nashville, Memphis, New Orleans, Washington, D.C., and of course Richmond were the most
popular options. At the 1898 national UCV reunion in Covington, Kentucky, it was decided that
the South’s “Battle-Abbey” would be built in the former capital of the Confederacy. A number of
financial backers who had advocated for other sites subsequently asked for a refund of their
donations. Ultimately, argues architectural historian William Rasmussen, “the memorial would
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become less a southern one and more a Virginian one.” Indeed, when the Battle-Abbey was
completed in 1921 it was revealed to be, in reality, a monument to Virginia’s Civil War. Its
centerpiece mural, The Four Seasons of the Confederacy, illustrates a conflict that took place
solely within the Old Dominion’s borders.5
The fears of Reinhardt, Cunningham, and non-Virginian supporters of the Battle-Abbey
were not unfounded; there were in fact Virginians working to make their state and its leaders the
focal point of Confederate memory. While their narrative of the Civil War did not reflect how
the white South as a whole was remembering the war in the early postwar decades, they
produced a voluminous literature that proved influential decades later, when professional
historians began to investigate the Lost Cause and explore construction of memory in the
postwar South.
No one exerted more influence on historians of Confederate memory than Jubal Early. A
prominent architect of the Lost Cause, he remembered a war fought almost exclusively by
Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. A Virginian himself, he had risen to corps
command under Lee during the war. While public opinion forced Lee to remove him from
command in the last months of the war, Early’s admiration for his chieftan never wavered in the
succeeding years. Historian Thomas L. Connelly has judged Early “perhaps the most influential
figure in nineteenth-century Civil War writing, North or South.”6
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Celebrating Lee’s second posthumous birthday in 1872, Early gave an address at
Washington and Lee University. Although Lee’s early life and antebellum career “constituted a
worthy prelude to the exhibition, on a larger theatre, of those wonderful talents and sublime
virtues, which have gained for him the admiration and esteem of the good and true of all the
civilized world,” Early assured his audience that they would not be the focus of his speech. Nor
would he expound on the “domestic virtues, the moral worth, the unselfish patriotism and
Christian purity of General Lee’s character.” These aspects of Lee’s life, said Early, already had
their storytellers. But “few . . . have formed a really correct estimate of his marvelous ability and
boldness as a military commander.”7
Early’s speech, which Gary W. Gallagher labels “the quintessential Lost Cause statement
of Lee’s greatness,” took his audience battle by battle through the Army of Northern Virginia’s
campaigns demonstrating how the army repeatedly triumphed over Union armies superior in
numbers and equipment but inferior in leadership. In Early’s pantheon of Confederate heroes,
Stonewall Jackson was second only to Lee. “As long as unselfish patriotism, Christian devotion
and purity of character, and deeds of heroism shall command the admiration of men, Stonewall
Jackson’s name and fame will be reverenced.” When the army did fail, as at Gettysburg, Lee was
blameless. Comparing Lee to Grant was like “compar[ing] the great pyramid which rears its
majestic proportions in the valley of the Nile, to a pigmy perched on Mount Atlas.” Lee was
superior not only to Grant but to Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Gustavus
Adolphus, Marlborough, Napoleon, and even George Washington. Early did mention Albert
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Sidney Johnston, only to dismiss him by pointing out that he had died before revealing his true
capabilities as a general.8
When Early assumed the presidency of the Southern Historical Society (SHS) in 1873 he
gained a prominent platform from which to profess his version of the Confederate experience.
Established in New Orleans in 1869 by former Rebel officers to preserve the history of the
Southern nation, the SHS moved its headquarters to Richmond in 1873. There it came under the
control of Early and like-minded ex-Confederates. On August 14 of that year, when members
assembled for a meeting in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, Early gave an address
outlining the society’s mission. Many recently published histories of the war, he claimed, were
more concerned with telling good stories than with conveying historical facts. “Let it be our task
to strip the Muse of History of the tawdry vestments and meretricious ornaments by which her
real beauty has been obscured, and present her once more to the world in her proper guise, as the
patroness and guardian of truth.” Like the Jews in Babylonian captivity, he said, the South had
weathered the storm and proven its faith. It was the Confederate veterans’ duty to chronicle the
true story of the South’s experience in the Civil War.9
It quickly became clear, however, that the South as it existed in the mind of Jubal Early
was Virginia and the war was Virginia’s war. The conflict Early recounted was fought at
Manassas, Sharpsburg, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, Richmond, and Appomattox. The
Confederacy’s adversaries were George McClellan, John Pope. George Meade, and Ulysses S.
Grant; its defender was Robert E. Lee and his sword was the Army of Northern Virginia. The
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sole anecdote Early offered to prove Confederate devotion was the story of a Virginia mother
who selflessly offered to the Rebel army her son, who subsequently lost his life in battle. “He
died,” Early declared,” doing his duty as a Virginian and a Confederate soldier.” After a brief
diatribe against unspecified Confederate “traitors,” Early made his singular reference to the war
outside Virginia, assuring his audience that “we always have a glorious consolation in being able
to point to the pure and unsullied lives and records of our great leaders, Robert E. Lee, Stonewall
Jackson, and Sidney Johnston.”10
Gary Gallagher identifies five themes consistently present in Early’s voluminous writings
and speeches on the Civil War:

(1) Robert E. Lee was the best and most admirable general of the
war; (2) Confederate armies faced overwhelming odds and
mounted a gallant resistance; (3) Ulysses S. Grant paled in
comparison to Lee as a soldier; (4) Stonewall Jackson deserved a
place immediately behind Lee in the Confederate pantheon; and
(5) Virginia was the most important arena of combat.

These tenets became, for all intents and purposes, the party platform of the SHA. Given that the
society’s members were largely Virginians and veterans of Lee’s army, this is perhaps
unsurprising. Moreover, as noted by historian Richard D. Starnes, there was significant overlap
between the membership of the SHS and that of the Association of the Army of Northern
Virginia, a veterans group headed for a time by Early. Although the SHS did not produce

10

Proceedings of the Southern Historical Convention, 41-43.

182

original works of history, Starnes points out that “by collecting and reprinting historical
documents, the Society sought to reinforce its version of the Confederate memory by providing
both an argument and concrete evidence for future professional historians.”11
Second only to Early in his Old Dominion bias and his influence on future historians of
the Lost Cause was J. William Jones. Born in Virginia, Jones served as a chaplain in the Army
of Northern Virginia and at Washington and Lee University during Lee’s presidency (when it
was called Washington College). In the SHS he wielded the power of the purse and the pen as
the organization’s treasurer and editor of its journal, the Southern Historical Society Papers
(SHSP). While Early was most concerned with proclaiming the military superiority of Lee and
Jackson, Jones looked to the two primarily as moral and spiritual exemplars. He opened his 1875
Personal Reminiscences of General Robert E. Lee by declaring his intention to describe “those
beautiful traits of character which made [Lee] seem even grander in peace than in war.”12
Jones devoted much of his career to sanctifying Lee’s memory. In his article “The Inner
Life of Robert E. Lee” (1900), Jones called the general “a model man” and noted “his devotion
to duty; his modest humility, simplicity and gentleness; his spirit of self-denial for the good of
others; his firmness in carrying out his purposes, but respect for the rights and feelings of others;
his social character; his love for children, and his beautiful domestic life.” But the focus of the
article was Lee’s “Christian character.” An ardent reader of the Bible, advocate of prayer, and
observer of the Sabbath, Lee “was a humble, devout Christian who trusted in Christ as his
personal savior and tried to follow with firm tread the ‘Captain of our salvation.’” Moreover,
“his life was ‘a living epistle, known and read of men,’ and death to him was but the welcome
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messenger that the Master sent to call him to ‘come up higher,’ to lay aside his cross, and wear
his fadeless crown.”13
Jones likewise praised Lee’s most famous lieutenant, whom he admired even more as a
Christian than as a general. In the first edition of his book Christ in the Camp (1888) Jones
wrote that “in the army [Stonewall Jackson’s] piety, despite all obstacles, seemed to brighten as
the pure gold is refined by the furnace.” Thirteen years later, in a short biography of Jackson he
wrote for the Veteran, Jones noted Jackson’s “manly bearing, quiet ambition, and emphatic
expression of a purpose to succeed” and mentioned some of his military exploits, but again
focused on Jackson “the humble, devout Christian, the ‘soldier of the cross,’ . . . the deacon of
his church . . . so devoted and true, the man of humble prayer, and the diligent student of God’s
word.” It was Jackson’s “simple trust in Christ, and full confidence in the promises of God’s
Word,” said Jones, which allowed him to rise from anonymous orphan to the magnificent
Stonewall.14
Jones’s Civil War, like Early’s, was Virginia’s crusade. In 1894 the Ladies Memorial
Association in Charlottesville, Virginia, asked Jones to give a brief Memorial Day address
commemorating the common soldiers of the Confederacy. He readily accepted the invitation,
stating at the beginning of his speech that “there is never an hour of the day or night when I am
not ready to talk about the ‘unknown and unrecorded hero’ of the rank and file of the
Confederate armies.” But, he added, obliging the request for conciseness would be challenging:
“how shall I compress within a ten minutes’ speech the hallowed memories of the brave old days
of 1861-1865 which come trooping up as I stand on this spot . . . and recall the deeds of the
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patriot heroes who, often with bare and bleeding feet, in ragged jacket and with empty haversack,
bore our tattered flag on the forefront of a hundred victorious fields[?]” The address Jones then
proceeded to give, ostensibly a tribute to all Rebel soldiers, depicted a war that took place only in
the east. Davis, Lee, Jackson, Stuart, and Gordon were the leaders he eulogized, while the only
geographic locations mentioned were Richmond and the James River.15
Jones gave a similar performance two years later in Richmond at the sixth annual UCV
reunion. At this meeting, as at most of the organization’s national gatherings, there was an effort
toward ecumenicalism. For example, UCV president and former Lee lieutenant John Brown
Gordon brought the meeting to order with a gavel made of wood from the Chickamauga
battlefield. But Jones, then serving as the UCV’s chaplain-general, opened the reunion with a
prayer that reflected his personal view of the war:

Oh! God our help in the ages past, our hope for years to come. God
of Israel, God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob—God of the
centuries—God of our Fathers—God of Stonewall Jackson and
Robert Lee, and Jefferson Davis—Lord of Hosts—God of the
whole of our common country—God of our Southland—Our God!
We bring Thee the adoration of grateful hearts as we gather in our
Annual Reunion to-day.

Presumably the God he addressed was also the God of Joseph E. Johnston, John Bell Hood,
Leonidas Polk, and Nathan Bedford Forrest; but for Jones the Confederate experience was
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embodied by Lee and Jackson. Perhaps aware that his selectivity might provoke criticism outside
Virginia, at the next two reunions, held in Nashville and Atlanta, Jones added Albert Sidney
Johnston to his prayer. Nevertheless, as historian Charles Reagan Wilson shows, Jones opened
many of his postwar invocations with similar pleas—always evoking Davis, Lee, and Jackson.16
Jones, like Early, used the SHS to present the Old Dominion as the focal point of the war
and the Lost Cause. The two were joined by others. Thomas L. Connelly and Barbara Bellows
show that the organization’s executive committee was composed exclusively of Virginia
residents. Consequently, the society’s publications offered a skewed version of the war. The
SHSP, while claiming to document the breadth of the Confederate experience, proved to be, in
practice, largely a record of Civil War Virginia. In some issues of the magazine, articles on the
eastern theater outnumbered those on all of the war’s other theaters by as much as four-and-ahalf to one.17
As Gaines Foster notes, Early, Jones, and the other postwar Virginia chauvinists failed to
convert the entire white South to their gospel of Confederate memory but they exerted an
extraordinary influence on future generations of memorialists and historians. Gary Gallagher
agrees, pointing out that while the Confederate Veteran had a wider circulation it “never
approached the Southern Historical Society Papers in terms of influencing historians.” Many
recent scholarly and popular histories of the Confederate war effort, says Gallagher, “would
certainly bring a smile to Jubal Early’s lips.”18
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A survey of significant historiography confirms Foster’s and Gallagher’s arguments.
Foundational studies of Civil War memory almost invariably turn to Early, Virginia, and the
Southern Historical Society when explaining the ideology of the Lost Cause. “From the late
1860s to the late 1880s,” writes David Blight in Race and Reunion, “diehards, especially though
not exclusively in Virginia, tended to shape the Confederate memory.” Indeed, his own
discussion of the origin and evolution of the Lost Cause, despite brief forays into other states, is
largely a Virginia story. A similar research methodology underlies Caroline E. Janney’s more
recent Remembering the Civil War. She goes so far as to argue that the date of Johnston’s
surrender to Sherman was widely selected as Confederate Memorial Day because Appomattox
was too painful a memory. (A more likely explanation is provided in a 1924 history of the
holiday’s origin: in most Southern states, more flowers are in bloom later in April.) The research
for Janney’s earlier book on Ladies’ Memorial Associations and the Lost Cause is restricted to
Virginia. William Blair, in his superb study of the politics of Civil War memory, limited his
research almost exclusively to Virginia in part because “arguably the greatest heroes of the Lost
Cause, Robert E. Lee and Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson, were native sons.” Charles Reagan
Wilson, who argues for the existence of a holy trinity of Confederate heroes in Lee, Jackson, and
Jefferson Davis, states simply: “Richmond remembered. It had been the capital of the southern
Confederacy, and when the drive for independence failed, Richmond became the eternal city of
Southern dreams. It, in turn, preserved the memory of its past and catered to the activities of the
Lost Cause.” Even Gaines Foster, whose research is the most geographically inclusive, argues
that while Early and company failed to convince the majority of white Southerners their ideas
formed the nucleus of the Lost Cause myth. Simply put, if one looks solely to the SHSP, the
records of the Lee Monument Association, J. William Jones’s sermons, or Richmond newspaper

187

reports on Monument Avenue dedications when exploring Confederate memories of the war,
Lee, Jackson, and the Army of Northern Virginia will of course seem omnipresent. Such
narrowly conceived research has led to the assumption or argument that the white South justified
its Lost Cause convictions regarding the Confederate military experience by looking almost
exclusively to Virginia.19
Another reason historians have overemphasized Virginia’s supremacy in the memory of
the Confederate military experience is that, with time, it did become virtually absolute. A survey
of modern expressions of Confederate identity reveals a narrative of the Civil War with Lee,
Jackson, and the Army of Northern Virginia at its center. A case in point is the Civil War-themed
artwork that has proliferated since the mid-1980s. Artists have produced and sold thousands of
prints illustrating many of the war’s storied episodes. However, the overwhelming majority of
these depict operations in the eastern theater; Gallagher estimates that the east is nearly five
times more commonly portrayed in such artwork than all other areas of operations combined. If
illustrations of Nathan Bedford Forrest are discounted, the western theater would vanish almost
completely from this illustrated narrative of the Confederate experience. “Modern artists and the
Civil War public to which they cater,” Gallagher concludes, “clearly join Early in considering
the arena of Lee’s activities the most important of the conflict.”20
If, as this dissertation has argued, the western theater was prominent in white Southern
memory as late as the first decades of the 1900s, and if, as Gallagher and others have shown,
modern Confederate memory is dominated by the eastern theater, a question arises: what
occurred in the interim that led the virtual disappearance of the Army of Tennessee?
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A basic reason for the diminished role of the west in Confederate memory was the
gradual disappearance of the wartime generation. Time’s steady march took its toll on Civil War
veterans. In 1914 the average age of veterans convalescing in Tennessee’s numerous
Confederate soldiers’ homes was nearly eighty. Fewer than 15 percent of Civil War veterans
who survived the war were still alive in 1920; of those, only 100,000 were former Confederates
and most were over the age of seventy-five. Twelve years later, only 35,000 Rebel veterans
were still among the living. Commenting on the diminishing turnout at UCV reunions, the
Confederate Veteran lamented in 1932 that “it seems the thin gray line has reached the breaking
point and cannot be stretched further. Of the many hundreds who were wont to meet in these
State reunions hardly a ‘corporal’s guard’ can now be mustered. . . . [M]uch will have been lost
from the life of the South when their gray-clad figures are only a memory.” (Indeed, the Veteran
itself would soon be defunct.) With fewer and fewer to care for, most Confederate soldiers’
homes closed during the 1930s. By the time of Pearl Harbor, perhaps as few as a thousand Rebel
veterans lived. With the passing of the war generation, Civil War memory among white
Southerners became less focused on the military experience; those aspects thereafter most
prominent, as will be seen below, were largely related to Lee and Virginia. The torch of
Confederate memory was passed to succeeding generations that found Lee and Virginia much
more useful to their version of the Lost Cause.21
The reconciliationist turn in national Civil War memory and the Lost Cause also played a
role in Virginia’s eventual domination of the Confederate narrative. While some recent
scholarship has challenged the notion of a ubiquitous reconciliationist spirit in the postwar
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period, it is clear that such a spirit did exist to some extent and that it grew in the early 1900s.
National travails such as the Second Industrial Revolution, the Spanish-American War, and
World War I strengthened the bonds between North and South. As elements of the Lost Cause
(such as the romanticization of agrarian society) permeated Northern memory, Robert E. Lee
proved to be the Confederate figure most palatable to a national audience. A pious, gentlemanly
warrior from a vanished culture, driven by honor and sense of duty to draw his sword on
Virginia’s behalf against the Union he loved, Lee appealed to more than just ex-Confederates.
He came to be seen, in the words of Connelly, “as the supreme representative of a virtuous
society submerged by the Industrial Revolution.”22
Thus Lee evolved into a national hero. During the early 1900s, Connelly argues, “the new
Lost Cause rationale was difficult to refute because the writers who described this civilization
related it, not to the entire South, but to romantic Virginia. Virginia came to epitomize in
secession a society that fought for finer virtues.” The literature produced during this period, he
shows, both reflected and shaped the reconciliatory image of Lee. “With Robert E. Lee as its
central theme, it preached that Virginia was unlike the cotton South. Virginia (and Lee) hated
slavery and secession. Virginia (and Lee) possessed a unique love for the Union born out of
Revolutionary heritage. Thus secession was a more difficult task for Virginians . . . because they
cherished the Union more.”23
In addition to the phenomenon of reconciliation, there was a gendered and class
dimension to Virginia’s ascendance in Confederate memory. Because mourning was seen as a
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domestic matter, in the early postwar period women were the driving force behind Confederate
memorialization—specifically, middle- and upper-class women, who had the financial
wherewithal and leisure that enabled them to devote time to such activities. Subsequent
developments, including the removal of federal troops and the end of Reconstruction, allowed
veterans to take more control over the construction of Confederate memory. However, beginning
around World War I, the momentum again shifted. As the ranks of the UCV thinned, those of the
UDC expanded; in 1919 the latter organization claimed 64,000 members and by 1924 over
100,000. Whereas the UCV comprised men from all social classes, the UDC was an association
of affluent women. The UDC not only took responsibility for memorializing the Confederacy
but also for teaching younger generations of white Southerners what they needed to know about
the past. The version of history remembered and propagated by the Daughters was distinctly
different from that the wartime generation had espoused.24
As the Daughters’ control over the Lost Cause increased, Confederate memory became
more feminized and purely military aspects of the war became less central. Justifications for
secession, apologias for slavery, “moonlight and magnolias” reminiscences of the Old South,
tales of the homefront, and diatribes against the perceived injustices of Reconstruction all
assumed greater significance. Moreover, in the early twentieth century the Daughters drew
parallels between their own travails and those of their Confederate ancestors. During World War
I, for example, members of the UDC—many of whom worked for the Red Cross, sold warbonds, or provided relief for wounded soldiers in Europe—evoked the steadfast devotion of
Southern women on the Civil War homefront. And too, the Daughters became concerned about
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what they perceived as the materialism of the younger generation of Southern men and thus
sought to provide them with role models exemplifying Christianity and gentility. While
memories that validated the white South’s conviction of its own martial superiority never
vanished, they became increasingly marginalized. When the Daughters did discuss Rebel
chieftains, namely Lee, Jackson, and Davis, they highlighted their character more than their
leadership. Lee could, better than any other Confederate leader, embody the ideals of the UDC.
Prominent Confederates who had been lionized by Rebel veterans but whose character was not
up to the standards of the Daughters, such as the rough-hewn Nathan Bedford Forrest and the
profane, hard-drinking Benjamin Franklin Cheatham, now faded into obscurity. As elite
Southern women became more central to Confederate memory construction, Lee reigned
supreme.25
No figure was more influential in this evolution of the Lost Cause than Mildred Lewis
Rutherford (born 1851), whom one historian has labeled “the living embodiment of the South’s
reborn aristocratic tradition.” A niece of Thomas R. R. and Howell Cobb, Rutherford had a
distinguished Georgia pedigree. She served as the UDC historian-general from 1911 until 1916,
the organization having amended its constitution’s two-year limit on the term of that office to
honor the popular and influential Rutherford. Under her stewardship, the UDC propagated a
version of Confederate history that justified a social hierarchy and ethos that reflected the
ideology of white Southern elites. Lee’s image was especially suited to serve as figurehead of
this patrician Lost Cause, for, as biographer Emory M. Thomas points out, Lee “believed in
government by the rich, the well-born, and the able. He believed in government sufficiently
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strong enough to keep the vulgar mob in its place and to ensure its deference to its betters.”
Rutherford and like-minded Daughters embraced Lee and Virginia, with their gentrified popular
image, as avatars. In many ways, Virginia became the South and Robert E. Lee became the
Confederacy.26
Until her death in 1927 Rutherford produced voluminous literature and gave countless
speeches setting forth the feminized, patrician version of the Lost Cause. In a 1914 address
(subsequently published in pamphlet form with the title Wrongs of History Righted), she took
issue with two college professors who had asserted “that the south had never produced a great
man,” reminding her audience that the South was the “section that gave a Robert E. Lee, and a
Stonewall Jackson.” Later in the speech, noting that some young Southerners seemed to have
developed an admiration for Lincoln, she declared that “it is full time to call a halt.” This new
generation of Southern youth, she said,

must now be taught that Lincoln can never measure up to many of
our great men of the South, especially to our Robert E. Lee, a man
who in every department of life measured up to the highest
standard. Whether as son, husband, father, soldier, teacher, master,
citizen, friend, scholar, or Christian gentleman, he presented the
most rounded character found in all human history.27
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In 1919, at the UCV’s request, Rutherford devised a list of requirements for textbooks to
be allowed in Southern schools. No book was suitable for Dixie’s classrooms and libraries, she
decreed, unless it conformed to the tenets of the Lost Cause as defined by the UDC. Published
as A Measuring Rod to Test Text Books and Reference Books in Schools, Colleges, and
Libraries, it set forth a version of the Civil War that justified the Rebel cause mainly by linking it
in various ways with the noble actions and beliefs of Lee. Had secession been unconstitutional, it
quoted Lee as saying, he would not have joined the Confederacy. Lee had freed his slaves
before emancipation, thus proving that slavery was not the cause of the war. Despite great
efforts, Lee had been unable secure a prisoner exchange agreement with the Yankees, thus
absolving the South of all guilt associated with the suffering of Union soldiers at Andersonville
and other Southern prison camps. While Union leaders had encouraged their troops to plunder
and pillage the Southern countryside, Lee had forbidden his soldiers to do so in Pennsylvania.28
Aside from crusading for the use of Lost Cause-themed textbooks, the UDC saw to it that
Lee’s image had a physical presence in Southern (and some Northern) classrooms. In 1907, UDC
president Lizzie George Henderson published an article in the Confederate Veteran telling of a
letter from a veteran urging the Daughters to place a portrait of Lee (alongside one of
Washington) in as many classrooms as possible. The merits of such a proposal, Henderson said,
were undeniable:

Do we not owe everything we can do, to honor him and to inspire
our children to a like life, to the coming generations of that country
for which he gave himself, even were it merely of the fact that he
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made it possible for the mothers of the South to point to him with
pride as the ideal Christian Southern gentleman of the old school
as we tell the children of the South how he gave himself and all he
had for the South and her rights?

Historian Karen L. Cox estimates that the UDC subsequently distributed thousands of Lee
portraits across the country. “Putting a face with a name such as Robert E. Lee, whose life
example children were taught to emulate,” she argues, “was an effective way for the Daughters
to achieve their goal of instilling respect and reverence for the Confederate past.”29
The Lee image cultivated by Early, Jones, and the UDC continued to appeal to the
America of the 1930s and 1940s. Nowhere was the supremacy of Lee and Virginia during this
period more vividly illustrated than in the career of Virginia journalist and historian Douglas
Southall Freeman. A son of one of Lee’s veterans, Freeman earned a Ph.D. in history from
Johns Hopkins University before becoming editor of the Richmond News Leader. Between 1915
and 1944 he published widely-read books on Lee and gave numerous radio addresses and
speeches in which he attested to the general’s greatness as a military leader and as a moral
example to a nation going through the Great Depression and two world wars. Even before
embarking on his professional career, Freeman had expressed a Lee-centric conception of
Southern history. “Surely if there is an ideal in the Old South it is Lee,” he said to his mother in
1907, “he stands for all that was best and brightest there.” For the remainder of his life, Freeman
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did all in his power to see that the narrative of the Confederate experience remained centered on
Lee and his army.30
In 1915 he published Lee’s Dispatches, a collection of the general’s correspondence with
Jefferson Davis. Enough time had passed since the war, Freeman told his readers, that an
objective analysis of Lee could be rendered: “the careless overstatements of partisans have given
place to the cool analysis of impartial investigators.” Nevertheless, the Lee whom Freeman
portrayed was remarkably similar to the one portrayed in Jones’s sermons, the pages of the
SHSP, and the pronouncements of the UDC. Scholar Keith D. Dickson argues that in setting
forth Lee’s own words, “Freeman could confirm that Lee was endowed with all the qualities of
physical and moral courage, character, intellect, faith, self-mastery, judgment, tact, and
discretion that legend had bestowed upon him” and furthermore he could use Lee to “enhance
the character of the people of the modern South.”31
White Southerners proved receptive to Freeman’s crusade. Impressed by the popularity
of Lee’s Dispatches, Charles Scribner’s Sons contracted with Freeman for a seventy-five
thousand-word Lee biography. Consumed with passion for his subject, Freeman spent nearly
two decades researching and writing what became four volumes of over a million words, the
Pulitzer Prize winning biography, R. E. Lee. It is a masterful hagiography written as if the ghosts
of Jubal Early, J. William Jones, and Mildred Lewis Rutherford had been whispering in
Freeman’s ear. Like Early and Jones, Freeman argued that Lee was pure of character and
unfailingly brilliant as a general. And like Rutherford, Freeman portrayed Lee as the ideal
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Southerner, a pious gentleman of Revolutionary stock. (It is worth noting that Freeman soon
began working on an even longer biography of George Washington.)32
R. E. Lee was a great critical and popular success. By 1948 thirty-five thousand sets had
been sold—nearly nine times the publisher’s projection. Despite his intention to move on to his
Washington biography, Freeman devoted the next several years of his life to studying the Army
of Northern Virginia’s high command. This culminated in the three-volume Lee’s Lieutenants:
A Study in Command (1942-43), which proved to be his most popular work. Keith Dickson sums
up Freeman’s powerful impact on Civil War memory by noting that his professional bona fides
and his skills as a biographer “allowed him to create works of history and memory that enabled
southerners to merge their identities with Lee, the Army of Northern Virginia, and the people of
the wartime South.”33
Robert E. Lee was always the Confederacy’s most popular hero. He was not, however,
always the embodiment of the Rebel cause nor was his army always the embodiment of the
Confederate war effort. As this dissertation has shown, the Army of Tennessee was prominent in
white Southern memory for decades after the war. But the passing of the wartime generation,
sectional reconciliation, and the ascendance of the United Daughters of the Confederacy led to
the eventual triumph of a Confederate memory centered on Lee and Virginia—a memory that
misleads professional historians even today.
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Conclusion:
“That other Immortal Army”

On March 27, 1900, George Moorman, the adjutant general and chief of staff of the
United Confederate Veterans and a former Rebel officer, issued general orders calling on
members to pay respects to “the Old Wearers of the Gray [who] are fast passing away.”
Veterans of every theater of the war, the recently departed were men of “remarkable
achievements,” “intrepid courage,” “military fame,” “great heart,” “humble surroundings,”
“honor,” “kingly majesty,” and “republican simplicity.” One of those lately lost was Louis
Arnauld, an artilleryman who had fought in the western theater. Moorman said of Arnauld:

His name is inscribed upon, and will be forever borne upon the
Roll of Honor of that other Immortal Army, which so long carried
the fortunes of the South upon the point of its glittering bayonets,
and only succumbed when worn out by attrition, and decimated in
the white heat of battle—the Army of Tennessee—and will be
handed down the streams of time linked indissolubly with the story
of the undying achievements of Albert Sidney Johnston,
Beauregard, Bragg, Hood, Stephen D. Lee, Bedford Forrest,
Leonidas Polk, Jos[eph] Wheeler and Jos[eph] E. Johnston.1

“That other Immortal Army” and its “undying achievements” loomed large in the minds
of the men and women of the wartime generation. When offering evidence of their martial,
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spiritual, and masculine superiority over the enemy, former Confederates did not look only to
Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. But they faced a challenge in reconciling the
memory of the Army of Tennessee with their Lost Cause convictions. The historical record of
that army was in many ways at odds with what they wanted to believe. They achieved the
necessary reconciliation of fact and faith by fragmenting their memory of the army.
The historical Army of Tennessee was plagued by discipline problems and had a higher
rate of venereal disease than any other Rebel army; at one point its chaplains, convinced that
their cause was hopeless, considered resigning in mass. Yet, in memory it was a model of piety
and dutifulness, claiming the “Fighting Bishop” Leonidas Polk as one of its corps commanders,
Sam Davis as one of its privates, and the Dalton revival as one of its formative experiences.
Moreover, the army lost nearly every engagement it fought in and its high command was full of
incapable and egotistical generals; its wartime exploits could hardly be cited as evidence of
Confederate martial superiority. Yet it was remembered as the army that triumphed at
Chickamauga—supposedly one of the most climactic struggles in modern warfare—and counted
brilliant, modest generals like Patrick Cleburne and Alexander P. Stewart among its division
commanders and the dauntless Orphan Brigade among its units. In a culture that equated martial
prowess with manliness, the army’s wartime record could be seen as shameful and emasculating.
But in memory the army’s soldiers charged fearlessly into annihilation at Franklin and its high
command included Nathan Bedford Forrest and Benjamin Franklin Cheatham, officers who
fought, drank, or swore their way into the ranks of manhood. Moreover, the remembered army
could lay claim to one of the war’s great contingencies—the death of Albert Sidney Johnston at
the Battle of Shiloh. Like the mortal wounding of Stonewall Jackson, this sudden, random turn of
events was seized on by a generation trying to explain the South’s defeat in the war, both to itself
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and its children. In memory, the Army of Tennessee was greater than the sum of its historical
parts.
Scholars of memory construction in the postwar South have focused narrowly on Robert
E. Lee and Virginia and given short shrift to the western theater, assuming that that is how
postwar Southerners themselves remembered the war. This dissertation has shown that that
assumption is false and that these scholars have overlooked a key dimension of the Lost Cause
myth and a significant way in which former Confederates coped with the trauma of defeat. Of
course, as explained in the last chapter, as the twentieth century progressed and the torch of Civil
War memory changed hands white Southerners expressing Confederate identity did become
increasingly focused on Lee and the Old Dominion. But this was a gradual process. In the late
nineteenth and into the twentieth century white Southerners grasped something akin to what
modern military historians have finally come to see—that the Civil War cannot be understood by
looking only at Virginia.
Whether they looked to Virginia or elsewhere in the former Confederacy, ex-Rebels
refused to allow defeat in the Civil War to overturn their cultural convictions. While militarily
the Army of Northern Virginia was the only consistently capable force the South fielded in the
Civil War, it was not the only army whose memory could be put to use. Instead of remembering
four years of defeats in the western theater, former Confederates created an incomplete mosaic,
each tile a carefully selected leader, soldier, unit, or event. Thus the memory of the Army of
Tennessee existed in fragments. It could not be made whole, lest it give the lie to the myth of the
Lost Cause.
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